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Abstract 
Managing quality and safety is critical in highly regulated industries because failing to do 
so can lead to serious negative consequences. One way to improve quality and safety is enhancing 
organizational focus, emphasis on a specific set of actions. To study various contexts of focus, I 
select three settings in highly regulated industries: acute-care hospitals, nursing homes, and oil 
pipeline operators. 
First, I study internally driven focus as disproportionate emphasis on a medical specialty 
in acute-care hospitals. I examine the effect of focus strategy and its combined effects with patient 
experience practices, on quality performance measured as readmission rates and patient satisfaction. 
Using secondary data from 3,027 hospitals, I find that focus has undesirable effects on both 
measures. However, patient experience mitigates the negative influence of focus on readmission 
rates. I also find that an imbalance between focus and patient experience results in poor 
performance. There is no single magic bullet to improve the two performance measures. 
Second, I study externally driven change in attentional focus where recurring visits are 
unannounced while initial visits are announced in advance at nursing homes. Drawing on the 
attention-based view, I examine the effects of announced and unannounced inspections on the 
immediate and sustained quality performance. Using a dataset from accredited nursing homes, I 
show that unannounced inspection visits lead to a more sustained increase in quality performance 
than announced visits. Thus, announcing the inspection in advance results in short-term gains but 
long-term disadvantages. 
 Finally, I study externally driven focus on a safety management program in oil 
transportation. The program requires pipeline operators to prioritize their resources to reduce 
incidents in high consequence areas (HCAs). I examine the effects of pipeline system complexity 
and the learning experience with the program, on safety performance measured as future incident 
cost. Using a panel dataset of 642 pipeline operators, I find that complexity increases the cost but 
organizational learning reduces it. Interestingly, complexity heightens the negative relationship 
between the experience and future incident cost. The program is fruitful for incidents in high 
consequence areas (HCAs), but not in non-HCAs, which substantiates the intent of the program. 
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Chapter 1  
Dissertation Overview  
 
Operations management scholars and practitioners frequently deal with quality and safety 
problems and consider them as top priorities (Ball et al., 2017; Das et al., 2008; Dean & Bowen, 
1994; Flynn et al., 1994; Hendricks & Singhal, 2001; Sousa & Voss, 2002; Su & Linderman, 2016; 
Zhang & Xia, 2013). However, managing quality and safety is more critical in highly regulated 
industries because failing to do so can lead to serious negative repercussions, such as injuries, 
fatalities, property loss, and environmental damage (TRB & NASEM, 2017). For instance, a single 
incident (e.g., the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the Kalamazoo River oil spill, Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear disaster) costed more than several billion dollars. Highly regulated industries are the 
industries that have a greater number of restrictions in federal regulations. According to the 
McLaughlin-Sherouse list, heavily regulated industries such as the healthcare, oil and gas, and air 
and water transportation industries, contain more than 10,000 restrictions in federal regulations, 
which are more than ten times greater than the overall mean (Al-Ubaydli & McLaughlin, 2014).   
One way to improve quality and safety in highly regulated industries is through enhancing 
organizational focus, emphasis on a specific set of actions or activities (McDermott & Stock, 2011). 
The central tenet underlying focus approach revolves more efficient and effective use of resources, 
which facilitates improved quality and safety performance. The benefits of focus have been 
demonstrated in diverse contexts in highly regulated industries such as airlines and healthcare 
industries (Clark & Huckman, 2012; Huckman & Zinner, 2008; Hyer et al., 2009; KC & Terwiesch, 
2011; McDermott & Stock, 2011; Tsikriktsis, 2007). Although the literature on focus approach has 
grown significantly in several decades, previous studies take for granted that organizational focus 
is internally driven. Therefore, an important question remains open whether externally driven focus 
also improve quality and safety performance. To fill this research gap, my dissertation, Essays on 
Improving Quality and Safety in Highly Regulated Industries, explores focus that are internally and 
externally driven. To study two aspects of focus, I select three settings in highly regulated industries: 
acute-care hospitals, nursing homes, and oil and gas pipeline operators in the United States. 
Specifically, I explore 1) internally driven disproportionate emphasis (focus) on a medical specialty 
in acute-care hospitals, 2) externally driven attentional focus on inspection visits in nursing homes, 
and 3) externally driven focus on high consequence areas in a safety management program of 
pipeline operators.  
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In chapter two, “The Dark Side of Focus: Is Patient Experience the Cure,” I study 
internally driven focus as disproportionate emphasis on a medical specialty in acute-care hospitals, 
and its effect on quality performance. In addition to focus approach, which conserves resources via 
disproportionate emphasis, I consider another improvement approach, patient experience practice, 
which expends resources to provide positive patient experiences. Because both approaches put 
conflicting demands on hospital management, I address the following question in this chapter: how 
do hospitals’ execution of focus strategy and patient experience practices affect their performance? 
These dual goals pose a considerable challenge for hospital administrators because pursuing focus 
rests on variation reduction, while improving patient experience increases variation in delivery 
processes.  
 To study these questions, I examine both direct and indirect effects of focus approach and 
patient experience practices on quality performance measured as readmission rates and patient 
satisfaction. Specifically, I model indirect effects in two ways: One, “moderation” to evaluate the 
combined effects of the two approaches, and two, “matching” to examine the impact of the 
imbalance between them. Using secondary data from 3,027 hospitals over six years and 
econometric analyses, I find that focus and patient experience have opposing direct effects on both 
the performance measures. Focus has undesirable effects on performance that it predicts an increase 
in readmission rates and a reduction in patient satisfaction, which are negative outcomes from 
management and patient perspectives. In contrast, patient experience predicts a reduction in 
readmission and an improvement in patient satisfaction, which are positive and desirable outcomes. 
However, I also find that interesting results from indirect effects. First, the joint effect of focus and 
patient experience reduces readmission rates. Second, an imbalance between focus and patient 
experience results in poor performance, particularly when hospitals emphasize focus over patient 
experience. As a set, this chapter highlights the challenges of hospital administrators that would 
pursue multiple objectives. Focus approach may not work effective in certain context and there is 
no single magic bullet to improve the two performance measures.  
Supply chain partners, regulatory and accrediting agencies often rely on inspections to help 
manage quality and safety. Two dominant strategies related to inspections are announcing the 
inspection visit in advance or making an unannounced visit with little advance notification. In 
chapter three, “Does Announcing the Visit Matter? An Empirical Examination in US Nursing 
Homes,” I study externally driven change in attentional focus on inspection visits in nursing homes 
when recurring visits are unannounced while an initial visit is announced in advance. In this context, 
this study addresses the following question: Do announced and unannounced inspections lead to an 
immediate and/or a sustained increase in overall quality performance? The attention-based view of 
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the firm provides theoretical grounding to investigate this question by understanding the differing 
roles of the two inspections strategies. The theory implies that what firms do depends on what they 
focus their attention on (Ocasio, 1997; Shepherd et al., 2017). Drawing on this theory, I argue that 
announced inspection results in transient attention to the inspection standards while unannounced 
inspection results in sustained attention.  
To answer this question, I examine the contrasting effects of the two inspections on quality 
performance using a four-year panel dataset on over 300 accredited nursing homes and difference-
in-difference relative time-models. I find that both types of inspection visits increase quality 
performance. However, unannounced inspection visits lead to a more sustained increase in quality 
performance when compared to the announced visits. Thus, announcing the inspection in advance 
lead to short-term gains but results in long-term disadvantages. To the best of my knowledge, this 
is the first empirical research to investigate the sustained effect of announced and unannounced 
inspections on operational performance. Thus, the results have important implications to supply 
chain partners and inspection agencies, who need to choose between announced and unannounced 
inspections. Specifically, unannounced inspections are more effective where high sustained quality 
performance is critically important, such as healthcare organizations.  
In chapter four, “Organizational Learning, Complexity, and Safety Management 
Performance: Evidence from the Oil and Gas Transportation,” I study externally driven focus of 
a safety management program that pipeline operators are required to prioritize their resources to 
reduce spill events in high consequence areas (HCAs). Pipeline operators should focus on HCAs 
because most damages were in HCAs when pipeline incidents occurred (Kowalewski, 2013). In 
this study, I address the following questions: 1) What is the relationship between complexity and 
pipeline safety performance, 2) What is the relationship between organizational learning through 
an HCA-focused program and pipeline safety performance, and 3) When does organizational 
learning become more effective? 
 To study these questions, I examine whether complexity of the pipeline system and 
learning experience from the program have impacts on subsequent incident cost. I also explore the 
moderating role of complexity on the relationship between learning experience and subsequent 
incident cost. Using a fourteen-year panel dataset of 642 pipeline operators and employing multiple 
econometric models, I find that while pipeline complexity increases subsequent incident cost, the 
experience with the safety management program reduces it. More interestingly, complexity 
heightens the negative relationship between the experience with the program and future incident 
cost. The results also show that learning experience reduces future incident costs in HCAs but not 
in non-HCAs, substantiating the intent of the program. As a set, I highlight the effectiveness of 
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using an externally mandated, but internally developed safety management programs in oil and gas 
transportation. This study contributes to organizational learning literature, especially in highly 
regulated industries with high-hazard. The findings are also of practical importance to both pipeline 
operators and federal regulators. 
Taken together, the three essays of my dissertation provide a deeper understanding of 
improving quality and safety in highly regulated industries through the lens of focus. I demonstrate 
that internally driven focus may not improve quality performance when pursuing multiple 
objectives and that externally driven focus improves quality and safety performance in highly 
regulated industries.  
 
Table 1.1  Dissertation Overview 
Essay Research Questions (Focus) Industry 
Key (Independent; Dependent) 
Variables 
1 
Do focus and patient experience have 
combined effects on quality performance? 
(Focus as disproportionate emphasis)† 
Hospitals 
Focus and Patient Experience;  
Quality 
2 
Does announcing the inspection visit 
influence quality performance? 
(Attentional focus on inspections)‡ 
Nursing 
Homes 
Inspection Announcement; 
Quality 
3 
Do organizations learn from safety 
management program?  
(Focus on high consequence areas)‡ 
Oil-Gas 
Pipelines 
Safety Management Program;  
Safety 
†: internally driven focus;  ‡: externally driven focus  
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Chapter 2  
The Dark Side of Focus: Is Patient Experience the Cure? 
 
2.1   Introduction 
 
Hospitals are under tremendous pressure to concurrently improve measures of clinical 
performance, such as readmission and mortality rates, as well as measures of patient satisfaction. 
Both types of outcomes have acquired added significance for hospital administrators in recent years 
because of new legislative and reimbursement policies. For instance, the Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services (CMS) monitors hospitals and provides incentives for improving both types of 
performance through various initiatives, including the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) 
Program and the Hospital Readmission Reduction Program (HRRP). However, improving both 
measures of performance simultaneously can put hospital administrators in a bind because the two 
measures require different approaches.  
To improve clinical performance, such as readmission and mortality rates, hospitals 
frequently emphasize conformance initiatives and adopt standardized clinical protocols and 
administrative practices to reduce rework and waste, among other approaches (Cook et al., 2014; 
Senot et al., 2016b). One of these “variance-reduction” approaches is adopting a “focus” strategy, 
which emphasizes growing specific healthcare specialties such as cardiology and hip replacement. 
The focus strategy has been shown to improve clinical and cost performance (Lee et al., 2015; 
McDermott & Stock, 2011). Such management decisions of where and how much to focus are 
mostly discretionary and illustrate how the organization rationalizes and allocates its resources.  
Regulatory agencies also influence hospitals to implement practices aimed towards 
improving overall patient satisfaction through financial incentives, penalties and regulatory policies. 
Such tactical initiatives require and consume hospital resources, and may increase variance in 
delivery processes. For instance, creating a positive patient experience may require “amenities of 
care” (Donabedian, 1988) such as quietness and cleanliness, as well as time-consuming interaction 
between hospital caregivers and patients (Chandrasekaran et al., 2012; Donabedian, 1988; Senot et 
al., 2016b; Westbrook et al., 2014). Hospitals may incur significant staffing and training costs to 
allow caregivers to spend extra time with patients to determine and fulfill their specific needs (Senot 
et al., 2016b). Interestingly, the core of the VBP Program (CMS, 2014) is the Patient Experience 
of Care initiative, a reimbursement policy requiring hospitals to show acceptable performance on 
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patient experience measures. Failure to show acceptable performance, by demonstrating a 
hospital’s improvement over time and in comparison to other hospitals, can result in penalties. 
Improving these two distinct outcomes (i.e. clinical performance and overall patient 
satisfaction) by pursuing two improvement approaches - via focus and patient experience - puts 
conflicting demands on hospital management: conserving resources via disproportionate emphasis 
on a medical specialty versus expending resources to provide positive patient experiences. These 
dual goals also pose a considerable challenge for hospital administrators because pursuing focus 
rests on variation reduction, while improving patient experience increases variation in delivery 
processes. Our extensive review of the related literature shows that both focus, a “variation-
reduction strategy,” and patient experience, based on “variation-increasing tactics,” have been 
studied extensively. However, none of the existing studies have examined them together, nor do 
they assess their individual or combined impact on these two distinct performance outcomes – 
clinical performance and overall patient satisfaction. Our study addresses this gap and inquires: 
how does a hospital’s execution of a focus strategy and patient experience practices, two potentially 
conflicting approaches, impact its performance? 
Following previous research, we measure focus as a disproportionate emphasis on a 
medical specialty (KC & Terwiesch, 2011; McDermott & Stock, 2011). We select the cardiology 
specialty as our setting for focus because it has been studied extensively, accounts for a significant 
proportion of hospital revenues and patient volume, and its effects on performance are fairly well 
understood (Ding, 2015; McDermott & Stock, 2011). Similar to previous studies, we conceptualize 
patient experience as patient perception of care, and use HCAHPS data to measure it (Donabedian, 
1988; Nair et al., 2013; Senot et al., 2016b). We measure hospital performance as readmission rates 
and overall patient satisfaction, both of which have been broadly used in previous literature 
(Boulding et al., 2011; Cook et al., 2014; Ding, 2015; Marley et al., 2004). In this study, we examine 
both the direct and indirect effects of focus and patient experience on readmission and overall 
patient satisfaction. We model indirect effects in two ways. First, we use “moderation” to evaluate 
the combined effects of the two approaches. Second, we use “matching” to examine the impact of 
the imbalance between them.  
We address our research question using data compiled from multiple secondary sources for 
3,027 U.S. hospitals over a 6-year period. We test our hypotheses using seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR) analyses. Our results show that focus and patient experience have opposing direct 
effects on the two measures of performance. Focus predicts an increase in the readmission rates 
and a reduction in patient satisfaction, i.e. negative outcomes from management and patient 
perspectives. In contrast, patient experience predicts a reduction in readmission and an 
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improvement in patient satisfaction, i.e. positive and desirable outcomes. The indirect effects are 
more nuanced, but equally interesting. First, we find that the joint effect of focus and patient 
experience reduces the readmission rates but has no significant impact on patient satisfaction. 
Second, an imbalance between focus and patient experience increases readmission and decreases 
patient satisfaction, both undesirable outcomes from management and patient perspectives. We 
conduct robustness checks to substantiate these results and post hoc analyses to explore these 
relationships. In doing so, we find that the undesirable influence of focus on readmission and patient 
satisfaction is greater for hospitals with higher bed occupancy rates and teaching responsibilities; 
we find no such dependence for patient experience. Our investigation into imbalance effects shows 
that its negative effects on performance are exacerbated when a hospital emphasizes the focus 
strategy more than patient experience practices. As a set, our results highlight the challenges 
hospital administrators face in pursuing multiple objectives. We show that while there is no single 
magic bullet to improve both clinical performance and patient satisfaction, a balanced approach 
can be effective for achieving multiple objectives. 
 
2.2   Literature Review, Theoretical Grounding and Hypotheses 
 
There are numerous studies examining hospital performance (Andritsos & Tang, 2014; 
Bechel et al., 2000; Hyer et al., 2009; KC & Terwiesch, 2011; Marley et al., 2004; McDermott & 
Stock, 2011; Nair et al., 2013; Senot et al., 2016b). However, it is difficult to compare their results 
because they vary greatly in their independent and dependent variables. Therefore, to understand 
the current state of knowledge and draw useful insights, we concentrate our literature review on the 
healthcare delivery context related to: 1) focus; 2) patient experience; and 3) performance measures. 
We summarize the most relevant studies in Table 2.1. Although these studies differ in terminology, 
measures of performance, and the unit of analysis, they allow us to make a few overarching 
observations about this literature. First, a majority of studies are conducted in the cardiology setting. 
Second, while focus is measured in a variety of ways, the most common measure is “case focus” 
(defined as “cardiology cases as a proportion of total cases”). Third, performance measures are 
most frequently either cost-related (e.g., length of stay, cost per day, cost per admission) or 
mortality, while readmission rates and patient satisfaction are included less frequently.  
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Table 2.1  Research on Focus in the Healthcare Sector 
Article Research Question 
Measure of focus 
(Unit of analysis)a 
Dependent 
Variables 
Control 
Variables 
Results 
   Hb Pb    
Lee et al. 
(2015) 
Effect of focus and vol on 
outcome  
(135 Hospital): Heart disease 
Patients / Total Patients 
 
X  
Risk adjusted 
mortality 
Pat-Hosp 
Characteristics; 
Pat. Vol  
- Focus reduces mortality.  
- Volume is not. 
Ding (2015) Effects of focus and 
quality improvement 
initiatives on clinical 
quality 
(210 Hospital): Cardiology 
Procedures / Total Procedures; 
(Department): Heart attack 
Procedures / Cardiology Procedures 
X  
Risk adjusted 
mortality; 
Risk adjusted 
readmission; 
Process care 
Hosp. 
Characteristics; 
Procedure 
Volume 
- Department focus improves 
mortality but not readmission;  
- Hosp focus does not impact 
performance. 
Andritsos & 
Tang (2014) 
Moderating effect of 
focus on process quality 
and resource use 
(1298 Patients, Operating Unit): 
Concentration of Cardiac Patients 
across all different conditions   X 
Resource usage;  
Length of stay 
Hosp. 
Characteristics 
Resource usage reduction on 
process quality is higher for low 
focus than greater focus hospitals. 
Cook et al. 
(2014) 
Adopting a focus factory 
model within a solution 
shop 
(Treatment): Focused-factory 
adoption    
Length of Stay;  
Mortality; Cost; 
Readmission 
Pat. 
Characteristics 
- Focus reduces resource use & cost; 
no improvement in clinical 
outcome. 
Ding (2014) Effects of focus, 
experience, & ownership 
on productive efficiency 
(3700 Hospital): Concentration of 
clinical area across all areas 
X  
Operating cost Hosp. 
Characteristics; 
Labor cost; 
Legislation 
- Focus & experience improve 
productive efficiency. 
Clark & 
Huckman 
(2012) 
Impact of focus on 
mortality 
(382 Hospital): Cardiovascular 
Patients / Total Patients X  
Risk adjusted 
mortality 
Hosp. 
Characteristics; 
Pat. Volume 
Focus reduces mortality. 
KC & 
Terwiesch 
(2011) 
Effect of focus (at three 
levels) on operational 
performance 
(Hosp.): Cardiac Pat. / Total Pat.; 
(Operating Unit): Revascular Pat. / 
Cardiac Pat.; 
(Process): CABG Pat. / Revascular 
Pat. 
X X 
Risk adjusted 
mortality; Risk 
adjusted length of 
stay 
Pat-Hosp 
Characteristics; 
Total Pat., 
Cardiac Pat. 
Volume 
- At hosp. level, focus lowers 
mortality & LOS, but effect is not 
significant with IV estimation; 
- At operating unit level, focus 
lowers LOS even with IV 
estimation. 
McDermott 
& Stock 
(2011) 
Effect of focus on cost 
performance  
 
(Cardiology; NY Hospitals):  
Cardiac Cases / Total cases; 
Cardiac Pat-days / Total Pat-days;  
Coronary Care Beds / Total Beds 
X  
Total cost;  
Cost per day  
Pat-Hosp 
Characteristics 
All three measures of focus reduce 
both measures of cost 
a: Unit of analysis in parenthesis; b: H – Hospital level, P – Patient level
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Next, we review the individual and joint effects of focus and patient experience on 
performance. In studies related to focus, we find that, in general, greater focus reduces most 
measures of cost (Cook et al., 2014; McDermott & Stock, 2011). However, its impact on 
readmission rates is not significant (Ding, 2015), and the evidence of its impact on mortality is 
mixed. Some studies identify no significant impact of focus on mortality (KC & Terwiesch, 2011), 
while others show that it reduces mortality (Clark & Huckman, 2012; Lee et al., 2015). We find no 
studies linking focus with patient satisfaction. In terms of patient experience, there are only a 
handful of studies examining its performance impact. Senot et al. (2016b) show that patient 
experience, measured as experiential quality, reduces readmission rates. While the relationship 
between patient experience and patient satisfaction is logical and should be widespread, 
Chandrasekaran et al. (2012) suggest that the effect is neither universal nor strong. It is noteworthy 
to point that we do not find any studies, which examine the impact of both focus and patient 
experience on readmission rates and patient satisfaction, as we do in the current study.  
 
Focus 
There is unambiguous evidence that focus is associated with improved performance in both 
manufacturing and service settings. For instance, in manufacturing, focus is associated with higher 
productivity (Brush & Karnani, 1996) and higher firm market value (Wernerfelt & Montgomery, 
1988). In services, the performance benefits of focus have been demonstrated in diverse contexts 
such as airlines (Tsikriktsis, 2007), banking (Staats & Gino, 2012), and healthcare (Clark & 
Huckman, 2012; Huckman & Zinner, 2008; Hyer et al., 2009; KC & Terwiesch, 2011; McDermott 
& Stock, 2011). Researchers argue that performance is improved because focusing on a narrow 
range of consistent and related tasks allows firms to use limited organizational resources more 
effectively. Additionally, by emphasizing work (customers) of a particular type, firms develop 
greater expertise in the associated tasks, and thus, appropriate advantages due to learning effects.  
The central tenet underlying each of the above mechanisms revolves around variance-
reduction and more efficient use of resources, which facilitate improved performance. These same 
mechanisms apply in the healthcare context. Focusing on a particular set of clinical conditions 
reduces variation among patients, and permits nurses and doctors to more readily apply their 
expertise and experience, making it easier to coordinate activities and communicate relevant 
information (Shortell et al., 1994). Increased coordination and communication, along with greater 
learning gained from focusing on high-volume conditions, should result in immediate improvement 
in clinical performance and lower future failure rates, such as readmission. Since high readmission 
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rates signal poor clinical quality, lower readmission rates is considered good performance.  Thus, 
we posit that:   
 
Hypothesis 1a. Focus is negatively associated with (i.e. reduces) readmission rates. 
 
Emphasizing a particular line of service or a narrow set of conditions implies that a hospital 
is likely to dedicate resources (such as equipment and space) into focal areas by redirecting them 
from other areas, perhaps to the detriment of the non-focal areas. Thus, while the increased learning 
and expertise gained from focus may medically benefit patients in the focal area, the emphasis on 
variance reduction is at odds with patient experience. This could result in lower overall satisfaction 
for the patients in the entire hospital. This dynamic is likely to be more accentuated in an acute care 
hospital setting, with a more diverse patient population compared to a specialty hospital. Thus, we 
propose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1b. Focus is negatively associated with (i.e. reduces) overall patient 
satisfaction.  
 
Patient Experience 
In recent years, patient experience has attracted considerable attention from practitioners. 
For instance, a report by the Institute of Medicine (IOM 2001, 2009), highlights the importance of 
patient experience as one of the key elements of high-quality care. In the same vein, the Agency 
for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) and CMS regularly survey patients on their hospital 
experience (IOM 2009) 
Despite its salience, patient experience has not been well investigated in the management 
literature. A few noteworthy exceptions include Chandrasekaran et al. (2012), Nair et al. (2013), 
and Senot et al. (2016a, 2016b), each invoking patient experience in their conceptualization of 
experiential quality. The two concepts are closely related; while similarities between them abound, 
the differences are fine-grained and nuanced. For instance, patient experience entails both 
humanistic factors such as how services are delivered to the patient, and mechanistic factors such 
as the physical settings where services are provided (Donabedian, 1988). In contrast, experiential 
quality focuses on the humanistic aspects of caregiver-patient interactions, such as interpersonal 
communication and the speed of addressing patient needs (Chandrasekaran et al., 2012; Senot et 
al., 2016a, 2016b). Nevertheless, both patient experience and experiential quality center on 
incorporating and responding to unique patient needs. This enhanced attention to patients should 
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result in identifying and resolving clinical issues as they occur during the delivery of care, reducing 
future readmission as well as enhancing overall patient satisfaction. Existing empirical evidence, 
albeit limited, supports these relationships. For instance, a positive patient experience is shown to 
reduce average length of stay and readmission rates (Boulding et al., 2011; Nair et al., 2013; Senot 
et al., 2016b). Given the evidence, we expect: 
 
Hypothesis 2a. Patient experience is negatively associated with (i.e. reduces) readmission 
rates. 
   
Hypothesis 2b. Patient experience is positively associated with (i.e. increases) overall 
patient satisfaction. 
 
Indirect Effects 
In hypothesizing the direct relationships between focus, patient experience, and the two 
measures of performance, we posit that focus helps reduce variance and employ resources more 
efficiently, whereas improving patient experience induces variances which may require firms to 
expend resources. Undoubtedly, management is faced with tough choices in their effort to balance 
these two approaches. In such cases, management can either pursue both approaches in the hopes 
of amplifying their individual effects or mitigating the negative effects of one with the other. In 
contrast, management may favor one approach over the other. Organizational theorists have 
popularized these two perspectives under the general umbrella of “fit,” and specifically refer to 
them as “moderation” and “matching” (Venkatraman, 1989). Following this conceptualization, we 
analyze the indirect effects of focus and patient experience as moderation and matching in this 
study. The moderation perspective implies that the predictor (independent variable) and the 
moderator (second independent variable) jointly determine the impact on the criterion (dependent) 
variable (Venkatraman, 1989). In contrast, the matching perspective is invoked when researchers 
suggest that a balance (or imbalance) between two variables impacts performance. In the section 
below, we describe how these apply in our particular context.   
 
Indirect Effects as Moderation  
We previously argue that both focus and patient experience individually result in lower 
readmission rates. If hospital management pursues both approaches simultaneously, their combined 
effects may have a different or greater effect than either of them individually. When hospitals 
emphasize one specialty relative to others, they are able to underscore a narrower, cohesive set of 
tasks. This allows them to appropriate greater learning about the medical condition as well as to 
12 
 
identify more and better improvement opportunities in the care delivery process. In a focused 
setting, experienced professionals can tailor their actions to meet the needs of the patients within 
that focused set. Thus, communication between providers and patients can be more targeted and 
instructions more specific, resulting in better understanding by patients at discharge, greater 
adherence to instructions, and thus, lower future readmission rates. The physical environment of a 
focal area can also reduce readmission rates: Cleaner rooms improve hygiene and prevent hospital-
acquired infections, and quieter rooms promote healing (Banerjee, 2017). Together, focus and 
patient experience are likely to have a greater effect in reducing readmission rates than their 
individual effects, resulting in the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3. Focus and patient experience have a negative (improvement) joint 
effect on readmission rates. 
 
In predicting overall patient satisfaction above, we hypothesized that it is negatively 
associated with focus in H1b, and positively associated with patient experience in H2b. Thus, on 
the one hand, enhancing patient experience may impact patient satisfaction in the entire hospital, 
and its positive effect may help overcome the negative effect of focus. On the other hand, patient 
experience may not be sufficiently strong to compensate for the negative effect of focus on overall 
patient satisfaction. In light of the ambiguous theoretical arguments, we believe that, together, 
patient experience and focus are likely to have a net positive effect on overall patient satisfaction. 
 
Hypothesis 4. Focus and patient experience have a positive joint effect on overall 
patient satisfaction. 
 
Indirect Effects as Matching 
Favoring either focus or patient experience over the other may result in lower performance. 
Instead, researchers have shown that, in comparison, a balanced approach typically results in better 
performance (He & Wong, 2004). Organization theorists assert that firms must carefully manage 
the tradeoffs when facing two conflicting approaches which create tension (Birkinshaw & Gupta, 
2013). They conclude that firms capable of balancing the two approaches simultaneously are likely 
to achieve superior performance relative to firms emphasizing one at the expense of the other. 
Applying this thinking to our context, we argue that when a hospital pursues focus without 
concurrent attention to patient experience, performance may suffer. Focus may dominate daily 
practices, but providers may not be sufficiently trained, staffed, or motivated to consider patients’ 
specific needs, thus influencing readmission rates. The reverse may also be true. To enhance patient 
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experience, if hospital administrators relentlessly cater to patient needs while ignoring or sacrificing 
the process standards or clinical protocols more closely aligned with a focused approach, clinical 
outcomes may suffer. Such an imbalance may result in higher readmission rates, suggesting the 
following hypothesis.   
 
Hypothesis 5. Relative imbalance between focus and patient experience is 
positively associated with (i.e. increases) readmission rates. 
 
We expect that a similar dynamic may impact patient satisfaction as well. An overemphasis 
on either focus or patient experience, without concurrent attention to the other, will have a negative 
impact on overall patient satisfaction, suggesting the following hypothesis.  
 
Hypothesis 6. Relative imbalance between focus and patient experience is 
negatively associated with (i.e. reduces) overall patient satisfaction. 
 
2.3   Research Design and Data 
 
We investigate the direct and indirect effects of focus and patient experience on 
performance in U.S. acute care hospitals. We exclude critical access hospitals (a designation for 
some rural hospitals in underserved areas) and Veterans Administration hospitals because they do 
not report certain necessary data to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). The 
final sample is an unbalanced panel of 3,027 acute care hospitals that provide heart failure care.1 
We select heart failure because services for this diagnosis are broadly provided, and such selection 
helps reduce contextual and spurious effects that might result from including multiple disease 
groups.2  Heart failure care represents a high-volume and high-revenue service set. About 5.7 
million adults have heart failure, causing about one in nine deaths in the U.S. in 2013 (Mozaffarian 
et al., 2016). The direct medical costs of treating heart failure were estimated to be $32.4 billion in 
2015 (Heidenreich et al., 2011). 
To test our hypotheses, we use data from multiple CMS reports. All variables and 
corresponding data sources are listed in Table 2.2. The CMS cost report provides information on 
total beds, bed days and hospital location. We obtain teaching status and hospital-level numbers of 
licensed practical nurses and registered nurses from the CMS Provider of Services file. Patient 
                                                     
1 Heart failure is “a condition in which the heart can't pump enough blood to meet the body's needs” 
(National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute, 2016) 
2 http://www.aha.org/research/rc/stat-studies/fast-facts2015.shtml (2013 AHA Annual Survey) 
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experience and patient satisfaction are from the CMS HCAHPS survey, and 30-day readmission 
rates and clinical process quality are from CMS Hospital Compare. We obtain case mix index from 
CMS Impact files. We merge the data using CMS’s unique hospital identifiers. Because all data 
sources contain information at the hospital level, our unit of analysis is the acute care hospital.   
Our study period spans July 2007 to June 2013 for two reasons. First, the CMS Hospital 
Compare provides three year rolling averages with the period beginning in July of each year. 
Second, the HCAHPS reports began providing data on a one-year rolling average basis in October 
2006, even though the records are updated quarterly.3 Because the readmission rates of CMS are 
available only for three-year rolling periods, our dataset has two time periods: July 2007 – June 
2010 and July 2010 – June 2013. We do not include data after June 2013 because the VBP and 
Hospital Readmission Reduction Programs initiated hospital performance incentives in late 2013, 
which is likely to influence our substantive variables. Therefore, we only analyze data prior to the 
implementation of these incentives. We aggregate all variables to three year rolling averages for 
our analyses. For robustness checks, we create a new dataset by allowing partial overlapping of 
time-periods (July 2007 – June 2010, July 2008 – June 2011, July 2009 – June 2012, and July 2010 
– June 2013). This extended dataset has four time-periods. 
                                                     
3 http://www.hcahpsonline.org/files/HCAHPS Fact Sheet, revised1, 3-31-09.pdf 
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Table 2.2  Summary Statistics and Sources 
Variable Description (n=3,027, Observations=5,862) Mean SD Min Max Source (CMS) 
Performance Measures       
 Readmission rate (%) Heart failure (HF) 23.856 2.206 16.6 33.8 Hospital Compare 
 Patient satisfaction overall (logit transformed) 0.670 0.370 -0.911 2.876 HCAHPS survey 
Independent Variables       
 Focus HF cases over total cases 0.242 0.100 0.005 1.000* Medicare volume 
 Patient Experience hospital average score (logit-ed) 0.808 0.235 -0.486 3.316 HCAHPS survey 
Controls       
 Time time dummies      
 State** state dummies (k=51)     Provider of Services 
 Ownership non-profit (64.0%), profit (18.8%), Gov’t (17.2%)     Provider of Services 
 Teaching whether hospital has a medical school (Teaching: 33.1%)     Provider of Services 
 Location whether hospital is located in urban area (Urban: 72.1%)     Cost report 
 Hospital size number of beds 204.38 177.36 12 2127 Cost report 
 Bed occupancy rate total bed days over total bed days available 0.570 0.176 0.090 1.085 Cost report 
 Case Mix Index  1.421 0.271 0.784 3.234 Impact files 
 Nursing intensity (LPNs) number of LPN/LVNs over number of LPN/LVNs and RNs  0.143 0.140 0 1.000 Provider of Services 
 Clinical Process QualityHF Logit-ed score from heart failure  4.015 2.037 -5 9.210 Hospital Compare 
 Clinical Process Qualityall Logit-ed score from heart attack, heart failure, and pneumonia  3.193 1.076 -1.754 9.210 Hospital Compare 
     * Three hospitals have max value of 1.000. The second highest value is 0.789. ** We control for state effect in specified models.  k includes Washington D.C. 
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Dependent Variable: Performance 
Readmission Rates in Heart Failure. Hospital readmission rates are an important measure of 
clinical performance (Axon & Williams, 2011). We use readmission rates for heart failure diagnosis 
from the CMS Hospital Compare file. The CMS data include Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) 
patients aged 65 or older when such patients are readmitted for the same diagnosis within 30 days 
after discharge. CMS reports a risk-adjusted measure because it is important in measuring and 
interpreting clinical outcomes. CMS creates this measure for each hospital using hierarchical 
logistic regression adjusting for patient age, gender, and comorbidities. The value of risk-adjusted 
readmission rates is the number of “predicted” outcomes over the number of “expected” outcomes, 
multiplied by the national readmission rates (CMS, 2014). We exclude hospitals whose readmission 
rates are constructed from fewer than 25 patients, following the CMS guideline.  
Patient Satisfaction. Patient satisfaction is another important dimension in assessing hospital 
performance (Kane et al., 1997; Marley et al., 2004). This is an outcome measure because it is 
assessed after a clinical treatment has ended (Kane et al., 1997).4 Patient satisfaction is defined as 
“how the patients judge the overall hospital experience” (Marley et al., 2004). We use data from an 
HCAHPS questionnaire which asks how inpatients rate their hospital overall, from 0 (“worst 
hospital possible”) to 10 (“best hospital possible”). The HCAHPS data provide the aggregate 
percent of inpatients in three clustered answer categories for each hospital, scores of “6 or lower,” 
“7 or 8,” and “9 or 10.” We create a patient satisfaction measure following (Chandrasekaran et al., 
2012): multiplying the percentage of responses in each category by -1, 0, and 1, respectively, and 
then summing them. The reported data on the patient satisfaction measure include all hospital 
patients (CMS, 2013).  
 
Independent Variables: Direct Effect 
Focus. Previous healthcare research on focus has been conducted primarily in the cardiac care 
context, where most researchers have employed a volume-based measure of focus using patient-
level, case-level, or procedure-level data (Clark & Huckman, 2012; KC & Terwiesch, 2011; Lee et 
al., 2015). For example, McDermott and Stock (2011) measure focus as a ratio of the number of 
cardiac cases relative to total cases. Ding (2015) uses both hospital-level focus measured as 
cardiology procedures relative to total procedures, and department-level focus measured as heart 
attack procedures relative to all cardiology procedures. Similarly, KC and Terwiesch (2011) 
measure three levels of focus: firm, operating unit, and process. Other notable researchers have 
                                                     
4 CMS collects HCAHPS survey from inpatients between 48 hours and six weeks after their discharge. 
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used Herfindahl-Hirschman index as an alternative volume-based measure (Andritsos & Tang, 
2014; Ding, 2014). We follow the more frequently used volume-based measures, and compute 
focus (Focusit) as the ratio of number of heart failure cases relative to the total number of cases at 
hospital i and during time t.  
Patient Experience. Patient experience incorporates patient perception of healthcare service 
delivery, including care and non-care aspects (Chandrasekaran et al., 2012; Donabedian, 1988; 
Manary et al., 2013). Care includes interactions between the patient and medical providers, such as 
general communication characteristics, pain management, and responsiveness to patient needs 
(Chandrasekaran et al., 2012; Nair et al., 2013; Senot et al., 2016b). Non-care captures perceptions 
of care amenities, including the hospital environment (e.g., quietness, cleanliness) (Donabedian, 
1988; Epstein et al., 2010; Westbrook et al., 2014). We use HCAHPS survey items (see Appendix 
A, Table 1), a national initiative to consistently measure patient experience in the domains of 
communication, responsiveness, and hospital (physical) environment (Giordano et al. 2010). While 
previous studies do not consider the non-care aspects of patient experience (ENV 1, ENV 2), our 
study uses a more comprehensive measure of patient experience by including all domains in the 
HCAHPS survey (Chandrasekaran et al., 2012; Nair et al., 2013; Senot et al., 2016a, 2016b) 
(Chandrasekaran et al. 2012, Nair et al. 2013, Senot et al. 2016a, 2016b). We assess our patient 
experience measure for internal consistency, and find that Cronbach’s alpha is 0.935. 
CMS provides data for all hospitals which report HCAHPS responses from 100 or more 
patients. CMS addresses potential bias in the HCAHPS survey data by using their Patient-Mix 
Adjustment (PMA) model, which addresses the effect of patient characteristics on HCAHPS 
responses. The model includes education, self-rated health status, language at home, age, type of 
service (maternity, surgical, or medical), survey mode, and interaction effects of age and service 
line type.5 
To create a comprehensive measure of patient experience (PatExpit), we first extract the 
percentage of survey respondents who answered “Always” or “Yes” for each measurement item, 
and average these values across the eight items. Following previous studies, we use a logit 
transformation to satisfy the normality assumption (Chandrasekaran et al., 2012; Nair et al., 2013; 
Senot et al., 2016b).  
  
                                                     
5 http://www.hcahpsonline.org/modeadjustment.aspx   
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Independent Variables: Indirect Effect 
We test two types of indirect effects for focus and patient experience, “fit as moderation” 
and “fit as matching” (Venkatraman, 1989). Fit as moderation corresponds to the joint effects of 
the variables and is measured as the product of focus and patient experience (Cao et al., 2009; He 
& Wong, 2004). It implies that focus and patient experience are complements and add value in 
addition to their individual effects toward improving hospital performance. In contrast, fit as 
matching corresponds to the (im)balance between the two variables and is measured as the absolute 
value of the difference between focus and patient experience (Birkinshaw & Gupta, 2013; He & 
Wong, 2004). Fit as matching examines how the degree of alignment (a small or large absolute 
difference) between focus and patient experience affects hospital performance. We standardize all 
the continuous variables, and focus and patient experience before computing the interaction and 
absolute difference terms to avoid multicollinearity with the main effects.  
 
Control Variables  
We incorporate several key control variables from previous studies to control for hospital 
characteristics that may influence hospital performance.  
Time. We include time dummy variables to account for the data collection periods. We consider 
July 2007 – June 2010 as the first time period and July 2010 – June 2013 as the second time period. 
This allows the models to capture changes over time in industry readmission rates and patient 
satisfaction. 
Ownership. Ownership is important in predicting hospital reactions corresponding to differences 
in operating policy. Using two ownership dummy variables, we classify hospitals by three 
ownership groups: not-for-profit (base level), for-profit, and governmental hospitals. This 
classification is commonly used in previous studies (Andritsos & Tang, 2014; Ding, 2014).  
Teaching. We control for teaching status because this may be related to hospital performance. 
Teaching status indicates the different mission and resource allocation of hospitals (Goldstein & 
Iossifova, 2012). We measure teaching status using a dummy variable, which indicates whether a 
hospital is affiliated with a medical school.  
Location. Hospitals located in urban areas are coded as one and otherwise zero. This indicator is 
based on Core Based Statistical Areas.  
Beds (Hospital Size). We control for hospital size measured as the total number of beds. We use a 
log transformation because of skewness. 
Bed Occupancy Rates. Bed occupancy represents hospital utilization measured by the total patient 
days over the total hospital bed days available (McDermott & Stock, 2011).  
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Case Mix Index (CMI). According to CMS, case mix index represents a hospital’s average 
diagnosis-related group (DRG) weight. It is calculated by total DRG weights for all Medicare 
discharges over total discharges. This reflects the extent of patient medical complexity.  
Nursing Intensity. Previous studies show that the level of nurse staffing, especially registered 
nurses, is related to clinical performance (Mark et al., 2004). Registered nurses are associated with 
greater expertise than licensed (practical or vocational) nurses, and are likely to have a systematic 
influence on hospital performance. Nursing intensity is measured as the number of registered nurses 
relative to the total number of licensed and registered nurses, in a hospital.  
Clinical Process Quality (CPQ). Following Senot et al. (2016b), we use CPQ to capture important 
dimensions of conformance (e.g. whether appropriate medications or treatments are delivered to 
patients in a timely manner) and include it to control for endogeneity in predicting hospital 
readmission. Similar to previous researchers, we measure CPQ across the categories of heart failure 
(HF), acute myocardial infarction (AMI), and pneumonia (PN) from the process of care measures 
of CMS Hospital Compare Data (see Appendix A, Table 2). Following Chandrasekaran et al. 
(2012), Nair et al. (2013), and Senot et al. (2016b), we compute separate composite scores for HF 
measures (cpqhf,it), and then combined for HF, AMI, and PN (cpqall,it), by averaging across items 
and taking a logit transformation. CPQ for HF is used in the readmission rate models (Table 2.4), 
while the combined measure is used in the overall patient satisfaction models (Table 2.5).  
 
Empirical Strategy 
We estimate separate models to test the direct and indirect effects of focus and patient 
experience on readmission rates and overall patient satisfaction. The models include focus (Focusit), 
patient experience (PatExpit), and all controls (Xit) of given hospital and time. We examine joint 
(Focusit × PatExpit) and relative imbalance effects ( |Focusit – PatExpit | ) in separate models. To 
partial out non-linear effects from the joint effect models, we include quadratic terms for focus and 
patient experience. It is considered a conservative approach for testing joint effects (Dawson 2014, 
Ganzach 1997). We run two equations for each dependent variable, first with joint effects and then 
with imbalance effects. The following equations describe the four models. 
 
Readmission Rateit = β0 + β1Focusit + β2Focusit2 + β3PatExpit + β4PatExpit2 
                                 + β5Focusit*PatExpit + β6Chf,it + Xitγ + εit 
(1) 
Readmission Rateit = β0 + β1Focusit + β2PatExpit + β3|Focusit – PatExpit| + β4Chf,it + Xitγ + εit (2) 
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Satisfactionit = β0 + β1Focusit + β2Focusit2 + β3PatExpit + β4PatExpit2 
                                 + β5Focusit*PatExpit + β6Call,it + Xitγ + εit 
(3) 
Satisfactionit = β0 + β1Focusit + β2PatExpit + β3|Focusit − PatExpit| + β4Call,it + Xitγ + εit (4) 
 
Estimation of combined effects on readmission rates (1) and patient satisfaction (3) are 
interdependent because equations sharing observable characteristics might also share unobservable 
characteristics. This may lead to correlation between their residual terms (Moulton, 1990). 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) is used when a system of equations are related due to the 
correlation in residual terms, although the equations seem unrelated (Devaraj et al. 2004, Zellner 
1962). In such a situation, SUR is appropriate because it produces smaller standard errors even 
when the residual terms of the equations are highly correlated. SUR results would be identical to 
the results from OLS regression without any added efficiency (i.e. smaller standard errors) if the 
right-hand side variables in the two equations, (1) and (3), are identical (Wooldridge, 2002).  
In our study, however, the set of regressors in each equation is different: clinical process 
quality in equation (1) is constructed from heart failure data, and in equation (3) from HF, AMI, 
and PN data; the same applies to equations (2) and (4). To check the appropriateness of SUR over 
OLS regression, we use the Breusch-Pagan LaGrange Multiplier test. The result indicates that the 
two residual terms are highly correlated (χ2 = 25.64, p < 0.001), supporting the use of the SUR 
approach. We use Huber–White standard errors and cluster them by state to control for any 
unobserved between-group heteroskedasticity because hospitals in different states are exposed to 
different state policies, health environments, and, potentially, patient demographics. We believe 
that multicollinearity is not a serious concern as all variance inflation factors are below 5. To 
summarize, we use SUR regression analysis with Huber-White standard errors clustered by state, 
and include state fixed effects using state dummies.   
 
2.4   Results  
 
A correlation matrix of the study variables (Table 2.3) shows that focus and patient 
experience have different associations with each of the dependent variables. While focus is 
positively related to readmission rates (ρ = 0.20, p < 0.01), its relationship with patient satisfaction 
is negative (ρ = −0.20, p < 0.01). Additionally, we observe that patient experience has a negative 
relationship with readmission rates (ρ = −0.24, p < 0.01), but a strong positive correlation with 
patient satisfaction (ρ = 0.76, p < 0.01). Lastly, our main interests, focus and patient experience, 
have a weak relationship (ρ = 0.10, p < 0.01). 
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SUR results for readmission and patient satisfaction are reported in Tables 2.4 and 2.5 
respectively. For each dependent variable, we first include control variables (Model 1). We then 
include focus (Model 2), patient experience (Model 3), and both focus and patient experience 
(Model 4) in a stepwise manner to test direct effects. Finally, we evaluate the indirect effects of 
focus and patient experience by including the interaction (Model 5), and the absolute difference 
(Model 6) terms. To ensure that the joint effects are not due to non-linearity of the main effects, we 
incorporate quadratic terms of focus and patient experience in Model 5 (Dawson, 2014; Ganzach, 
1997). 
We first describe the direct effects of focus and patient experience on readmission (Table 
2.4). We find that focus is positively associated with readmission (b = 0.159, p < 0.001, Model 2), 
resulting in a failure to support Hypothesis 1a, which theorized a negative effect. The coefficient 
for patient experience is negative and statistically significant (b = −0.097, p < 0.001, Model 3) 
suggesting a strong support for Hypothesis 2a. These effects remain negative in all other models. 
Our results show that both the combined and imbalance effects are significant. However, the 
coefficient of the interaction term is negative (b = −0.041, p < 0.01, Model 5) suggesting that our 
results support Hypothesis 3, which theorized a negative effect. Finally, we evaluate the imbalance 
effect: the coefficient for absolute difference is positive (b = 0.064, p < 0.001, Model 6), providing 
support for Hypothesis 5. This implies that the more divergent a hospital’s attention to focus and 
patient experience, the worse (higher) its readmission rates. 
Moving to patient satisfaction (Table 2.5), we find a significant negative association for 
focus (b = −0.164, p < 0.001, Model 2) and a positive association for patient experience (b = 0.956, 
p < 0.001, Model 3). These results provide support for Hypothesis 1b and 2b, respectively. We also 
observe that the interaction term is not significant (b = 0.021, p = 0.225, Model 5), indicating failed 
support for Hypothesis 4. In contrast, the coefficient for absolute difference term is significant (b 
= −0.105, p < 0.001, Model 6), providing support for Hypothesis 6. This indicates that the greater 
the imbalance between focus and patient experience, the worse (lower) its patient satisfaction. 
 
Robustness Checks 
We conduct several robustness checks related to endogeneity, data, measures, and other 
underlying assumptions, to ensure the consistency of our results. We first address endogeneity 
concerns by examining the relationship between focus and readmission rates. Previous literature 
finds that a volume-type measure of focus, such as that used in our main analysis, may be 
endogenous because it may reflect a selective referral effect (Huesch, 2009). Hospitals that are 
well-known for heart failure treatment may also attract sicker heart failure patients. These effects 
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may result in biased estimates on focus. To address this potential bias, we use an instrumental 
variable two-Stage least squares (2SLS) approach (Angrist & Imbens, 1995). Because we use 
hospital-level data, we consider the number of cardiologists in the hospital’s state as an instrument 
for focus. We obtain cardiologist data from Physician Characteristics and Distribution in the US, 
published by the American Medical Association. We conduct our analysis in two stages (see 
Appendix A, Table 3). In stage 1, we regress endogenous independent variable, focus, using the 
instrumental variable (number of state cardiologists), and control variables, and compute the 
predicted values of focus. In stage 2, we use the predicted values of focus obtained in stage 1 and 
the control variables to estimate the coefficients for Model 2 with SUR regression and Huber-White 
robust standard errors. Based on the Durbin–Wu–Hausman endogeneity test (χ2 = 0.17, p = 0.678), 
we can conclude that focus is not endogenous in the readmission rates model.  
We check to ensure that our instrument satisfies relevance and exclusion restrictions 
assumptions (Wooldridge, 2002). Instrument relevancy requires that an instrument should be 
strongly correlated with the endogenous regressor in the first stage. However, the correlation 
between focus and number of state cardiologists is significant but relatively low (ρ = 0.089). 
Instrument exogeneity mandates that an instrument is uncorrelated with the error term in stage 2 
(Wooldridge, 2002). The F-test statistic from the test of excluded instruments assumption (R2 = 
0.346, F = 184.96, p < 0.001) and minimum eigenvalue statistic (F = 109.85) are larger than the 
cut-off values of 10 (Staiger & Stock, 1997) and 16.38 (Stock & Yogo, 2005). These tests support 
the requirements of a strong instrument (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010).  
Next, we check whether the results are robust to alternate measures for patient satisfaction 
and patient experience. First, we change the patient satisfaction measure from the overall hospital 
rating item (an 11-point scale) to the “willingness to recommend” item (a 4-point scale). Results  
using this alternative measure are substantively the same. For patient experience, we consider an 
alternative measure by replacing the patient experience measurement items with the items used to 
measure experiential quality (Chandrasekaran et al., 2012; Nair et al., 2013; Senot et al., 2016a, 
2016b). The patient experience measure in this study is more encompassing and constructed using 
“care and non-care” aspects while the experiential quality measure used in related studies focuses 
solely on care (interpersonal) measures. The results with experiential quality are consistent with 
our reported results. It is worth noting that our measure explains 3 percent more variation in patient 
satisfaction than experiential quality (alternate measure).  
Because our main analysis used only two periods due to three-year rolling readmission 
rates, we use the extended data of four time-periods to test robustness. Before conducting the 
analysis, we use an autocorrelation test to check for serial correlation (Wooldridge, 2002). We 
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employ feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) to address serial correlation in the new data.6 We 
report results for readmission (Models 1–4) and patient satisfaction (Models 5–8) in Table 2.6. The 
results with FGLS are consistent with, and marginally stronger than SUR. We find that the 
interaction term for predicting patient satisfaction, which was insignificant for SUR is significant 
now in the hypothesized direction (Model 6). 
We further address between-group heteroscedasticity by repeating all our SUR regression 
models with Huber–White standard errors clustered by hospital. We continue to include state fixed 
effects using state dummies, along with all the other substantive variables. The results are identical 
to the main analysis. 
Lastly, there may be potential bias due to common method variance (CMV) since the 
respondents of patient experience and patient satisfaction are the same (Chandrasekaran et al., 
2012). However, we note that the effect of CMV decreases when more independent variables are 
added, and while CMV cannot produce any placebo effects for interaction terms, it can 
underestimate those effects (Siemsen et al., 2010). Therefore, the significant effects of the 
interaction terms even if CMV were a concern are the strong evidence that supports our hypotheses 
of combined effects.  
                                                     
6 We remove 196 hospitals from the original sample because FGLS requires a balanced panel. 
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Table 2.3  Correlation Matrix for Variables 
   1 
  2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10 
1 Readmission 1.00                   
2 Satisfaction -0.35 *** 1.00                 
3 Focus 0.20 *** -0.20 *** 1.00               
4 Patient Experience -0.24 *** 0.76 *** 0.10 *** 1.00             
5 Bed (logged) -0.02 * -0.03 ** -0.43 *** -0.40 *** 1.00           
6 Bed occupancy (%) 0.08 *** -0.03 ** -0.34 *** -0.38 *** 0.61 *** 1.00         
7 Case Mix Index -0.25 *** 0.23 *** -0.52 *** -0.20 *** 0.67 *** 0.52 *** 1.00       
8 Nursing Intensity Rate -0.12 *** 0.10 *** -0.32 *** -0.17 *** 0.37 *** 0.32 *** 0.39 *** 1.00     
9 CPQ (HF) -0.22 *** 0.19 *** -0.14 *** 0.07 *** 0.15 *** 0.07 *** 0.21 *** 0.19 *** 1.00   
10 CPQ (Overall) -0.29 *** 0.25 *** -0.16 *** 0.10 *** 0.19 *** 0.09 *** 0.28 *** 0.24 *** 0.78 *** 1.00 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. 
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Table 2.4  Seemingly Unrelated Regression Analysis Results: Readmission Rates 
  Model Model Model Model Model Model 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Focus   0.159***  0.153*** 0.201*** 0.136*** 
  (0.022)  (0.022) (0.026) (0.021) 
Focus2     -0.025***  
     (0.005)  
PatExp   -0.097** -0.083** -0.083*** -0.080*** 
   (0.030) (0.027) (0.019) (0.024) 
PatExp2     0.039***  
     (0.005)  
Focus*PatExp     -0.041**  
     (0.015)  
|Focus-PatExp|      0.064*** 
      (0.018) 
For-profit 0.271*** 0.260*** 0.227*** 0.223*** 0.201*** 0.219*** 
 
(0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040) 
Government 0.069 0.031 0.065 0.029 0.015 0.022 
 
(0.043) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.037) (0.039) 
Teaching 0.064* 0.043 0.061† 0.041 0.042 0.038 
 
(0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) 
Location 0.021 0.014 -0.001 -0.004 -0.014 -0.014 
 
(0.043) (0.041) (0.040) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039) 
Hospital size 0.118*** 0.138*** 0.082* 0.107** 0.121*** 0.120*** 
 
(0.031) (0.031) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.036) 
Bed occ. rate 0.101*** 0.114*** 0.088*** 0.103*** 0.098*** 0.103*** 
 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) 
CMI -0.306*** -0.245*** -0.286*** -0.230*** -0.218*** -0.244*** 
 
(0.034) (0.031) (0.037) (0.033) (0.031) (0.034) 
Nursing intensity  -0.018 -0.005 -0.017 -0.006 -0.009 -0.004 
 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
CPQ (HF) -0.022† -0.017 -0.016 -0.012 -0.010 -0.009 
 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) 
Constant 0.253*** 0.395*** 0.267*** 0.402*** 0.455*** 0.329*** 
 (0.034) (0.039) (0.031) (0.038) (0.043) (0.037) 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,862 5,862 5,862 5,862 5,862 5,862 
Chi2 2778.2 3108.6 2868.2 3176.1 3397.0 3211.9 
R2 0.322 0.347 0.329 0.351 0.367 0.354 
Clustered Standard Errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1.  
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Table 2.5  Seemingly Unrelated Regression Analysis Results: Patient Satisfaction 
  Model Model Model Model Model Model 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Focus   -0.164***  -0.091*** -0.108*** -0.064** 
  (0.036)  (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) 
Focus2     0.016***  
     (0.004)  
PatExp   0.956*** 0.948*** 0.983*** 0.945*** 
   (0.051) (0.050) (0.020) (0.043) 
PatExp2     -0.079***  
     (0.007)  
Focus*PatExp     0.021  
     (0.018)  
|Focus-PatExp|      -0.105*** 
      (0.026) 
For-profit -0.592*** -0.579*** -0.149** -0.146*** -0.107** -0.138*** 
 
(0.072) (0.072) (0.037) (0.038) (0.035) (0.036) 
Government -0.133** -0.095* -0.098*** -0.077*** -0.050*** -0.067*** 
 
(0.042) (0.040) (0.021) (0.019) (0.015) (0.007) 
Teaching -0.041 -0.020 -0.010 0.002 0.003 0.007 
 
(0.054) (0.052) (0.026) (0.025) (0.021) (0.023) 
Location -0.049 -0.042 0.170*** 0.172*** 0.195*** 0.189*** 
 
(0.056) (0.052) (0.025) (0.025) (0.022) (0.024) 
Hospital size -0.297*** -0.319*** 0.052* 0.037† 0.023 0.015 
 
(0.027) (0.029) (0.021) (0.022) (0.017) (0.023) 
Bed occ. rate 0.006 -0.007 0.129*** 0.121*** 0.129*** 0.121*** 
 
(0.026) (0.027) (0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013) 
CMI 0.367*** 0.305*** 0.173*** 0.140*** 0.134*** 0.164*** 
 
(0.024) (0.023) (0.018) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
Nursing intensity  0.046* 0.033† 0.046** 0.039** 0.041** 0.038* 
 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
CPQ (All) 0.151*** 0.141*** 0.061*** 0.056*** 0.042*** 0.051*** 
 
(0.022) (0.020) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
Constant 0.063 -0.086† -0.107*** -0.188*** -0.211*** -0.070† 
 (0.048) (0.047) (0.025) (0.028) (0.034) (0.037) 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE 
s 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,862 5,862 5,862 5,862 5,862 5,862 
Chi2 1684.9 1873.9 19160.3 19754.2 21006.9 19755.0 
R2 0.223 0.242 0.766 0.771 0.782 0.771 
Clustered Standard Errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1.  
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Table 2.6  Robustness Checks 
 Readmission Rates  Patient Satisfaction 
 
Combined                          Imbalance  Combined                          Imbalance 
  SUR FGLS SUR FGLS  SUR FGLS SUR FGLS 
 1 2 3 4 
 5 6 7 8 
Focus  0.201*** 0.256*** 0.136*** 0.187***  -0.108*** -0.123*** -0.064** -0.079*** 
 (0.026) (0.005) (0.021) (0.005)  (0.022) (0.002) (0.022) (0.002) 
Focus2 -0.025*** -0.030***    0.016*** 0.016***   
 (0.005) (0.002)    (0.004) (0.001)   
PatExp -0.083*** -0.066*** -0.080*** -0.067***  0.983*** 0.873*** 0.945*** 0.866*** 
 (0.019) (0.004) (0.024) (0.005)  (0.020) (0.002) (0.043) (0.002) 
PatExp2 0.039*** 0.038***    -0.079*** -0.065***   
 (0.005) (0.002)    (0.007) (0.001)   
Focus*PatExp -0.041** -0.033***    0.021 0.017***   
 (0.015) (0.004)    (0.018) (0.001)   
|Focus-PatExp|   0.064*** 0.052***    -0.105*** -0.083*** 
   (0.018) (0.004)    (0.026) (0.002) 
For-profit 0.201*** 0.217*** 0.219*** 0.231***  -0.107** -0.152*** -0.138*** -0.170***  
(0.040) (0.009) (0.040) (0.011)  (0.035) (0.004) (0.036) (0.004) 
Government 0.015 -0.034*** 0.022 -0.037***  -0.050*** -0.059*** -0.067*** -0.063***  
(0.037) (0.010) (0.039) (0.010)  (0.015) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) 
Teaching 0.042 0.102*** 0.038 0.101***  0.003 -0.024*** 0.007 -0.021***  
(0.030) (0.008) (0.031) (0.009)  (0.021) (0.003) (0.023) (0.003) 
Location -0.014 -0.052*** -0.014 -0.040***  0.195*** 0.190*** 0.189*** 0.181***  
(0.038) (0.010) (0.039) (0.011)  (0.022) (0.004) (0.024) (0.004) 
Hospital size 0.121*** 0.194*** 0.120*** 0.198***  0.023 -0.020*** 0.015 -0.029***  
(0.034) (0.006) (0.036) (0.006)  (0.017) (0.002) (0.023) (0.002) 
Bed occ. rate 0.098*** 0.145*** 0.103*** 0.158***  0.129*** 0.099*** 0.121*** 0.090***  
(0.020) (0.004) (0.021) (0.005)  (0.011) (0.002) (0.013) (0.002) 
CMI -0.218*** -0.301*** -0.244*** -0.335***  0.134*** 0.193*** 0.164*** 0.226***  
(0.031) (0.006) (0.034) (0.007)  (0.014) (0.002) (0.015) (0.002) 
Nursing intensity  -0.009 -0.025*** -0.004 -0.021***  0.041** 0.051*** 0.038* 0.050*** 
  (0.016) (0.005) (0.016) (0.005)  (0.015) (0.002) (0.015) (0.002) 
CPQ (HF) -0.010 -0.008* -0.009 -0.011**  0.042*** 0.036*** 0.051*** 0.042***  
(0.011) (0.003) (0.012) (0.003)  (0.010) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) 
Constant 0.455*** 0.365*** 0.329*** 0.307***  -0.211*** -0.035*** -0.070† 0.008*  
(0.043) (0.009) (0.037) (0.011)  (0.034) (0.004) (0.037) (0.004) 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of hospitals 3,027 2,831 3,027 2,831  3,027 2,831 3,027 2,831 
Observations 5,862 11324 5,862 11,324  5,862 11,324 5,862 11,324 
Wald-Chi2  or (F) 3397.0 146958.0 3211.9 71647.7  1684.9 238330.7 19755.0 228380.1 
R2 0.367 – 0.354 –  0.223 – 0.771 – 
Clustered Standard Errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1.  
Notes. We consider AR(1) in FGLS and robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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2.5   Discussion 
 
We summarize our results in Table 2.7. Overall, we show that focus increases readmission 
rates and reduces patient satisfaction, both of which are undesirable outcomes from managerial, 
regulatory, and patient perspectives. In contrast, patient experience has a desirable effect on both 
outcomes, by resulting in lower readmission rates and increased patient satisfaction. We also find 
that focus and patient experience together reduce readmission rates, implying that patient 
experience mitigates the negative effect of focus on readmission rates. Finally, an imbalance 
between focus and patient experience results in an increase in readmission rates and a reduction in 
patient satisfaction; both are undesirable outcomes. To further investigate these effects, we conduct 
detailed post-hoc analysis. We describe the theoretical, managerial, and policy implications of these 
results below.  
 
Table 2.7  Summary of Results 
 Readmission Rates Patient Satisfaction 
 Direction* Desirable Direction* Desirable 
Focus Positive No Negative No 
Patient Experience Negative Yes Positive Yes 
Focus*Patient Experience Negative Yes – – 
|Focus – Patient Experience| Positive No Negative No 
*Only statistically significant effects from Tables 2.4 and 2.5 are shown. 
 
Our research makes three notable contributions to existing theory. First, by showing that 
focus has an undesirable effect on both readmission rates and patient satisfaction, our results reveal 
that focus as a strategy has an undetected dark side which previous research has failed to identify 
in the healthcare setting. Instead, previous studies have predominantly highlighted positive effects 
of focus on efficiency (e.g. cost) and clinical performance (e.g. mortality rate) (Clark & Huckman, 
2012; KC & Terwiesch, 2011; Lee et al., 2015). Until the current study, few studies have examined 
the relationship between focus and readmission rates or overall patient satisfaction for the entire 
hospital. We explore the boundary conditions where these results apply, and also identify an 
underlying mechanism that might explain the undesirable relationship between focus and 
readmission rates.  
To better understand the boundary conditions, we examine whether the direct effects of 
focus vary across different types of hospitals, based on two hospital characteristics: resource 
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utilization and teaching status. Researchers have studied these two characteristics extensively and 
find they impact hospital performance systematically and significantly (Goldstein & Iossifova, 
2012; McDermott & Stock, 2011). We measure hospital resource utilization by average bed 
occupancy rates, and categorize our sample hospitals into two groups: hospitals with high and low 
bed occupancy. Teaching status is measured as a binary variable (Yes/No), and hospitals are 
divided into two groups: teaching and non-teaching hospitals. For each group, we replicate Models 
2−4 of our main SUR analysis.  
For readmission rates (see Appendix A, Table 4), our results show that the direct effect of 
focus is positive and significant for hospitals with both ‘high’ bed occupancy (b = 0.228, p < 0.001) 
and ‘low’ bed occupancy (b = 0.090, p < 0.001). A beta coefficient difference test shows that the 
effect is significantly greater in the high occupancy group (p < 0.001). This makes sense because 
higher utilization requires hospitals to consume substantial resources for inpatients in the focal area. 
We conducted the exact same analysis for teaching status and find similar results (see Appendix A, 
Table 5). The direct effect of focus on readmission rates is positive and significant for teaching 
hospitals (b = 0.222, p < 0.001) and non-teaching hospitals (b = 0.123, p < 0.001), and the difference 
between them is also significant (p = 0.018).  
In regards to patient satisfaction, our main results showed that hospitals with greater focus 
have lower patient satisfaction (Table 2.5). To understand the generalizability of this result, we 
repeat the analysis using the two hospital groups categorized by bed occupancy and teaching status 
(see Appendix A, Table 6). These results show that the direct effect of focus is significant and 
negative for both occupancy groups (high: b = −0.224, p < 0.001; low: b = −0.128, p < 0.001), and 
the effect is again greater for the high occupancy group (p = 0.001). For teaching status (see 
Appendix A, Table 7), our results show the focus has a negative effect in both groups (teaching: b 
= −0.309, p < 0.001; non-teaching: b = −0.114, p < 0.001), and the effect is greater for teaching 
hospitals (p = 0.002).  
We also conducted the subgroup analyses to examine the boundary conditions associated 
with the positive effect of patient experience on readmission rates and patient satisfaction. The 
results show that the effects are significant in hospitals with both high and low occupancy rates, as 
well as teaching and non-teaching hospitals, for the two performance measures. The differences are 
not significant across the groups, implying that patient experience has a uniformly desirable effect 
on both measures under the tested boundary conditions.   
Lastly, to understand why analysis shows a positive relationship between focus and 
readmission, we explore a possible mechanism. Our literature review revealed that, while there is 
limited research linking focus with readmission rates, prior researchers have shown that focus 
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reduces mortality rates (Ding, 2015; Lee et al., 2015), and in separate studies, other researchers 
have shown mortality reduces readmission rates (Jha, 2018; Press et al., 2013). While it is logical 
that high mortality results in lower readmission rates, the low mortality-high readmission 
relationship may require an explanation. Jha (2018) conjectured that hospitals with low mortality 
rates might be better at keeping their sickest patients alive, who are at higher risk of being 
readmitted than the average patient, which increases readmission rates. They concluded that for 
conditions such as heart failure, it should not be surprising that hospitals with low mortality rates 
have higher readmission rates. In light of these observations, we propose that mortality rates might 
explain the positive relationship between focus and readmission by acting as a mediator between 
them. We test our supposition using a mediation test. 
Three things are generally required to demonstrate mediation: (1) the explanatory variable 
that predicts the mediator; (2) the mediator predicting the dependent variable; and (3) the decrease 
in the direct effect of the explanatory variable when the model incorporates the mediator with the 
explanatory variable (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Following this sequence requires conducting three 
separate regression analyses. We obtain mortality rate for the hospitals in our sample, and use SUR 
to run the analysis (Table 2.8). We first use mortality rate as the dependent variable, and find that 
focus has a significant negative effect (b = −0.184, p < 0.001, column 1). Next, we use focus to 
predict readmission rates (b = 0.161, p < 0.001, column 2). Lastly, we incorporate the mortality 
rate into the full SUR model and find that it is negatively associated with readmission rates (b = 
−0.072, p < 0.01, column 3). We also observe that the beta coefficient for focus is marginally 
smaller than in column 1 but it retains significance at 0.001 level. 
We conduct additional subgroup analysis to test whether the mediation effect differs for 
high and low mortality hospitals (statistical results not included here). We find that the mediation 
effect is consistent across both high and low mortality hospitals, and that the effect size does not 
differ across these groups. Taken together, this provides strong evidence that mortality rate 
mediates the relationship between focus and readmission rates. 
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Table 2.8  Mediation Test Using Mortality Rate as the Mediator 
  Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 
  Mortality Readmission Readmission 
Focus -0.184*** 0.161*** 0.147*** 
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.020) 
Mortality   -0.072*** 
   (0.015) 
For-profit -0.153*** 0.255*** 0.244*** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) 
Government 0.060† 0.035 0.040 
 (0.036) (0.042) (0.041) 
Teaching  -0.053† 0.057† 0.053† 
 (0.028) (0.030) (0.030) 
Location -0.162*** 0.021 0.010 
 (0.045) (0.042) (0.041) 
Hospital size -0.060† 0.112*** 0.108*** 
 (0.032) (0.027) (0.027) 
Bed occ. rate -0.076** 0.121*** 0.116*** 
 (0.029) (0.022) (0.020) 
CMI -0.077** -0.229*** -0.235*** 
 (0.023) (0.029) (0.028) 
Nursing intensity 0.015 0.006 0.007 
 (0.013) (0.017) (0.017) 
CPQ (HF) -0.008 -0.017 -0.018 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
Constant 0.533*** 0.379*** 0.417*** 
 (0.036) (0.039) (0.041) 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,848 5,848 5,848 
F 21.85 65.15 65.21 
R2 0.185 0.403 0.407 
Clustered Standard Errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1. 
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Figure 2.1  Moderation Plot: Focus and Patient Experience for Readmission Rates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Our second contribution consists in showing that, together, focus and patient experience 
reduce readmission rates (indicated by negative coefficient in Model 5, Table 2.4). Considering the 
positive effect of focus and the negative effect of patient experience, this joint effect suggest that 
patient experience mitigates the negative influence of focus on readmission. To better understand 
the nature of the joint effects on readmission, we examine the interaction plot (Figure 2.1). We find 
that as focus increases, readmission rates increase regardless of the level of patient experience, as 
indicated by the upward sloping solid and dashed lines representing low and high levels of patient 
experience, respectively in Figure 2.1. Further, we observe that a low level of patient experience 
(i.e. the solid line) has a steeper slope and a higher end-point of readmission compared to a high 
level of patient experience (dashed line). This pattern of results suggests that together, focus with 
low level of patient experience is particularly harmful to readmission rates.  
Although non-linear effects were not hypothesized, focus and patient experience quadratic 
terms are included to ensure the accuracy of the beta coefficients associated with the interaction 
term in equation 1. Both quadratic terms (Focus2 and PatExp2) are statistically significant but in 
opposite directions (Model 4, Table 2.4). Focus2 has a negative sign, and along with its positive 
linear effect, indicates a negative U-shaped relationship between focus and readmission. This 
implies that low and high levels of focus are associated with low readmission rates, while moderate 
levels of focus result in relatively higher readmission rates. In contrast, PatExp2 is positive, while 
its direct effect is negative. This suggests a U-shaped relationship between patient experience and 
readmission, where low and high levels of patient experience are less desirable than moderate levels. 
Taken together, the non-linear and joint effects demonstrate the nuanced nature of relationships 
between focus and patient experience, and their impact on readmission rates. While our results 
-0.7
-0.5
-0.3
-0.1
0.1
0.3
0.5
0.7
Low Patient
Experience
High Patient
Experience
R
ea
d
m
is
si
o
n
R
at
es
Focus
33 
 
paint a complicated picture, they are important for all stakeholders because decisions made using 
results from prior studies may be incomplete and inaccurate as none of them include both focus 
and patient experience, or examine their joint effects, in one single study. Our study is the first step 
toward linking previously unstudied initiatives and their impacts.    
Third, our results related to the imbalance effect show that keeping balance between focus 
and patient experience is also important because favoring either focus or patient experience over 
the other degrades both types of performance, by increasing readmission and reducing patient 
satisfaction. Recall that imbalance, measured as the absolute difference between focus and patient 
experience, does not distinguish between positive and negative differences. We use a spline 
regression model to identify whether the negative influence is exacerbated when one of these is 
emphasized over the other. Spline regressions are frequently used to establish a point (or multiple 
points) where a continuous relationship changes slope at a ‘knot’ (Marsh & Cormier, 2002). A 
major advantage of spline regression is that it does not reduce sample size and attenuate a 
continuous variable. We adopt a spline function with a single knot and use one dummy variable to 
signify values above and below the knot. We define the difference between focus and patient 
experience as DFit = Focusit – PatExpit, and compute an indicator variable (D) which takes the 
value of zero when the difference (DFit) is negative and one otherwise. Specifically, DF is negative 
when hospitals emphasize patient experience over focus and positive when hospitals put more 
emphasis on focus than patient experience. The following set of equations represent these 
conditions: 
 
Readmission Rateit = β0 + β1Focusit + β2PatExpit + β31|DFit| + β32D(DFit – 0) + β4Chf,it + Xitγ + εit (5) 
  where DFit = Focusit – PatExpit  
(i) For DFit < 0 (D = 0),  
    Readmission Rateit = β0 + β1Focusit + β2PatExpit – β31DFit + β4Chf,it + Xitγ + εit (5a) 
(ii) For DFit ≥ 0 (D = 1),  
    Readmission Rateit = β0 + β1Focusit + β2PatExpit + (β31 + β32) DFit + β4Chf,it + Xitγ + εit (5b) 
 
We conduct a similar analysis for patient satisfaction. The results of both of these models 
are presented in Table 2.9. First, we note that the imbalance effects on readmission rates (b31 = 
0.066, p < 0.001) and on patient satisfaction (b31 = −0.108, p < 0.001) even after including D, the 
indicator spline variable, are consistent with our main models, both in algebraic sign and statistical 
significance. Next, we note that the indicator variable is marginally significant in both the 
readmission rates and patient satisfaction models. Specifically, we find that the indicator variable 
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in the readmission model is positive (b32 = 0.063, p = 0.089), which indicates that favoring focus 
over patient experience is associated with a higher readmission rates. In contrast, the negative sign 
in the patient satisfaction model (b32 = −0.084, p = 0.060) shows that favoring focus over patient 
satisfaction results in lower patient satisfaction. We used balance plots to further substantiate these 
results. In Figure 2.2, we show that an imbalance created by high focus increases readmission rates 
substantially (i.e. moving left to right on the x-axis), while imbalance from high patient experience 
does not increase readmission rates (moving bottom to top on the y-axis). If an increase in focus is 
accompanied with an increase in patient experience (i.e. imbalance is reduced), readmission rates 
remain the same. A similar pattern is observed in relation to patient satisfaction (Figure 2.3). 
However, patient satisfaction increases slightly with a reduction in imbalance.  
 
Figure 2.2  Balance Plot: Focus and Patient Experience for Readmission Rates 
 
Figure 2.3  Balance Plot: Focus and Patient Experience for Satisfaction 
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Table 2.9  Spline Regression using Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
  Readmission  Satisfaction 
  Model 1  Model 2 
Focus 0.119***  -0.041 
 (0.023) 
 (0.028) 
PatExp -0.063*  0.921*** 
 (0.025) 
 (0.050) 
|Focus-PatExp| (β31) 0.066***  -0.108*** 
 (0.017) 
 (0.026) 
Spline Dummy (β32)a 0.063†  -0.084† 
 (0.037) 
 (0.045) 
For-profit 0.216***  -0.135*** 
 (0.040) 
 (0.035) 
Government 0.022  -0.066*** 
 (0.039) 
 (0.017) 
Teaching 0.038  0.007 
 (0.031) 
 (0.023) 
Location -0.016  0.191*** 
 (0.039) 
 (0.024) 
Hospital size 0.123***  0.012 
 (0.036) 
 (0.023) 
Bed occ. rate 0.104***  0.120*** 
 (0.021) 
 (0.013) 
CMI -0.245***  0.165*** 
 (0.034) 
 (0.015) 
Nursing intensity -0.004  0.038* 
 (0.016) 
 (0.015) 
CPQ (HF) -0.009   
 (0.012) 
  
CPQ (All)   0.051*** 
 
  (0.010) 
Constant 0.306***  -0.040 
 (0.040) 
 (0.046) 
Time FE  Yes  Yes 
State FE Yes  Yes 
Observations 5,862  5,862 
F 64.23  377.98 
R2 0.411  0.804 
Clustered Standard Errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1. 
a: The positive sign in the readmission rates model indicates that favoring focus over patient experience is associated 
with higher readmission rates (b32 = 0.063, p = 0.089). The negative sign in the patient satisfaction model shows that 
favoring focus over patient experience results in lower patient satisfaction (b32 = −0.084, p = 0.060). 
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These results both validate our main results, and also help to isolate where and when the 
relationships occur. As a set, our results show that while any imbalance appear undesirable, it is in 
fact hospitals which favor focus over patient experience that suffer greater degradation in their 
performance, compared to the inverse where hospitals favor patient experience over focus.  
These results have critical implications for hospital management and regulators. Our study 
shows that managers face challenging tradeoffs in their pursuit to improve multiple dimensions of 
performance. A focus strategy has been associated with superior performance in numerous 
empirical studies, and has resulted in an inordinate emphasis on a few selected clinical specialties 
in many acute care hospitals.  However, our study shows that focus has a significant dark side that 
was not recognized in previous studies. We attribute this to a predominance of efficiency related 
performance measures such as cost and length of stay in prior studies. This negative effect of focus 
may be more salient in acute care general hospital settings, where management is required to offer 
a broad set of services.  
The dark side of focus is buttressed by the spline regression results, which show that 
emphasizing focus over patient experience has an undesirable impact on both readmission and 
patient satisfaction. As a set, our results suggest that management must critically evaluate how 
much to emphasize focus, especially if the objective is to improve non-efficiency oriented 
performance measures. In contrast, by substantiating the implicit influence of patient experience, 
we not only provide evidence of its broader benefits but also show that it may help to mitigate the 
negative impact of focus on both types of performance measures. At a higher level, our results 
imply that investing resources in practices that improve care and non-care aspects of patient 
experience have positive spillover effects beyond patient satisfaction. 
Finally, the results have significant implications for regulators responsible for designing 
policies to encourage hospital administrators to simultaneously improve multiple performance 
measures. Our results show that it may be very challenging to do so because no single mechanism 
positively impacts multiple performance measures. Our results also suggest that performance 
evaluation policies should be contingent on the type of hospitals. Specifically, specialty hospitals 
face less complex challenges and should not be evaluated in the same manner as a general acute 
care hospital. Recognizing these challenges should help regulators design policies that account for 
the inherent tradeoffs among different performance measures on the one hand, and accommodate 
different types of hospitals on the other.  
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2.6   Conclusion and Limitations 
 
Although focus and patient experience in hospitals have attracted immense attention from 
researchers, hospital administrators, and policy makers, our current understanding lacks a coherent 
theory to clearly explain their relationship with hospital performance. We address this research gap 
by providing a holistic view of these relationships. Our results underscore not only the dark side of 
focus, but also the beneficial effects of patient experience on readmission rates and patient 
satisfaction. Even so, our study has some limitations related to data and measures that might offer 
opportunity for future research.  
First, we use aggregated hospital level data. Some previous studies have used patient level 
data (KC & Terwiesch, 2011) or patient level data nested in hospitals (McDermott & Stock, 2011). 
However, readmission rates and overall patient satisfaction are aggregated from patient level 
responses, and should not significantly impact the relationships. Second, while our data span 2007 
to 2013, we only have two time windows because HCAHPS provides rolling data over a three-year 
window. Although, we validate our results with an extended four-period model, it would be useful 
to have longer panel or annual data. Our data are from 3027 acute care facilities, without specialty 
free-standing hospitals, which would be useful for understanding the generalizability of our results. 
Finally, for our unit of analysis, we measure focus and readmission for “heart-failure (HF)” patients, 
while patient experience and patient satisfaction are measured for all inpatients. While this is logical 
for hypotheses 1a and 2b, which link variables in the same sets, it may pose a challenge when 
evaluating hypotheses 1b and 2a, which link focus with patient satisfaction, and patient experience 
with readmission, respectively. In hypothesis 1b, it is likely that the effect is underestimated due to 
the smaller HF patient set; but the strong significance of our results should ameliorate the “unit of 
analysis” concern. In case of hypothesis 2b, HF patients constitute a part of the overall inpatient 
population, and clinical and administrative staff are trained to interact with all patients in the same 
manner. Again, the differing patient sets used to measure patient experience and readmission should 
result in underestimation of the effect. This conservative approach has an advantage: using different 
units of analysis, and hence different respondents, reduces the potential for common method bias. 
We expect our study to spur other researchers to more thoroughly investigate the effect of 
focus and patient experience in different contexts and for different types of performance measures. 
For instance, one potential question is to examine whether the effect of focus changed before and 
after the implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Our research primarily addresses the 
period before the ACA. However, the Hospital Readmission Reduction Program in the ACA, 
38 
 
implemented in 2013, shifted hospital incentives toward reducing readmission rates for evaluating 
the hospital for pay for performance program, making it an interesting question to study.  
Notwithstanding the limitations, our results highlight the challenges that hospital 
administrators face in pursuing seemingly mutually exclusive performance objectives. While there 
is no one magic bullet to improve both readmission rates and overall patient satisfaction at the same 
time, our results show that patient experience has desirable direct and indirect effects because of 
its ability to overcome the negative effects of focus.  
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Chapter 3  
Does Announcing the Visit Matter? An Empirical 
Examination in US Nursing Homes 
 
3.1   Introduction 
 
Various types of inspections have been used to improve and monitor quality and safety in 
the manufacturing and service industries (Anand et al., 2012; Ball et al., 2017; Gray et al., 2011; 
Levine et al., 2012; Mani & Muthulingam, 2019; Short et al., 2016). Inspecting agencies make an 
important choice between two inspection modes: either announce the inspection before arriving at 
the facility or make an unannounced inspection with little advance notification (Greenfield et al., 
2012; Klerks et al., 2013). In practice, agencies use both types of strategies, and may sometimes 
combine the two inspection modes (GAO 2004, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2008, 2012a, 2012b). Table 
3.1 lists the use of announced and unannounced inspections strategies at various regulatory and 
accrediting agencies. Some agencies, such as the Federal Highway Administration, only use the 
announced inspection strategy. They believe that unannounced inspections create a "gotcha" 
environment that damages their relationship with the inspected organizations (GAO, 2012a). 
However, Table 3.1 also shows that the healthcare industry often uses the unannounced inspection 
strategy. According to Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and The Joint 
Commission (TJC), unannounced inspections better capture an accurate picture of the 
organization’s actual day-to-day processes, while announced inspections allow for temporal 
adjustments in organization’s daily processes (GAO, 2004, 2006, 2007b). Finally, Table 3.1 shows 
that some agencies, like the U.S. Coast Guard and the Department of the Interior, use both types of 
inspection strategies (GAO, 2008). While these agencies argue for the efficacy of unannounced 
inspections, they also concede that unannounced inspections create other issues. For instance, 
unannounced visits may occur when needed records and personnel were absent during inspections 
(Allen, 2015; GAO, 2007a, 2012b). In contrast, announced inspections enable organizations to 
assemble appropriate records and personnel prior to the visit (GAO 2012a, 2012b).  
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Table 3.1  Current Usage of Announced and Unannounced Inspections 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inspecting body Announced Unannounced Target unit 
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)1 X  Highway infrastructure 
Department of Education (DOE)2 X  Schools 
Commission on Accreditation of Rehabilitation 
Facilities (CARF) 
X  Healthcare organizations 
Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)3  X Healthcare organizations 
Healthcare Facilities Accreditation Program  X Healthcare organizations 
The Joint Commission (TJC)4 Conditional X Healthcare organizations 
Department of Defense (DOD)5  X Child development facilities 
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)6  X Animals and plant dealers 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA)7 Foreign region Domestic region Drug manufacturing plants 
U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)8  X X Maritime facilities 
Department of the Interior (DOI)9 X X Oil and gas facilities 
US. Government Accountability Office (GAO) Reports: 1 GAO-12-474, 2 GAO/HEHS-96-143, 3 GAO-04-850 & GAO-06-416, 4 GAO-07-79,  
                                                                                           5 GAO/HEHS-00-7, 6 GAO-10-945, 7 GAO-08-224T, 8 GAO-08-12, 9 GAO-12-423. 
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Despite the debates on the efficacy of these different inspection strategies, scholars have 
not examined the operational differences between announced and unannounced inspections. A few 
studies that have explored announced and unannounced inspections did not consider the impact on 
operational performance outcomes (e.g., quality, safety) (Ehlers et al., 2017; Greenfield et al., 2012; 
Klerks et al., 2013), which is the main goal in adhering to standards. In addition, an implicit 
assumption of unannounced inspections is that it will lead to more attention to the standard and will 
better sustain performance, but no coherent theory explains how announced and unannounced 
inspections lead to operational performance outcomes. Further, scholars have not investigated the 
differences between the immediate and sustained effects of an announced versus and unannounced 
inspection strategy on performance. Therefore, research is needed to better understand the 
difference between announced and unannounced inspections, and its immediate and sustained 
operational performance effects. This study addresses these research gaps and examines the 
following questions: Do announced and unannounced inspections lead to an immediate and/or a 
sustained increase in overall quality performance? To the best of our knowledge, it would be the 
first study to compare the operational performance differences between different inspection 
strategies and their short and long term operational effects. 
 The attention-based view (Ocasio, 1997; Shepherd et al., 2017) provides a theoretical lens 
to investigate this question. This theory implies that what firms do depends on what they focus their 
attention on (Ocasio, 1997). Drawing on this theory, we argue that announced inspection results in 
transient attention to the standard while unannounced inspection results in sustained attention. We 
operationalize operational performance as quality performance, and empirically examine 
immediate and sustained effects of announced and unannounced inspections on quality 
performance in nursing homes that are accredited by The Joint Commission (TJC). An econometric 
analysis of panel data from the CMS, TJC, and Long-Term Care Focus datasets spanning a 4-year 
period shows that both announced and unannounced inspections increase nursing home quality. 
However, an unannounced inspection leads to more sustained quality performance, while quality 
performance tends to decline after an announced inspection.  
This study makes several theoretical contributions. First, it is the first research to 
investigate the effect of announced and unannounced inspections on operational performance. 
Previous literature does not go beyond examining the effect of announced and unannounced 
inspections to compliance of the standard. Second, it contributes to developing a theory that 
explains the difference between announced and unannounced inspections on performance 
outcomes. We provide strong theoretical explanation of how the types of inspections related to the 
attention in attention-based view theory and the actual practice in nursing homes. Third, this 
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research provides empirical evidence that announced and unannounced inspections play different 
roles in affecting immediate and sustained quality performance.   
This study also provides important managerial and practical implications. First, the results 
have broad applicability to inspection agencies, who want to improve and maintain quality through 
inspection and compliance. The analyses suggest that announced inspections result in immediate 
improvements in quality performance, but this is effect is more short term. Organizations can make 
temporal adjustments to processes prior to the inspection. In contrast, unannounced inspections 
tend to result in more sustained improved quality performance over time. Therefore, in the context 
of healthcare, unannounced inspections can be effective where sustained high-quality performance 
is critically important. Next, we empirically show the quality performance benefits for 
organizations interested in going through accreditation. The results suggest that inspections help 
organizations improve and sustain quality performance.  
The rest of the paper has the following organization. The Sections 3.2 and 3.3 describe 
research context, relevant literature and hypothesis development. Section 3.4 gives the research 
design, empirical setting, data, and describes the empirical strategies employed. Section 3.5 gives 
the results and 3.6 discusses the implications.  Finally, Section 3.7 discusses limitations and topics 
for future research.    
 
3.2   Research Context 
 
Healthcare organizations that have TJC accreditation provide an attractive context to study 
inspection strategies for several reasons. First, TJC is the largest accrediting agency that accredits 
more than 21,000 healthcare organizations and programs across the United States. 7  Second, 
inspection plays a critical role in the accreditation process at TJC.8 Before the inspection, the 
organization prepares for the site visit by evaluating if they met the accreditation standards and 
takes appropriate actions if they have any deviations from the standard. Then, inspectors visit the 
organization and carry out an on-site inspection. During the inspection, inspectors interview the top 
management team, staff, residents/patients and their family members, trace the delivered care and 
treatment, and review multiple documents to ensure compliance to the criteria. Depending on the 
inspection outcome, TJC may require the organization to make improvements for any unmet 
                                                     
7 https://www.jointcommission.org/facts_about_the_joint_commission/  
8 Surveyors (inspectors) visit healthcare organizations to evaluate compliance with pertinent standards. This 
visit implies an inspection and is called as a survey 
(http://www.jointcommission.org/about/jointcommissionfaqs.aspx). 
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criteria.9 Thus, the entire accreditation process has the following phases: preparing for an inspection, 
receiving an inspection, and addressing non-compliance issues identified from the inspection. Third, 
TJC announces the first inspection for an initial application in advance, but recurring inspections 
are unannounced (GAO, 2004, 2007b). Therefore, TJC accredited organizations provide an 
attractive context to investigate announced and unannounced inspections.  
However, TJC did not always conduct recurring inspections on an unannounced basis. 
Before 2006, all TJC inspections were announced in advance. TJC shifted from announced to 
unannounced regime in 2006 to follow federal government guidelines, which indicated that TJC 
had not identified some serious operational deficiencies that could have been identified with 
unannounced inspections (GAO, 2004, 2007b). TJC conceded that when healthcare organizations 
no longer know when inspectors will visit, they would more likely maintain compliance on an 
ongoing basis. TJC further postulated that an unannounced inspection will eliminate the ramp-up 
process and reduce unnecessary costs, which occurs when the organization view the inspection as 
a short-term event. Thus, TJC perceived that adopting an unannounced inspections strategy will 
increase the credibility of the inspection and accreditation process by disclosing a clearer picture 
of the actual healthcare delivery systems and actual care delivered (JCAHO & JCR, 2006). 
However, there was a lot of anxiety when TJC initially started conducting unannounced inspections. 
Some felt anxious since not having time to prepare for the inspection and not having key staff 
present during the inspection would lead to more deficiencies (JCAHO & JCR, 2007). Others tried 
to leverage this opportunity and through education empowered their staff to be more engaged in 
the accreditation process, which would result in more ongoing compliance (JCAHO & JCR, 2006). 
Overall, nobody knew exactly how this change would work. 
We note that announcement timing is the main difference between announced and 
unannounced inspections. An announced inspection is typically scheduled one month before the 
actual site visit. In contrast, for an unannounced inspection, TJC notifies the relevant staff member 
of the inspection schedule on the morning of the inspection day, by 7:30 am in the organization’s 
local time zone. We take this setting to examine announced and unannounced inspections on quality 
performance in US nursing homes. 
  
                                                     
9 https://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/6/2009_LTC_Overview_Combo_10_30_09.pdf 
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3.3   Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 
Inspection Literature Review 
A number of industries ranging from manufacturing, pharmaceutical, healthcare, oil and 
gas, to many others use inspection as an effective tool to ensure compliance (Anand et al., 2012; 
Ball et al., 2017; Gray et al., 2011; Levine et al., 2012; Mani & Muthulingam, 2019; Short et al., 
2016). Researchers have investigated inspections in the context of occupational safety (Levine et 
al., 2012; Short et al., 2016), food safety (Ibanez & Toffel, 2019; Reske et al., 2007), healthcare 
compliance (Ehlers et al., 2017; Lu & Wedig, 2012), environmental performance (Dhanorkar et al., 
2018; Mani & Muthulingam, 2019), product recall (Ball et al., 2017), and quality risk (Gray et al., 
2011). Two major streams of the literature on inspections have emerged, reflecting the perspective 
of the inspectors and the organizations. Table 3.2 summarizes the literature from these two streams 
of research. The first stream of literature examines factors that influence inspectors’ inspection 
activity and stringency. The findings indicate that market competition, work environment (e.g., 
weather), inspector’s experience, inspector’s schedule, inspector team composition, and other 
inspector characteristics influence inspection outcome and leniency (Ball et al., 2017; Bennett et 
al., 2013; Ibanez & Toffel, 2019; Scott, 2018; Short et al., 2016). The second research stream 
examines the relationship between inspections and organizational factors on performance outcomes. 
These studies show the relationship between cultural distance and inspection outcome (Gray et al., 
2011), chain (network affiliation) and inspection outcome (Lu & Wedig, 2012), inspection and 
occupational safety (Levine et al., 2012), and R&D colocation and inspection outcome (Gray et al., 
2015). A few recent studies focus on the behavioral perspective of inspected organizations. For 
example, Mani and Muthulingam (2018) examine the role of organizational learning  (e.g., 
cumulative volume of inspections) on environmental performance. Specifically, they show that 
inspected organizations learn from direct and vicarious inspections. Dhanorkar et al. (2018) also 
showed that the timing of an inspection influences managerial attention in project implementation. 
Anand et al. (2012) studied inspections as renewal events that help prevent system deterioration. 
They concede that, while inspections will increase managerial attention to operational activities in 
the organization, but the organization will inevitably shift its attention to other priorities after the 
inspection.  
Overall, the literature review highlights several important gaps. First, most authors have 
focused on the inspection compliance (e.g., number of non-compliance issues or deficiencies), but 
only a few have focused on operational outcomes. For instance, Ball et al (2017) examined the 
effect of inspections on product recalls and Levine et al., (2012) considered the effect on 
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occupational safety (e.g., injury rate). Second, little research has investigated the types of 
inspections: some researchers have considered types of inspections as control variables but not as 
the main objective of the study. Moreover, in many studies that were included in the review, 
announced and unannounced inspections are poorly delineated. Instead, the authors tend to 
distinguish inspection types based on routine and non-routine inspections (Ibanez & Toffel, 2019; 
Short et al., 2016), related and non-related inspections (Dhanorkar et al., 2018), inspection outcome 
severity (Ball et al., 2017; Dhanorkar et al., 2018; Mani & Muthulingam, 2019), and entity 
responsible for financing the inspection (Short et al., 2016).  
According to three key articles identified and reviewed by Greenfield et al. (2007) and 
Klerks et al. (2013), previous studies focus exclusively on inspection outcome and lack consensus 
about the effects of announced and unannounced inspections. On the one hand, Klerks et al. (2013) 
and Ehlers et al. (2017) do not find any empirical evidence in the healthcare industry that inspection 
outcomes from announced and unannounced inspections at the same organizations are statistically 
significantly different. Short et al. (2016) also show that the control variable that indicates whether 
an inspection is announced was insignificant in the context of global supply chain. On the other 
hand, other studies provide evidence of the beneficial effect of announced over unannounced 
inspections. For example, Reske et al. (2007) demonstrate that the restaurants that received 
announced inspections in addition to routine unannounced inspections report better inspection 
outcomes (fewer violations) than the restaurants that received only routine unannounced 
inspections. Greenfield et al. (2012) similarly suggest that Australian hospitals are more likely to 
meet inspection outcome standards if subjected to 2-day notice announced inspections rather than 
unannounced inspections. Besides, based on the results yielded by analytical models, Kim (2015) 
demonstrates that announced inspections are superior to unannounced inspections in overall 
efficiency. Consequently, current studies do not fully comprehend the different aspects of 
announced and unannounced inspections. First, previous studies do not fully incorporate 
operational perspective. The authors do not go beyond articulating the relationship between 
inspection types, announced and unannounced inspections, and inspection outcome. Second, there 
is no empirical support for the beneficial effect of unannounced inspections, which contradicts the 
popular use of unannounced inspections in practice. Third, a coherent theory elucidating the 
underlying distinction between announced and unannounced inspections is presently lacking. Our 
study fills these important gaps in the current literature. 
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Table 3.2  Literature Review 
Article 
Industry  
sector 
Research focus† 
Independent 
variables 
Dependent 
variables 
(a) (b) (1) (2) 
Ball et al. 
(2017) 
Medical 
device 
Investigate the moderating role of inspector 
experience on the relationship between  
inspection outcome and future product recalls 
Inspection outcome, inspector 
experience 
Future recall 
(operational) 
X   X 
Scott (2018) Road 
Examine how work environment (bad weather) 
influences inspectors' productivity 
Weather 
Total inspections; 
inspection 
outcome 
X   X 
Bennett et al. 
(2013) 
Vehicle test 
Examine the relationship between competition and 
inspection stringency 
Competition 
Inspection 
outcome  
X  NA NA 
Ibanez & 
Toffel (2019) 
Restaurants & 
food 
Study the relationship between  
inspection scheduling and inspection quality 
Inspector’s schedule, Inspector 
experience (e.g. prior outcome) 
Inspection 
outcome 
X  * * 
Reske et al. 
(2007)  
Restaurants 
Study how announced inspections affect food safety 
- announced inspections reduce critical violations  
Announced and unannounced 
inspections 
Inspection 
outcome 
X  X X 
Short et al. 
(2016) 
Various 
Identify the factors that influence violation detection 
- inspection outcome is unaffected by inspection type 
(announced or unannounced)  
Inspector experience, team 
composition 
Inspection 
outcome 
X  X X 
Ehlers et al. 
(2017) 
Hospital 
Study the effectiveness of announced and 
unannounced inspections in detecting 
violations 
- unannounced inspections are not more effective than 
announced inspections with respect to non-
compliance detection 
Inspection type (announced or 
not) 
Inspection 
outcome 
X  X X 
Greenfield et 
al. (2012) 
Healthcare  
Compare announced inspection and short-notice 
inspection (2 days or 1.5 hour before)  
- unannounced inspections detect more non-
compliance than announced inspections 
Inspection type (timing of 
announcement) 
Inspection 
outcome 
X  X X 
(a) Inspection body or Inspector's perspective (b) Inspected organization's perspective 
(1) Announced inspection (2) Unannounced inspection 
* Inspection announcement is not explicitly mentioned or controlled (routine and non-routine inspections are included in the data) 
** Announced and unannounced inspections are included in the data, but interpretation is limited due to the empirical setting. 
†This column includes research question from inspection studies, but the findings are further reported only if the study is relevant to announced and unannounced inspections. 
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Table 3.2  Literature Review (Continued) 
Article 
Industry  
sector 
Research focus 
Independent 
variables 
Dependent 
variables 
(a) (b) (1) (2) 
Dhanorkar et 
al. (2018) 
Mfg. 
Investigate whether punitive tactics (inspection) help 
firms in implementing supportive program 
Inspection (type, outcome) 
Recommendation 
Program 
implementation 
rate 
 X  X 
Gray et al. 
(2011) 
Pharma 
Identify which factors influence quality risk 
(inspection outcome) in offshore and domestic plants  
Employee skill, geographic and 
cultural distance   
Inspection 
outcome 
 X  X 
Levine et al. 
(2012 
Various 
Investigate how occupational safety inspection 
influences injury rate 
Unannounced inspection Injury rate  X  X 
Lu & Wedig 
(2013) 
Nursing 
homes 
Investigate the relationship between geographic 
clustering and quality (inspection outcome) 
Chain size 
Inspection 
outcome 
 X  X 
Gray et al. 
(2015) 
Pharma 
Study the effect of R&D colocation on conformance 
quality (inspection outcome) and identify moderators 
Colocation, moderators 
(technology, knowledge, size) 
Inspection 
outcome 
 X  X 
Mani & 
Muthulingam 
(2018) 
Oil 
Examine relationship between  
organizational learning from inspection experience 
and environmental performance (inspection outcome) 
Direct and indirect inspection 
experience 
Inspection 
outcome 
 X * * 
Anand et al. 
(2012) 
Pharma 
Study whether decay in operational routines is 
systematic and predictable 
Time since last inspection, 
M&A 
Inspection 
outcome 
 X ** ** 
Klerks et al. 
(2013) 
Nursing 
homes 
Investigate the differing effects of announced and 
unannounced inspections on risk detection 
(inspection outcome) 
- unannounced inspections do not report more 
violations than announced inspections 
- while inspectors noted a major difference between 
two inspections, in interviews, managers stated that 
they do not perceive much difference 
Inspection type (announced or 
not) 
Inspection 
outcome 
X X X X 
This paper  
Nursing 
homes 
Study how announced and unannounced 
inspections differently affect the level and the 
variation in quality performance  
Inspection type (announced 
or not) 
Clinical quality  X X X 
(a) Inspection body or Inspector's perspective (b) Inspected organization's perspective 
(1) Announced inspection (2) Unannounced inspection 
* Inspection announcement is not explicitly mentioned or controlled (routine and non-routine inspections are included in the data) 
** Announced and unannounced inspections are included in the data, but interpretation is limited due to the empirical setting. 
†This column includes research question from inspection studies, but the findings are further reported only if the study is relevant to announced and unannounced inspections. 
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Attention-Based View 
The attention-based view (ABV) of an organization offers a theoretical lens on how 
organizational attention influences performance. According to this theory organizational attention 
refers to “the socially structured pattern of attention by decision-makers within an organization” 
(Ocasio, 1997). Shepherd et al. (2017) define top managers’ attention as “the focusing of time, 
energy, and effort on issues and answers” and classify it into transient and sustained attention. 
Transient attention refers to “a fleeting focus of time, energy, and effort on a particular task” and 
sustained attention refers to “a prolonged focus of time, energy, and effort on a particular task” 
(Shepherd et al., 2017).  
 Ocasio (1997) proposes in ABV that organizations (firms) are “systems of structurally 
distributed attention” and that organizational behavior results from allocating attention of decision-
makers to the specific context and situation that organizations face. Specifically, Ocasio (1997) 
proposes three aspects of organization attention: focus of attention, situated attention, and structural 
distribution of attention. First, focus of attention indicates “what decision-makers do depend on 
what issues and answers they focus their attention on.” Next, situated attention indicates “what 
issues and answers decision-makers focus on, and what they do, depends on the particular context 
or situation they find themselves in.” Lastly, structural distribution of attention refers to “what 
particular context or situation decision makers find themselves in, and how they attend to it, 
depends on how the firm’s rules, resources, and social relationships regulate and control the 
distribution and allocation of issues, answers, and decision-makers into specific activities, 
communications, and procedures.” We delineate announced and unannounced inspections in the 
context of nursing homes using the ABV. 
Attention to Announced Inspection 
The top management team in a nursing home consists of administrators, directors of 
nursing, and medical directors. They coordinate staff, care, and services at the nursing home, and 
manage the external regulation and accreditation processes (Castle et al., 2009). They focus 
attention and resources on inspections because it leads to quality improvement and signals high 
quality to consumers, which improves organizational survival (JCAHO & JCR, 2007; Ruef &Scott,  
1998; Su & Linderman, 2016; Wagner et al., 2012b; Westphal et al., 1997). In addition, they 
allocate their time and attention to inspections because failure to comply would damage the nursing 
home’s reputation. However, top managers’ attention is limited (Ocasio, 1997), and a number of 
organizational issues compete for their attention. Therefore, the level and the duration of their 
attention that they allocate to an inspection may depend on whether the inspection is announced or 
unannounced.  
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In an announced inspection, the organization receives notification of the inspection well in 
advance to the site visit. In addition, an inspection is a non-routine event and not part of the typical 
daily operating activities in a nursing home. Top managers have limited attentional resources for a 
non-routine event and other important issues compete for their attention (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001; 
Ocasio, 1997). When an inspection is scheduled far in advance, managers may focus their attention 
on the immediate short-term daily operational needs such as managing staff problems. Thus, an 
announced inspection results in transient attention whereby the top managers will respond to an 
inspection if and only if the scheduled inspection is approaching and requires immediate 
preparations for the visit. According to some of our interviews of healthcare administrators as well 
as a case study conducted by TJC (JCAHO & JCR, 2006, 2007), the administrators indicated that 
preparing for an announced inspection is like “cramming for an exam in college,” “everybody is 
scrambling around the facility in the months and weeks before the inspection,” and “an intense 
period of time when we would do tons of work.” During this period, managers allocate their 
attention and resources to the inspection in a temporary but intense manner.  
When an inspection is announced, managers allocate transient attention through 
interactions and communication with the employees about the impending inspection. For instance, 
nursing homes need to post the upcoming inspection schedule at all entrances to alert staff members 
before the inspectors’ visit, which creates an intended awareness and concern about the inspection 
(JCAHO, 2004; JCAHO & JCR, 2006). Such transient attention may last several weeks, because 
preparing for an inspection requires that all employees be familiar with the current standards and 
processes before the inspection visit.10 After the inspection, attention may be reallocated to other 
emerging priorities since it is a scarce resource. Administrators also noted that after the inspection 
everyone breathed a sigh of relief and went back to their normal way of doing things, indicating 
that attention to the accreditation standards might not be sustained over time (JCAHO & JCR, 2006, 
2007). Specifically, one administrator said “We monitored for a little bit of time, but we’d stop 
monitoring (after the inspection).” In sum, under the announced inspection strategy, top managers 
allocate high levels of attention to the accreditation criteria for a limited time.  
Attention to Unannounced Inspection 
In the unannounced inspection strategy, the nursing home receives an unscheduled 
inspection that is not known until the morning of the site visit. This inspection is also a non-routine 
event, but top managers cannot allocate their attention away from the accreditation criteria since 
                                                     
10 Retrieved from https://www.centrahealthcare.com/calling-all-rehab-professionals-how-to-prepare-for-a-
joint-commission-survey/ and 
https://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/18/LTC_10_steps_to_Accred_08.pdf  
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they cannot plan in advance for the site visit. Managers need to always be diligent to the 
accreditation criteria since they cannot plan for the inspection in advance and could potentially 
receive a negative inspection outcome. To avoid a negative inspection outcome, managers are likely 
to allocate a sustained level of attention to the accreditation criteria. Interestingly, our conversation 
with healthcare administrators that experienced unannounced inspections substantiate this thinking: 
they indicated that unannounced inspections are less disruptive than announced inspections because 
staff can concentrate on their job without looking at the inspection schedule. One administrator 
stated that his staff retained the same focused intensity on the criteria after the inspection as they 
did before the inspection (JCAHO & JCR, 2006, 2007).   
 Ocasio and Joseph (2017) suggest that sustained attention engenders both formal and 
informal interaction and communication on the selected issue. Sustained attention on an issue 
results in getting incorporate into routine meetings, reports, and administrative protocols (Ocasio, 
1997). In practice, top managers at nursing homes prepare a checklist, distribute leadership 
notebook, held periodic quality resource councils, and educated staff to increase employee 
engagement in continuous readiness.11 Since unannounced inspections are not viewed as scheduled 
events, but they motivate the organization to continuously meeting their quality and service 
standards. Thus, top managers will maintain sustained levels of attention on the accreditation 
criteria.  
Attention and Quality 
While the previous literature argues that inspections influence quality performance (Anand 
et al., 2012; Ball et al., 2017; Gray & Shimshack, 2011; Mani & Muthulingam, 2019), we know 
little about the relationship between inspection mode (announced/unannounced) and quality 
performance. However, the ABV implies that unannounced inspections will likely cause managers 
to maintain a sustained level of attention on accreditation. But, an announced inspection has a 
greater immediate effect than an unannounced inspection, because a prior notice leads to intense 
transient attention of top managers and provides time and opportunity to enhance the immediate 
quality performance. Instead, unannounced inspections lead to a sustained attention that may 
eliminate the ramp-up approach. These arguments suggest the following hypotheses:  
 
H1. a) Announced and b) unannounced inspections increase the immediate 
quality performance. 
 
                                                     
11 Transcript of unannounced survey telephone conference call on March 9, 2006. Retrieved from 
http://www.jointcommission.org:80/NR/rdonlyres/8220A9E6-5278-4FAE-A7BB-
FB14DAB631AE/0/unann_surv_transcript.pdf via wayback machine (https://archive.org/web).  
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H1c. Announced inspections have a greater effect on immediate quality 
performance than unannounced inspections. 
 
However, unannounced inspection visits are more likely to exert a persistent effect on 
quality performance relative to the announced inspection visits. For instance, announced 
inspections that call for immediate attention can prompt the facility managers to exhibit an 
opportunistic behavior, while reverting to the normal practices after the inspection without making 
any systemic or permanent changes. In contrast, an unannounced inspection draws sustained 
attention and mandates conformance to standards on an ongoing basis, making it more likely to 
result in continuous improvements in quality performance. This suggests the following hypotheses:  
 
H2. a) Announced and b) unannounced inspections increase sustained quality 
performance.  
 
H2c. Announced inspections have a smaller effect on sustained quality 
performance than unannounced inspections. 
 
3.4   Data and Variables 
 
Sample and Data Collection 
The data comes from the CMS, Long-Term Care Focus, and TJC. We first obtained a full 
list of Medicare or Medicaid certified nursing homes from the CMS Nursing Home Compare. We 
then retrieved the nursing home name, address, and characteristics, including ownership, hospital 
affiliated status, and quality measure items that are reported and updated on a quarterly basis. Next, 
we obtained other relevant nursing home information from the CMS Provider of Services (POS), 
CMS Cost Report, and Long-Term Care Focus datasets. The POS dataset had information on the 
number of beds, nursing home chain membership (network affiliation), and staffing information. 
The Cost Report had financial information such as operating revenue and expenses. The Long-
Term Care Focus contains important resident variables that CMS Online Survey, Certification and 
Reporting (OSCAR) and Certification and Survey Provider Enhanced Reports (CAPSER) have 
offered. We thus obtained facility-level acuity index and payer mix information from Long-Term 
Care Focus. Then we merged the data using Medicare provider number, which is a unique identifier 
across data sources. Finally, we obtained nursing home name, address, accreditation program, 
inspection date, and accreditation outcome by scraping from the TJC Quality Check website 
(http://www.qualitycheck.org/). We combined the TJC data with the previous dataset by matching 
the nursing home name and address because TJC data does not contain the Medicare provider 
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number. This process resulted in 834 TJC accredited nursing homes with a Medicare provider 
number after excluding prisons, VA facilities and non-Medicare or non-Medicaid facilities.  
We use nursing home quarterly data in the analysis. Quarterly data is the shortest time 
interval in our dataset, and using yearly data may not capture fluctuations in quality performance 
caused by inspections. Quarterly data also enables us to examine both immediate and sustained 
effects of inspections. However, we use data range from 2013 to 2016 for several reasons. First, we 
do not have data from 2006, when the TJC regime changed from announced to unannounced 
inspections. We note that more reliable and accurate quality measures in Nursing Home Compare 
were released after implementing MDS 3.0 in late 2010.12 Next, the current data range allows us to 
provide a reliable estimate of announced and unannounced inspections conducted since 2013. It is 
critical to know the current and previous inspection dates and types (e.g., initial or recurring 
inspection) to identify whether the current inspection is announced or unannounced. Since TJC 
provides a comprehensive accreditation history from 2009 and the inspection interval can be up to 
39 months, 2013 is the appropriate starting point of identification.13  
 
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable of nursing home quality comes from Nursing Home Compare and 
consists of multiple items that measure quality. These quality items represent overall quality rather 
than inspection outcome (e.g., non-compliance during an inspection), and they do not come from 
the inspectors or the accreditation decision.14 Therefore, the items do not directly influence the 
accreditation outcome. However, these items are important because the set of quality measures are 
converted to CMS nursing home star ratings, where potential consumers can access this quality 
performance rating of a nursing home. We selected these eleven items (see Table A1) that have 
been included in determining the nursing home star rating between 2013 and 2016. These items 
assess how each nursing home addresses its residents’ physical and clinical needs. The items have 
good accountability, as the Research Triangle Institute and the National Quality Forum 
demonstrated the validity, reliability, and reportability for each one.15 We first convert a value of 
each item to an 100-point scale following the scoring method in the nursing home star rating (CMS, 
2012). For each item, we assign 100 points for top performers. Then, we assign 1 to 99 points for 
                                                     
12 https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-Assessment-
Instruments/NursingHomeQualityInits/NHQIMDS30.html 
13 We note that TJC updated the interval of unannounced inspections to 18–36 months in 2011, while 
previously it was 18–39 months (GAO, 2011). 
14 Confirmed through interviews with an associate director at TJC and a previous healthcare administrator.  
15 https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-Assessment-
Instruments/NursingHomeQualityInits/index.html 
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remained nursing homes based on the updated national percentile after eliminating top performers. 
The only exception is the activities of daily living (ADL) item in Table A1. We use the state-
specific quantile for the ADL measure, because ADL can be influenced by state Medicaid policies. 
Following the CMS manual, we assign 100 points for the best performers, 20 points for the worst 
performing quantile, and 40, 60, and 80 points for the second, third, and fourth quantile, 
respectively (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2012). For the nursing homes in the 
states with fewer than five facilities, we use the quantile from national distribution, as the manual 
suggests.  
We categorize the eleven items into three groups, all residents, long-stay residents, and 
short-stay residents, instead of considering individual item respectively. The residents are denoted 
as long-stay residents if they stayed in a nursing home for a period longer than 100 days and are 
short-stay residents otherwise. Long-stay quality items are collected only from long-stay residents 
and short-stay quality exclusively from short-stay residents by CMS. There are eight items for long-
stay residents and three items for short-stay residents in Table A1. To create measures for the 
dependent variables, we first construct the most comprehensive measure, all resident quality, by 
adding up all 11 items in nursing home star rating in Table A1. Next, we compute a measure of 
long-stay (short-stay) quality by aggregating long-stay (short-stay) resident items in the nursing 
home star rating.  
It is also important to note that the computed quality measures represent relative quality not 
absolute quality, similar to Su and Linderman (2016) who used this notion to highlight that high-
quality stands for an organization’s overall quality relative to its competitors. This concept of 
relative quality corresponds to the achievement score in nursing home Value Based Purchasing 
program, which forms the basis of CMS’ pay for performance program starting in 2019.16  
 
Independent Variables 
To examine the immediate effects of inspection in H1, we construct two dummy variables 
that indicate whether a nursing home received an announced or unannounced inspection visit in a 
given corresponding quarter. In other words, the announced visit variable takes the value of 1 if a 
nursing home receives an announced inspection visit at quarter t. For non-TJC-accredited nursing 
                                                     
16 https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-Assessment-Instruments/Value-Based-
Programs/Other-VBPs/SNF-VBP.html 
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homes, the value of this variable is always 0. The coding of these variables including exceptional 
conditions was verified extensively.17  
To investigate the sustained effects in H2, we create dummies for relative timing of 
inspection entry, up to two-quarter leading and lagged variables for both inspection visit indicators. 
The coding is similar to and consistent with other empirical studies (see for instance, Autor (2003) 
and Hydari et al. (2019)). We do not consider periods more than two quarters because the post-
effect of the current inspection might be contaminated by the pre-effect of the next inspection if a 
nursing home has a minimum six-quarter interval between inspections.  
 
Matching Variables 
Ownership. Ownership may predict quality level and thus the likelihood of applying for the TJC 
accreditation program (Chesteen et al., 2005; Wagner et al., 2012a). For-profit nursing homes 
would likely apply for the accreditation program because the TJC accreditation signals superior 
quality to potential customers who seek better care. 18  However, for-profit nursing home 
management may be also interested in cutting costs instead of investing resources into the TJC 
accreditation program, which requires higher standards. Conversely, governmental nursing homes 
are more likely to seek to deliver higher level of quality and safety through TJC accreditation. To 
control for nursing home ownership, we use two ownership dummies variables to describe three 
ownership groups: for-profit, not-for-profit, and governmental nursing homes as a baseline group. 
This classification has been used in several other studies (Afendulis et al., 2016; Grabowski et al., 
2016, 2004).  
Chain membership. To control for the effect of chain membership (network affiliation), we use a 
dichotomous variable indicating whether a nursing home is owned by a multi-facility organization, 
a chain. Members of nursing home chains can achieve greater economies of scale and higher quality 
(Lu & Wedig, 2012; Wagner et al., 2012a). We note that some large chains, such as Lexington 
Health Network, participated in TJC accreditation as a set.  
Location. Nursing homes in urban areas are more likely to be found accredited than those located 
in rural areas (Wagner et al., 2012a). Thus, to control for location, we create a dummy variable and 
assign it the value of 1 if a nursing home is located in an urban area. 
                                                     
17 We verified them by reviewing hospital affiliation status, accreditation program type, and accreditation 
history from 2010 to 2016. Further discussion of exceptions is provided in the Robustness Check section. 
18 TJC has touted the benefits of its accreditation, including gaining competitive advantage, signaling high 
quality to consumers, and ensuring greater quality and safety. 
(https://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/6/2009_LTC_Overview_Combo_10_30_09.pdf)  
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TJC state. Thirteen states recognize TJC’s nursing home accreditation program while the 
remaining states do not.19 For instance, the Department of Labor and Employment in Colorado 
recommends TJC accreditation for long-term residential services at nursing homes, and the 
Department of Community Health in Georgia considers TJC accreditation as evidence of 
established compliance with the departmental requirements. To control for these effects, we create 
a dichotomous variable indicating whether a nursing home is located in the state that recognizes 
TJC accreditation.  
Size. Large nursing homes may have higher level of quality and are more likely to apply for 
accreditation (Lu & Wedig, 2012; Wagner et al., 2012a). Extant literature suggests that nursing 
homes can be classified into three groups depending on the size: small (with 75 beds or fewer), 
medium (76–125 beds), and large (126 beds or more) (Afendulis et al., 2016; Grabowski et al., 
2016). To control for nursing home size, we use two dummy variables representing small, medium, 
and large size, treating small as the baseline level.   
Payer mix. Payer mix is a factor affecting financial resources because nursing homes generate 
greater margins from Medicare and private-pay residents than from Medicaid residents (Lu et al., 
2018; Nyman, 1993). To control for the payer mix, we created two continuous variables denoting 
the percentage of residents in a nursing home whose payer is Medicare or Medicaid, respectively 
(Afendulis et al., 2016; Grabowski et al., 2016).    
Acuity index. To control for an average intensity of nursing care required by residents in a nursing 
home, we use an acuity index. We obtain the acuity index from Long-Term Care Focus, where this 
measure is constructed by considering the ratio of residents with respect to various levels of 
activities of daily living (ADL) assistance and special treatment (Cowles, 2007).  
Operating margin. Operating margin is one of the profitability indicators that represent the nursing 
homes’ ability to generate financial return (Bowblis, 2011; Pradhan et al., 2013). Operating margin 
is possibly associated with TJC accreditation because only nursing homes that are financially viable 
can apply for the accreditation program. 20  To control for the operating margin, we create a 
continuous variable by computing the formula, whereby each item is extracted from the Cost Report. 
 
operating margin = (operating revenue – operating expense) /operating revenue 
  
                                                     
19 https://www.jointcommission.org/state_recognition/state_recognition.aspx 
20 The typical three-year accreditation fee was $9,700 in 2009 that can vary depending on the nursing home 
size (https://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/6/2009_LTC_Overview_Combo_10_30_09.pdf). 
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Missing Variables and Final Sample 
Figure 3.1 summarizes the steps taken to prepare the dataset for analyses. We first remove 
the nursing homes with missing variables of payer mix, acuity index, and operating margin. This 
resulted in 731 TJC accredited nursing homes from the 13,326 Medicare (or Medicare) certified 
nursing homes between 2013 and 2016. Next, our sample size was reduced further to 452 TJC 
accredited nursing homes from the sample of 4,927 nursing homes for which all dependent 
variables were available. Specifically, CMS publicly reports each quality measure item only if a 
nursing home has a sufficient number of residents. For instance, long-stay resident measures should 
mandate at least 30 long-stay residents and short-stay resident measures require at least 20 short-
stay residents in a nursing home (Smith et al., 2012). Based on the data availability of these items, 
CMS labels nursing homes as long-stay facility, short-stay facility, or both. Long-stay facilities are 
the nursing homes that successfully report all long-stay quality items and short-stay facilities are 
the nursing homes with all reported short-stay quality items (CMS, 2012). Given 452 TJC 
accredited nursing homes that belong to both long-stay and short-stay facility, we could compare 
quality from long-stay residents and short-stay residents. Third, we consider 337 TJC-accredited 
nursing homes that received only one inspection, either announced or unannounced, from 2013 to 
2016: We have 225 nursing homes that received only one announced inspection and 112 nursing 
homes that received only one unannounced inspection. In the robustness section, we also discuss 
nursing homes that received two inspections (e.g., two announced inspections, two unannounced 
inspections, or one announced and one unannounced inspection) during the 2013−2016 study 
period.21  
Table 3.3 reports descriptive statistics for nursing homes whose quarterly quality measures 
items are available. Table A2 shows that these nursing homes are more likely to be large and located 
in an urban area, with relatively lower operating margin, and have residents with higher 
hospitalization risk (acuity index) than an average nursing home.22 This is consistent with our 
sample reduction approach because we have removed the nursing homes that serve fewer than 30 
long-stay residents or 20 short-stay residents. 
  
                                                     
21 It should be noted that 115 nursing homes received two inspections by TJC between 2013 and 2016. 
Specifically, 78 nursing homes received two announced inspections, 21 received two unannounced 
inspections, and 16 received one announced and one unannounced inspection. 
22 We did not use imputation strategy for missing dependent variables because many values were missing 
from our quarterly-based dataset. If we implemented the state-average imputation for the nursing homes, 
whose number of residents is close to the reporting margin, the imputation would create abrupt changes and 
would result in a quality level overestimate for those nursing homes that actually have lower quality.  
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Table 3.3  Summary Statistics and Data Sources 
  
Variable 
Description  (n = 4,927; TJC-accredited = 452; non-TJC-
accredited = 4,475) 
Mean SD Source  
Quality Measure (QM) at time = 1 
   
 
All Quality Sum of 11 QMs in nursing home star-rating 660.2 119.9 NH Compare 
 
Long-stay Quality Sum of 8 QMs of long-stay residents in nursing home star-rating 472.6 93.6 NH Compare 
 
Short-stay Quality Sum of 3 QMs of short-stay residents in nursing home star-rating 187.7 51.5 NH Compare 
Independent Variables 
    
 
Announced Visit† 1 if a NH received announced visit by TJC, otherwise 0 (4.5%) 
  
TJC 
 
Unannounced Visit† 1 if a NH received unannounced visit by TJC, otherwise 0 (2.3%) 
  
TJC 
Matching Variables 
    
 
Ownership† Profit (74.8%), non-profit (22.1%), government (3.1%) 
  
Provider of Services 
 
Chain† Whether a NH is owned by a multi-facility organization (60.2%) 
  
Provider of Services 
 
Location† Whether a NH is located in urban area (83.0%)         
  
Provider of Services 
 TJC State Whether a NH is in the state that recognizes TJC accreditation 
(33.3%) 
  TJC 
 
Size number of beds 147.3 63.7 NH Compare 
 
Medicare (%) % of Medicare resident in a NH 16.1 9.0 Long Term Care Focus 
 
Medicaid (%) % of Medicaid resident in a NH 61.3 15.1 Long Term Care Focus 
 
Acuity Index Average intensity of nursing care required by residents in a NH 12.4 1.0 Long Term Care Focus 
  Operating Margin (%) [(operating revenue + operating expense)/operating revenue]*100 -2.3 27.4 Cost Report 
† Only percentage values are reported for categorical variables 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
834 TJC-accredited nursing homes (NHs)
in All Medicare/Medicaid-certified NHs
Remove NHs, whose payer mix, acuity index, or 
operating margin is missing
731 TJC-accredited nursing homes (NHs)
in 13,326 Medicare/Medicaid-certified NHs
452 TJC-accredited nursing homes (NHs)
in 4,927 Medicare/Medicaid-certified NHs
Exclude NHs that do NOT report any quarterly 
nursing home quality measures during 2013-2016 
337 TJC-accredited nursing homes (NHs)
in 4,927 Medicare/Medicaid-certified NHs:
225 NHs w/ an Announced Inspection
112 NHs w/ an Unannounced Inspection
Consider NHs that received only one inspection 
between 2013-2016
Figure 3.1  Steps of Finalizing the Sample 
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3.5   Analysis and Results 
 
Empirical Strategy 
We adopt a matching method for TJC-accredited nursing homes, which serves as the treatment 
group, and non-TJC-accredited nursing homes comprising the control group. This method can 
address selection bias by balancing the distribution of characteristics that are potentially associated 
with treatment and outcome between treated and controlled nursing homes (Blackwell et al., 2009). 
It is important to note that a nursing home’s application for the TJC accreditation is always 
voluntary and thus non-random. Among various matching options, we opt for coarsened exact 
matching (CEM) over the more popular propensity score matching (PSM) method for several 
reasons. First, PSM can cause a random matching problem whereby the paired treatment and 
control have imbalanced covariates even with similar propensity score. Next, CEM is more 
appropriate when both continuous and discrete matching variables are employed (King and Nielsen 
2019). Since CEM considers a coarsened range of variables rather than exact covariate values, 
CEM approximately provides a fully blocked experimental design (Blackwell et al., 2009). We use 
the following variables from previous nursing home studies to find a match: ownership, chain, 
membership, location, size, payer mix, and acuity index (Afendulis et al., 2016; Grabowski et al., 
2016; Wagner et al., 2012a). We further include two matching variables that related to TJC 
accreditation - TJC state and operating margin.  
We follow existing literature to deal with each continuous variable. For payer mix, we 
replace continuous variable with dummy variables following the previous literature to minimize 
the curse of dimensionality (Afendulis et al., 2016; Grabowski et al., 2016). In contrast, we retain 
the acuity index and operating margin as continuous variables. For operating margin, we specify a 
set of pre-defined cut-points (e.g., 0%, 5%) in CEM where lower than 0% is considered as low 
operating margin, 0–5% as moderate operating margin, over 5% as high profitability (Cadigan et 
al., 2015).  
For 337 TJC-accredited nursing homes that are eligible for inclusion into both long-stay 
and short-stay facility groups, the implementation of one-to-one without replacement CEM leads 
to 331 TJC-accredited nursing homes and 331 non-TJC-accredited nursing homes. Table A2 shows 
that TJC-accredited nursing homes are more likely to be for-profit nursing homes located in urban 
area, with a chain membership and relatively higher percentage of Medicare patients. However, we 
confirm that TJC-accredited and non-TJC-accredited nursing homes are well balanced with respect 
to these characteristics after matching. 
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To examine H1 we conduct panel regression analyses with nursing homes and unit time 
fixed effects. We include a lagged dependent variable term because past quality level may persist 
in the future; that is, the current care and service is the function of past care and service, which may 
be modified by an inspection. We develop announced visit and unannounced visit models 
separately by implementing two distinct equations. Specifically, we first consider TJC-accredited 
nursing homes that received one announced inspection and non-TJC-accredited nursing homes. 
Next, we analyze differences between TJC-accredited nursing homes that received one 
unannounced inspection and non-TJC-accredited nursing homes.   
Next, to investigate sustained effects of inspection visits postulated in H2, we add up to 
two-quarter lags and leads of the announced inspection visit indicator () and the unannounced 
inspection visit indicator () in the above equations.23 This relative timing model has been used in 
many studies to investigate the causal and sustained effects (Autor, 2003; Dhanorkar, 2019; Hydari 
et al., 2019). This model has several advantages. First, it allows us to examine the changes to 
inspection visit effect over time, before and after the inspection visit. Specifically, lead variables 
detect pre-treatment effects and lagged variables capture post-treatment effects. Second, we can 
test parallel trends assumption in this model, while a traditional difference-in-difference model fails 
to address the issue of different pre-trends between treatment and control groups (Autor, 2003; 
Dhanorkar, 2019; Hydari et al., 2019). For instance, unlike to our approach, a traditional difference-
in-difference model should consider an entire period before the event as a baseline. Lastly, we can 
evaluate the causality concern by investigating coefficients of lead variables. The causality is 
supported if results suggest no pre-treatment effects.  
 
Results 
Figure 3.2 shows the changes in the quality levels near the inspection visit. The y axis 
indicates the quality score from all residents, long-stay residents, and short-stay residents, 
respectively, and the x axis indicates the time relative to the quarter of the inspection visit. 
Specifically, the reference time (t = 0) is the quarter when a nursing home received either 
announced or unannounced inspection visit. Overall, we observe notable patterns indicating that 
the quality level increases as the inspection visit approaches. However, the quality level peaks at 
the time of the announced inspection visit and then takes a slight dip. In contrast, the level persists 
or rises slightly after the unannounced inspection visit. 
                                                     
23 Our notation follows Hydari et al. (2019). For instance, announced visit follows: 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +
𝛽−2𝐴𝑖𝑡+2 + 𝛽−1𝐴𝑖𝑡+1 + 𝛽0𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛾𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛿𝑡𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
16
3 . where 𝐴𝑖𝑡 
is  𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡. Lead variables detect pre-treatment effects and lagged variables capture post-
treatment effects. 
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Figure 3.2  Quality Level Changes Near the Time of Inspection Visit 
Notes. Figure 3.2 displays the changes in the quality levels near inspection visits. The y axis indicates the quality score 
from all residents, long-stay residents, and short-stay residents, respectively. The x axis represents the time passage 
relative to the quarter of the inspection visit. Specifically, the reference time () is the quarter when a nursing home 
received either announced or unannounced inspection visit.  
 
We first examine H1 for the presence of immediate effects of announced and unannounced 
inspections on quality. Table 3.4 shows the effects of both inspections on three dependent variables: 
quality performance of all residents (column 1), long-stay residents (column 2), and short-stay 
residents (column 3). The results in Table 3.4 provide partial support for H1a. We find that an 
announced inspection visit increases immediate quality performance for all resident (b = 11.206, p 
< 0.05) and long-stay resident quality (b = 8.094, p < 0.05), but the results are not significant for 
short-stay residents (b = 2.903, p > 0.10). Next, the analysis indicates that an unannounced 
inspection visit has a positive and significant impact on short-stay resident quality (b = 8.516, p < 
0.01) but the results are not significant for all-stay and long-stay resident quality. These results 
partially support H1b. To examine H1c, we compare regression coefficients across the two models 
related to announced and unannounced inspection visits, following the procedure introduced by 
Clogg et al. (1995). We find a marginally significant difference in long-stay resident quality (∆b = 
8.527, p < 0.10), indicating that the immediate quality increase due to an announced inspection 
visit is greater than an unannounced inspection visit, which supports H1c.   
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Table 3.4  Immediate Effects of Inspection Visits 
 (1) Announced Inspection  (2) Unannounced Inspection  
  
All residents 
Quality 
Long-stay 
Quality 
Short-stay 
Quality 
All residents 
Quality 
Long-stay 
Quality 
Short-stay 
Quality 
  1a 2a 3a 1b 2b 3b 
Inspection Visit 11.206* 8.094* 2.903 7.671 -0.433 8.516** 
 (4.677) (3.732) (2.288) (5.905) (4.963) (2.817) 
DV (t-1)  0.516** 0.470** 0.489** 0.526** 0.473** 0.497** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) 
Constant 349.940** 275.167** 103.434** 344.446** 274.804** 102.789** 
 (8.693) (6.607) (2.527) (9.640) (7.522) (2.871) 
Nursing FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Nursing Homes 552 552 552 441 441 441 
Observations 8,280 8,280 8,280 6,615 6,615 6,615 
R2 0.282 0.241 0.241 0.299 0.249 0.250 
Clustered Standard Errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, †p<0.1.  
 
 
 
Table 3.5  Sustained Effects of Inspection Visits 
 (1) Announced Inspection  (2) Unannounced Inspection  
  
All 
residents 
Quality 
Long-stay 
Quality 
Short-stay 
Quality 
All 
residents 
Quality 
Long-stay 
Quality 
Short-stay 
Quality 
  1a 2a 3a 1b 2b 3b 
2 Quarters Prior 1.811 2.050 -0.183 8.940 5.505 3.646 
 (5.027) (3.915) (2.942) (6.677) (6.046) (3.135) 
1 Quarter Prior 0.988 -1.203 2.095 8.118 7.417 1.112 
 (4.712) (4.014) (2.497) (7.816) (6.588) (3.722) 
Inspection Visit 11.248* 7.901* 3.172 10.732† 1.619 9.664** 
 (4.750) (3.815) (2.318) (6.137) (5.183) (3.022) 
1 Quarter After -2.135 -4.056 2.262 9.040 2.791 6.800* 
 (5.064) (3.997) (2.561) (6.778) (6.035) (2.857) 
2 Quarters After 0.100 1.531 -1.319 10.777† 9.096† 2.213 
 (4.811) (3.924) (2.394) (6.253) (5.199) (3.070) 
DV (t-1) 0.516** 0.470** 0.489** 0.525** 0.472** 0.496** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) 
Constant 349.904** 275.096** 103.405** 344.999** 274.991** 102.949** 
 (8.693) (6.606) (2.529) (9.648) (7.513) (2.878) 
Nursing FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Nursing Homes 552 552 552 441 441 441 
Observations 8,280 8,280 8,280 6,615 6,615 6,615 
R2 0.282 0.242 0.242 0.299 0.249 0.250 
Clustered Standard Errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, †p<0.1.  
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Next, Table 3.5 shows the sustained effects of announced and unannounced inspections for 
the three dependent variables—quality variables based on all resident (column 1), long-stay 
resident (column 2), and short-stay resident (column 3). We also include leading and lagging 
variables for announced and unannounced inspections in Table 3.5. First, we examine H2a. The 
results show significant increases in all resident quality (b = 11.248, p < 0.05) and long-stay resident 
quality (b = 7.901, p < 0.05) at the time of the inspection visit. However, no post-inspection effects 
are revealed. We note that the previous result related to H1a is still supported even after we 
incorporate leads and lags of the inspection visit indicators. Next, we investigate H2b which argues 
for a sustained effect of an unannounced inspection visit. In contrast to the announced inspection 
visit, the results show sustained effects of unannounced inspection visits. First, unannounced visits 
increase all resident quality measures. The positive effects are marginally significant at the time of 
the inspection visit (b = 10.732, p < 0.10) and two quarters after the inspection visit (b = 10.777, p 
< 0.10). Next, for long-stay resident quality, we observe a marginally significant effect two quarters 
after the inspection (b = 9.096, p < 0.10). Finally, the effect of an unannounced inspection visit on 
short-stay resident quality is significant at the time of the inspection visit (b = 9.664, p < 0.01) and 
one quarter after the visit (b = 6.800, p < 0.05). Overall, these results support H2b, suggesting that 
unannounced inspection visits increase sustained quality performance.  
To examine H2c, we compare coefficients of announced and unannounced inspection visits. 
Figure 3.3 gives the plot of the coefficient estimates of leads and lags of inspection visit indicators 
and their 95% confidence intervals. This figure suggests that the announced inspection effect 
exhibits a greater fluctuation over time than the unannounced inspection effect. We use the 
approach previously proposed by Clogg et al. (1995) to compare these coefficients between 
announced and unannounced inspections. The results support H2c, indicating that the sustained 
effects of announced inspections on all resident quality are significantly smaller than those of 
unannounced inspections both one quarter after the visit (∆b = −11.175, p < 0.10) and two quarters 
after the visit (∆b = −10.677, p < 0.10).  
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Figure 3.3  Effects of Leads and Lags of Inspection Visits on Quality 
 
 
Notes. The y axis indicates coefficient estimates on quality. Dots represent estimates of the difference between treatment and control groups with respect to relative time of 
inspection and vertical lines display 95% confidence intervals of these estimates. The x axis represents the time passage relative to the quarter of the inspection visit. Specifically, 
the reference time (t = 0) is the quarter when a nursing home received either announced or unannounced inspection visit.  
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Robustness Checks 
We conduct several robustness checks for bias correction in the dynamic panel model, 
unobserved effects, sensitivity, re-matching, and placebo tests. First, we perform a bootstrap-based 
bias correction procedure for the dynamic panel model (Everaert & Pozzi, 2007). Previous studies 
indicate that fixed effect estimators may be inconsistent when the number of cross-sectional 
observations is large but the number of time periods is small or fixed (Nickell, 1981). Some notable 
solutions are based on generalized method of moments (GMM) approaches, including difference 
GMM (Arellano & Bond, 1991) and system GMM (Blundell & Bond, 1998). However, these GMM 
estimators raise the issues of weak instruments and poor small sample property (Bun & Windmeijer, 
2010). The bootstrap-based bias correction can mitigate these concerns through easier 
implementation that does not require any decisions regarding instrument selection (Everaert & 
Pozzi, 2007). Our bootstrap procedure employs 250 (wild) bootstrap iterations with burn-in 
initialization, which allows general heteroscedasticity and does not require an assumption regarding 
the initial condition of the fixed or normal distribution. The results confirm that the outcomes 
remain consistent after correcting for possible biases in the dynamic panel, while the p-values 
decrease slightly (see Appendix B, Table 3).  
Next, we address the concern regarding unobserved effects. We first focus on the presence 
of potential seasonal patterns in nursing homes. The number of residents in a nursing home peaks 
in winter and reaches a low point in summer (according to the description by the Long-term Care 
Focus). To control for this pattern, we replace the fourteen-quarter dummies with three-year 
dummies and three-quarter dummies. We verify that our results hold after replacing the time fixed 
effects.  
Another concern related to unobserved effects is that we did not consider regular 
unannounced inspections by state survey agencies (SA), which are monitored by CMS.24 We note 
that these inspections are slightly different from the TJC inspections in several respects. First, while 
only nursing homes that voluntarily apply for TJC accreditation would receive a TJC inspection, 
state-survey agencies’ inspections are mandated for all Medicare or Medicaid certified nursing 
homes. Next, TJC accreditation is subject to annual accreditation and on-site inspection fees, but 
state-survey agencies’ inspections are free of charge. Lastly, administrators in healthcare 
organizations perceive TJC inspections as accommodating, collaborative, collegial, and 
educational. In contrast, state-survey agencies’ inspections are inspection-oriented and more 
                                                     
24 State survey agencies have used unannounced inspections following the CMS State Operations Manual 
2700A. Staffs of the Survey and Certification (S&C) office at CMS confirmed that the unannounced 
inspection process started around 1980. 
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stressful to staff members in organizations.25,26 Apparently, state survey agencies’ inspections do 
not affect TJC accreditation and inspection, because they are mandated by state governments for 
institutions that participate the Medicare or Medicaid program. To address any concerns that may 
arise from state survey agencies’ inspection effects, we incorporate a dichotomous variable in our 
model indicating whether a nursing home received an unannounced inspection from the state 
government agency in the quarter. The results are robust after incorporating unannounced 
inspections by state government agencies (see Appendix B, Table 4). We observe non-significant 
effects of governmental unannounced inspections on quality performance, while the effects of 
TJC’s inspections are statistically significant.  
We also check sensitivity of the results by employing other measures for dependent 
variables, decomposing inspections into more granular categories, and investigating heterogeneity 
in the inspection effects. We first investigate whether the results are robust under alternative 
measures of dependent variables. We previously constructed quality performance measures for all 
residents, long-stay residents, and short-stay residents from the items listed in CMS Five-Star 
Quality Rating System. Now, we reconstruct quality measures by additionally including the items 
that are not listed in the star rating but are included in Nursing Home Compare, such as vaccination 
and mental care items. The results show stronger statistical significance, supporting the previous 
results.   
Next, we classify inspections into more granular categories to check for sensitivity. 
Although we previously distinguished between announced and unannounced inspections, 
announced inspections can be further disentangled based on the inspection history and interval 
between the day of notice and the actual visit. TJC conducts 30-day announced inspections (n = 76) 
when a nursing home apply the first TJC accreditation and recurring 7-day announced inspections 
(n = 145) under exceptional conditions such as when the accreditation program was retired (see 
Appendix B, Table 5). We note that both the first 30-day announced inspection and the recurring 
7-day announced inspection only lead to an immediate increase in quality performance (see 
Appendix B, Table 6), while there are no sustained effects. However, we cannot fully separate the 
confounding effects of first announced versus recurring announced inspections and 30-day versus 
7-day announced inspections independently. The results indicate that a negative post-treatment 
effect of the (first) 30-day announced inspection and a positive immediate effect of the (non-first) 
7-day announced inspection. This disparity suggests that 7-day announced inspections attract more 
intense level of transient attention than do 30-day announced inspections, with a less pronounced 
                                                     
25 TJC’s teleconference about unannounced survey on March 9, 2006. 
26 Interview with a previous administrator in healthcare organizations held on May 25, 2017.  
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decaying effect. However, since 2015, TJC no longer conduct 7-day announced inspections as a 
part of the TJC nursing home accreditation program.  
Next, we investigate heterogeneity in the inspection effects. Although inspections may lead 
to an increase in quality performance, we do not know whether inspection effects are much greater 
in the nursing homes with lower baseline quality. We suppose that the relative quality of top 
performers may not fluctuate, because their performance is always robust irrespective of any 
external shocks, including announced and unannounced inspections. In contrast, bottom performers 
may have more room for improvement. To examine this heterogeneity effect, we conduct 
unconditional quantile regressions as post-hoc analyses. We chose unconditional quantile 
regression because it yields more interpretable results than conditional quantile regression does. 
For instance, inclusion of control variables does not influence the definition of the quantile in 
unconditional quantile regression, while it affects the one in conditional quantile regression (Borah 
& Basu, 2013; Borgen, 2016; Firpo et al., 2009). We find a notable pattern in immediate effects. 
Our results (see Appedix B, Table 7 and Figure 1) suggest, if an inspection is announced in advance, 
the nursing homes whose quality level is in the middle of the distribution exhibit a significant 
increase in quality, while the nursing homes at the upper or lower ends of the distribution do not 
experience an increase. In contrast, the effects of unannounced inspections increase gradually but 
insignificantly along the quality level. 
To address concern about issue in matching methods and procedures, we re-match 
treatment and control groups and consider alternative samples. First, we re-match after adjusting 
the operating margin. We note that TJC-accredited nursing homes have spent about $2,000 on 
annual accreditation fees. Our previous matching variable, operating margin, does not reflect these 
annual expenses. Thus, we recalculate the operating margin for the accredited nursing homes by 
adding $2,000 to the numerator in the operating margin formula. Next, we implement CEM and 
analyze the data based on the new treatment and control group. The results demonstrate the 
consistent result with those obtained previously. Second, in our analysis, we consider 115 nursing 
homes that received two inspections, namely 78 with two announced inspections, 21 that have had 
two unannounced inspections, and 16 nursing homes with one announced and one unannounced 
inspection. We verify that our results are robust when we include nursing homes that received two 
inspections. Third, we analyze the full sample of TJC-accredited and non-TJC-accredited nursing 
homes without using the matching method. We note that ex post matching approaches (e.g., 
coarsened exact matching and caliper-based approaches) could aggravate the imbalance between 
TJC-accredited and non-TJC-accredited nursing homes with respect to the variation in the 
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unmeasured covariates (Brooks & Ohsfeldt, 2013). Our consistent results without using matching 
address this concern. 
Finally, we conduct a series of placebo tests to investigate spurious effects of inspection 
visits. We first randomly assign placebo inspection visits to the treatment group, TJC-accredited 
nursing homes. We implement the tests for two groups of nursing homes respectively (either 
received an announced or unannounced inspection) with respect to qualities of all residents, long-
stay residents, and short-stay residents. We obtain kernel density plots of the distribution of 2,000 
placebo estimates of the inspection visits, displayed with the vertical line indicating the estimate 
observed in the actual data (see Appendix B, Figure 2 and Figure 3). Overall, the inspection visit 
estimates in the actual data are unlikely to occur by chance. To eliminate the concern in the control 
group, we create randomly assigned placebo visits for non-TJC-accredited nursing homes and 
confirm that there is no placebo effect. 
 
3.6   Discussion 
 
Increasingly, accreditation agencies like TJC have employed two dominant inspection 
strategies to ensure compliance, with the ultimate goal of improving quality performance. However, 
the academic literature has not distinguished between these two strategies clearly and investigated 
their relative benefits precisely. In this paper, we make a distinction between announced and 
unannounced inspections and examine their immediate and sustained effects on all-stay, long-stay 
and short-stay resident quality performance. The empirical analyses and supporting robustness 
checks show that the effects of the two strategies depend on the time duration over which the effects 
are aggregated (i.e. immediate or sustained) and the type of resident stay (i.e. all, short, and long-
stay residents) under consideration. We discuss our results and their theoretical and practical 
implications for announced and unannounced inspection strategies for immediate and sustained 
effects, only for all-stay residents. We then discuss the nuances of these results for all, long and 
short-stay residents.  
Our results show that as a set for all-stay residents, announced inspection strategy has 
significant immediate and to a lesser degree sustained quality performance effects while the effects 
associated with unannounced inspection strategy are not as clear. Moreover, for unannounced 
inspections quality performance increases steadily over time (Figure 2) for all-stay residents 
whereas for announced inspections, it shows a temporary spike around the time of inspection but 
remains relatively flat during other time periods. Using the attention-based view of a firm, we have 
argued that nursing home administrators have limited attention (a scarce resource), which is 
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allocated to ensure compliance with the accreditation standards. It is reasonable to argue further 
that different events may require different types of attention. For instance, announced inspections 
may require short-term transient attention targeted to specific areas of improvement whereas 
unannounced inspections are likely to require more long-term, sustained attention. This logic was 
validated during the conversations with top managers who conceded that, unlike an announced 
inspection, an unannounced inspection is minimally disruptive to the general routine and employees 
tend to retain the same focused intensity even after the inspection is completed (JCAHO & JCR, 
2006). In essence, under unannounced inspections, a nursing home is likely to achieve a steady 
increase in quality levels and may not experience sudden ebbs and spikes in quality levels around 
the inspection time. In contrast, under an announced inspection, one is likely to see detectable 
changes in quality levels around the inspection time, which decay to pre-inspection levels once the 
inspection has been conducted.   
By distinguishing between announced and unannounced inspection strategies on the one 
hand, and the immediate and sustained quality effects on the other hand, we are able to empirically 
demonstrate that these two inspection modes play different roles in affecting quality performance 
in immediate and long terms. Findings reported in related literature do not indicate any predominant 
performance differences between unannounced versus announced inspections (Greenfield et al., 
2007; Klerks et al., 2013), while unannounced inspections tend to be favored by the industry. 
Instead, studies have either shown that inspection outcomes (compliance of the standard) from 
announced and unannounced inspections are not statistically significantly different (Ehlers et al., 
2017; Klerks et al., 2013) or the authors argue for inspection efficiency of announced inspections 
relative to unannounced inspections (Greenfield et al., 2012; Kim, 2015). Overall, previous studies 
cannot explain why unannounced inspections are prevalent in practice. However, our results show 
the sustained effect of unannounced inspections on quality performance that prevents degeneration 
in quality performance, which is not achieved by announced inspections. This result helps reveal 
the performance benefits of unannounced inspections. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
attempt to investigate the impacts of announced and unannounced inspections on operational 
performance.  
In addition to all-stay residents, we also examined the above relationships for long and 
short-stay residents separately. While the results for long-stay residents are similar to all-stay 
residents under announced inspection mode (Tables 4 and 5, columns 1a and 2a), they are 
considerably different under unannounced mode (Tables 4 and 5, columns 1a and 2a). Our results 
show that an unannounced inspection strategy has a significant positive effect on both immediate 
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and sustained quality performance for short-stay residents. These unintended positive results 
buttress the importance of unannounced inspection strategy for nursing home administrators.     
Our findings also have important managerial implications for other stakeholders. First, our 
results broadly apply to other inspection agencies, whose goal is to improve quality and safety 
through compliance. Information reported in Table 3.1 showed that inspection strategies 
(announcement / unannounced) vary across regulators and industries. In practice, the decision to 
adopt announced, unannounced, or mixed inspection strategy requires careful consideration 
because unannounced inspections incur extra cost and require more effort. By demonstrating the 
different roles of announced and unannounced inspections, we can help regulators and inspection 
agencies evaluate the benefits versus the cost of these different strategies. Moreover, our findings 
raise an important question in supply chain context where a buyer inspects or audits a supplier: 
should they follow an announced or unannounced strategy?  
Next, we provide crucial insight for organizations that may shun accreditation. In the 
healthcare industry, the accreditation rate of nursing homes is relatively low (approximately 5%), 
although it has increased slightly in recent years. Our findings support the view that accreditation 
simulates continuous improvement in quality performance for healthcare organizations (Schmaltz 
et al., 2011; Wagner et al., 2012b; Westphal et al., 1997). We contend that continuous improvement 
may stem from the accreditation that offers additional monitoring opportunity. Thus, accredited 
and non-accredited nursing homes should carefully reassess the cost and benefit of TJC 
accreditation. Furthermore, our findings have potential implications for other industries. That is, 
unannounced inspections may be a useful tool for maintaining consistent quality, which is critical 
in highly regulated industries, such as the oil and gas industry and the pipeline industry.  
 
3.7   Limitations and Future Research Directions 
 
This study has some limitations that could be mitigated through further research. Most of 
the limitations are related to the data employed in the analyses. First, we did not incorporate the 
outcome of inspection or accreditation in our analyses. These are important measure because 
unfavorable outcome could create more sustained attention after the inspection. For example, bad 
outcome can lead to follow-up inspections and organizations may need time to address those issues 
that may not be directly related to their daily operations. However, TJC does not provide specific 
inspection outcomes, such as the number of deficiencies or violations. Instead, TJC provides five 
ordinal outcomes of the accreditation on its website: accredited, accreditation with follow-up 
inspection, contingent accreditation, preliminary denial of accreditation, and denial of accreditation. 
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Although unfavorable outcome may prompt a more sustained attention to inspection on behalf of 
the top managers, our sample included only 11 nursing homes that received accreditation outcome 
other than “accredited.” Thus, we cannot investigate this issue further based on the accreditation 
outcome. We do confirm that our results are robust after removing those 11 nursing homes.  
Second, we cannot thoroughly investigate pre-inspection and post-inspection effects due 
to data granularity. Anecdotes from the industry suggest that the ramp-up period of an announced 
inspection can range from several weeks to months, while we adopted a quarter as our unit time 
window. Therefore, we cannot disentangle pre-inspection, inspection visit, and post-inspection 
effects with granularity. Future studies utilizing data incorporating each admission/discharge 
episode of nursing home residents (e.g., MDS data) will address this concern.  
Next, we did not measure attention level of top managers before and after the two 
inspection regimes. Future researchers may investigate changes in attention level near the 
inspection time through lab or field experiments. Because attention is closely related to 
organizational culture, investigating culture with respect to inspection announcement can also be 
an interesting avenue for a future study. Interestingly, Wagner et al. (2012b) suggest that top 
managers in accredited nursing homes are more likely to perceive better patient safety culture in 
their organizations than mangers in non-accredited nursing homes. We hope that our study will 
spur other researchers to investigate the effect of announced and unannounced inspections in 
diverse contexts and across a wide range of industries using quantitative and qualitative methods. 
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Chapter 4  
Organizational Learning, Complexity, and Safety 
Management Performance: Evidence from the Oil and 
Gas Transportation Industry 
 
4.1   Introduction 
 
High-hazard industries (e.g., nuclear power plants, oil production, and oil transportation) 
face significant threats of experiencing negative incidents, many of which are highly consequential 
in their impact (e.g., the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, and 
the Kalamazoo River oil spill). These industries have experienced incidents that have resulted in 
significant injuries, fatalities, property loss, and environmental damage. Despite the potential for 
large-scale consequences, these incidents are difficult to predict and pose tremendous challenges 
to organizations that wish to avoid them (Leveson et al., 2009). To prevent such incidents, 
regulatory agencies have employed several activities, such as sharing useful information, 
conducting inspections, and penalizing organizations for compliance failure (Ball et al., 2017; Gray 
& Shimshack, 2011; Johnson, 2018; Mani & Muthulingam, 2019). In an effort to reduce accidents 
and improve safety, regulatory agencies have also streamlined the compliance process and created 
objective standards to facilitate compliance by organizations.  
However, inspections are not an effective means of preventing future failure, and 
compliance with standards is often in conflict with learning and innovation (Ball et al., 2017; 
Carroll et al., 2002). To successfully pass an inspection, an organization is required to strictly 
adhere to regulatory standards, which in turn discourages it from experimenting with newer 
approaches to improve process outcomes. Additionally, inspection standards are designed to cover 
a broad range of organizations, are established in advance, and are changed relatively infrequently; 
this causes inspections to be less effective in preventing future failures, especially because 
organizations vary greatly from one another, and their operating environment and technology 
change rapidly (TRB & NASEM, 2017). Moreover, inspections are costly to regulatory agencies, 
which often face shortages of qualified inspectors (Congressional Research Service, 2019). To 
overcome these shortcomings, some regulatory agencies have proposed safety and risk 
management programs, which require high-hazard organizations to develop their own unique 
approach to identify and mitigate their specific risks within the general framework of the program. 
One such program, developed by the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 
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(PHMSA) to monitor oil and gas transportation, is the Integrity Management Program (IMP). The 
program has attracted considerable attention because of its potential to substantially reduce 
regulators’ monitoring burdens and costs (Kowalewski, 2013). More importantly, the Integrity 
Management Program constitutes a general framework, allowing organizations the opportunity to 
better understand their unique processes, comprehensively assess their specific hazards, and 
continually update their safety management procedures. 
However, an extensive review of the literature reveals that there are only a handful of 
empirical studies in high-hazard industry settings (Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002; Madsen, 2009; 
Madsen & Desai, 2010; Mani & Muthulingam, 2019). Interestingly, these studies focus on learning 
from the failures of high-consequence, low-probability events. While the results are useful, the 
rarity of such events provide organizations limited opportunities to learn and innovate (Haunschild 
& Sullivan, 2002; Madsen & Desai, 2010; Starbuck, 2009). Moreover, few studies have examined 
the effectiveness of externally mandated, but internally developed risk/safety management 
programs, such as the Integrity Management Program (Blanco et al., 2019; Cohen & Kunreuther, 
2007; Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005). We believe research is needed to better determine if an 
organization’s participation in this type of program is universally effective, and whether there are 
contingencies that enhance the relationship between experience with the program and safety 
performance. It is important to understand these relationships, because such programs are being 
increasingly employed by many regulatory agencies.  
We conduct our study in the context of the oil and gas pipeline industry and an operator’s 
experience with the Integrity Management Program designed by PHMSA. Our research questions 
are grounded in organizational learning and complexity literature. We posit that a pipeline 
operator’s experience with IMP has an impact on safety performance, and this relationship differs 
across the pipeline operator’s unique structural characteristics, such as the complexity of the 
pipeline. We examine our questions with data from 642 pipeline operators and use several different 
empirical methods. Our results show that while pipeline complexity increases subsequent incident 
cost, experience with IMP reduces it. More interestingly, we find that complexity heightens the 
negative relationship between experience with IMP and future incident cost. This implies that 
pipeline operators with greater complexity derive greater benefits from participation in the program. 
Our results are robust to sample specification, sample selection bias, and endogeneity concerns 
(e.g., omitted variable bias). We also conduct post-hoc analyses to explore these relationships with 
respect to within and between pipeline operator variations using a hybrid approach. The results 
show that while experience with the program differs within and between pipeline operator variance, 
the complexity effects are universal. This implies that an operator faces higher subsequent costs 
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from incidents as its level of complexity increases (i.e., within-operator effect), and operators with 
greater complexity have higher subsequent costs compared to operators with less complexity (i.e., 
between-operator effect). As a set, our results highlight the effectiveness of using externally 
mandated, but internally developed safety management programs, such as IMP, in the oil and gas 
transportation industry. This study contributes to the organizational learning literature, especially 
in high-hazard industry context. The findings are also of practical importance to both pipeline 
operators and federal regulators.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 describe the research 
context, relevant literature, and hypothesis development. Section 4.4 provides the research design, 
empirical setting, and data, and describes the empirical strategies employed. Section 4.5 offers the 
results, and Section 4.6 discusses the implications and topics for future research.  
 
4.2   Research Context 
 
High-hazard industries include those industries involved in the production and 
transportation of oil and gas, nuclear, chemical manufacturing, marine transportation, air 
transportation, and mining sectors (TRB & NASEM, 2017). We focus on the oil and gas pipeline 
industry for three reasons. First, pipelines are the primary mode of oil and gas transportation, 
accounting for more than 70% of transportation volume in the United States. Two, oil and gas 
pipelines have a large footprint. In 2018, there were 2.6 million miles of oil and gas pipelines, a 
majority of which are distribution lines crossing every state. Finally, oil and gas pipelines carry the 
potential to have an immense impact on human life and property. According to the Pipeline and 
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, there have been more than 700 serious incidents over 
the last 20 years, averaging 39 incidents, 15 fatalities, and 63 injuries per year. 27  Therefore, 
assessing the effectiveness of programs designed to increase safety outcomes, and identifying 
conditions under which they are more or less effective, is critical to evaluate.  
Safety is of significant concern in the oil and pipeline industry, because it involves the 
transportation of hazardous materials, including crude oil, petroleum products, and liquids (e.g., 
propane, butane), which are highly volatile, flammable, and toxic (Kowalewski, 2013; Trench, 
2003). A federal government regulatory agency, PHMSA, is tasked with developing and enforcing 
safety standards using inspections, among other methods.28 However, since pipeline operators have 
hired away PHMSA inspectors to improve their own safety, PHMSA faces perpetual understaffing 
                                                     
27 https://opsweb.phmsa.dot.gov/primis_pdm/serious_inc_trend.asp  
28 https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/about-phmsa/phmsas-mission 
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of well-trained inspectors (Congressional Research Service, 2019). Additionally, infrequently 
modified regulatory standards often fail to keep pace with the rapidly changing technological and 
operating environments of pipeline operators. Pipelines vary greatly from one another in terms of 
dimensions (e.g., narrow, medium, wide), materials used in their construction, and geographic 
dispersion (e.g., within state or across state boundaries), exacerbating the mismatch between 
operating procedures and regulatory standards, which are designed to apply to many different types 
of organizations. Such standards are ill-suited to accurately assess risk and prevent subsequent 
incidents. They also hinder regulators’ ability to establish a magic bullet (e.g., micro-level 
regulatory standards). Previous studies have also noted that inspections and penalties are poor 
deterrents in reducing incidents (Stafford, 2014, 2017).  
To overcome these problems, PHMSA introduced the Integrity Management Program in 
2001. IMP is a proactive program that calls for pipeline operators to establish their own customized 
internal safety management programs to identify and mitigate risks (DeWolf, 2003; TRB & 
NASEM, 2017). Specifically, operators of hazardous liquid pipelines have been required to 
“identify, prioritize, assess, evaluate, repair and validate the integrity of hazardous liquid pipelines 
that could affect High Consequence Areas (HCAs).” HCAs represent densely populated area and 
areas with drinking water and ecologically sensitive resources (Kowalewski, 2013, 49 C.F.R. §195, 
2006). Under this program, PHMSA assigns responsibility to pipeline operators for managing their 
own risks in a systematic way because they are in a better position to understand the sources of risk 
in their system and take necessary action (Kowalewski, 2013; TRB & NASEM, 2017). In this way, 
operators can prioritize resources to HCAs and reduce potential damage from incidents. IMP also 
affords operators the flexibility to choose their own risk reduction technologies and practices within 
the general guidelines. This allows them to customize the program to suit their own unique needs 
and characteristics. Overall, IMP is a safety management program that helps operators learn about 
their processes.  
 
4.3   Literature Review, Theoretical Grounding, and Hypotheses 
 
Our research is informed by two streams of literature: structural complexity and 
organizational learning, both of which are mature in nature and have extensive functional spans. In 
reviewing them, we focused our efforts on their relevance to our chosen context, high-hazard 
industries. 
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Complexity 
Complexity is frequently associated with “a large number of parts that interact in a non-
simple way” (Simon, 1962). Other researchers have focused on the heterogeneous aspect of 
complexity, defining it as “the degree of heterogeneity in the range of activities” that are relevant 
to an organization’s operations. Heterogeneity, here, is often described as “the degree of similarity 
between constituent elements” (Aldrich, 1979; Child, 1972; Dess & Beard, 1984). Our review of 
the operations management literature reveals that complexity has been measured using many 
different units of analysis (Table 4.1). These include task complexity (Argote et al., 1995; 
Avgerinos & Gokpinar, 2017), product and process complexity (Novak & Eppinger, 2001; Vickery 
et al., 2016; Wolf, 2001), project complexity (Peng et al., 2014), supply chain complexity (Bode & 
Wagner, 2015; Bozarth et al., 2009; Choi & Krause, 2006), and environmental (market) complexity 
(Azadegan et al., 2013; Wiengarten et al., 2017). The literature is conclusive in terms of its impact 
on performance: researchers agree that complexity diminishes performance, and the relationship is 
true across different measures of complexity and performance. For instance, high task complexity 
is associated with lower productivity (Argote et al., 1995), and supply chain complexity (e.g., 
upstream, manufacturing, and downstream) lowers plant performance (Bozarth et al., 2009). 
Additionally, complexity in the process and supply chain leads to more frequent disruptions and 
higher incident rates (Bode & Wagner, 2015; Wolf, 2001). The basic argument underlying the 
causes of the negative impact is that because complexity entails numerous components with 
multiple interactions, it is difficult to comprehend all of the information necessary to process it. 
This makes it impossible for an individual to perceive inherent risks and execute appropriate tasks, 
resulting in inferior performance (Azadegan et al. 2013, Child 1972, Dess and Beard 1984, Peng et 
al. 2014, Vickery et al. 2016, Wood 1986).  
Complexity is inherent in high-hazard activities and organizations (TRB & NASEM, 2017). 
Specifically, Perrow (1999) proposes that complexity in a system will increase risk where the 
interactions in the system “cannot be thoroughly planned, understood, predicted, or guarded against” 
(Leveson et al., 2009). Oil and gas pipelines are inherently complex because they consist of a 
variety of physical components (e.g., pipes, valves, break tanks, and other connected structures) 
and vary in terms of construction methods, physical properties, design configurations, and 
operating conditions. Most of the pipes are buried and are therefore invisible, making it challenging 
to monitor, maintain, and repair them. Operators may also face negative repercussions when they 
point out problems or potential risks in the pipelines, reducing the likelihood of identifying 
problems (Leveson et al., 2009; TRB & NASEM, 2017). Pipelines are operated by humans who 
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are prone to mistakes (Kowalewski, 2013). The above logic suggests that an increase in pipeline 
complexity has a negative impact on performance and results in a higher incident risk.  
 
H1. Complexity is positively associated with subsequent incidents.  
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Table 4.1  Overview of Role Complexity on Operational Performance 
Authors (year) Industry Sector  
(Unit of analysis) 
Research Focus Type and source of complexity Dependent Variables 
Argote et al. 
(1995) 
Experiment  
(240 subjects) 
Effects of turnover and task complexity on group performance 
– Complexity reduces productivity, and this becomes more apparent through 
repetitive tasks over time (learning). 
– Complexity dampens the effect of turnover on group productivity. 
Task complexity (required steps in 
production) 
Productivity (production 
volume) 
Avgerinos & 
Gokpinar (2017) 
Healthcare 
(6,206 surgeries) 
Effect of task complexity and task familiarity on team productivity 
– Complexity enhances the positive relationship between team familiarity and 
team productivity 
Task complexity (patient condition) Productivity (surgery 
duration) 
Azadegan et al. 
(2013) 
Manufacturing 
(126 firms) 
Effect of environmental complexity and environmental dynamism on lean 
practices 
– A positive effect of complexity on performance 
– Lean practices mitigate the negative effect of environmental complexity on 
performance 
Environmental (market) complexity 
(-industry concentration index) 
Performance (gross margin) 
Bode & Wagner 
(2015) 
Manufacturing  
(396 buying firms) 
Effect of supply chain complexity on the frequency of supply chain 
disruptions 
– All supply chain complexity measures leads to more disruptions. 
SC complexity (horizontal, vertical, 
spatial) 
SC disruptions 
Bozarth et al. 
(2009) 
Manufacturing  
(209 plants) 
Effect of supply chain (SC) complexity on plant performance 
– All complexity constructs adversely influence plant performance. 
SC complexity (upstream, 
manufacturing, downstream, 
dynamic) 
Operational performance 
(e.g., cost) 
Liu (2015) Information system 
(128 projects) 
Contingent effect of complexity risk on the relationship between control and 
project performance 
– A negative effect of complexity on performance 
– Moderating effects of complexity risk are different across control modes 
(positive: behavior/self-control, negative: outcome/clan control). 
Complexity risk (perceived 
technology immaturity, uncertainty) 
Perceived project 
performance 
Lo et al. (2014) Manufacturing  
(211 firms) 
Relationship between a safety certification and operational performance 
– Complexity heightens the effect of certification on operational performance. 
Complexity (R&D and labor 
intensities) 
Operational performance 
(profitability, productivity, 
safety) 
Peng et al. (2014) Manufacturing  
(212 NPD projects) 
Relationship between IT tools and NPD collaboration 
– Project complexity dimensions moderate this relationship: positively 
(product size), negatively (project novelty, task interdependence). 
Project complexity (product size, 
project novelty, task 
interdependence) 
Perceived NPD collaboration 
Vickery et al. 
(2016) 
Manufacturing  
(112 firms) 
Relationship between product modularity, process modularity, and NPD 
performance 
– An insignificant main effect of complexity on NPD performance. 
– Complexity negatively (positively) moderates the effect of product (process) 
modularity on NPD performance. 
Product/process complexity  Perceived NPD performance  
Wiengarten et al. 
(2017) 
Manufacturing 
(3,945 firms) 
Effects of operational and financial slacks on occupational safety 
– Complexity positively moderates the relationships between coupling and 
safety violations. 
Environmental (market) complexity 
(-industry concentration index) 
Safety (violations) 
Wolf (2001) Petrochemical  
(36 refineries) 
Relationship between complexity, coupling, and safety performance 
– Chemical release accident rates is related to the refinery complexity, but 
occupational safety incident rate is not. 
Process complexity (# of possible 
states in a process system) 
Incident rate 
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Organizational Learning in High-hazard Industries 
Organizational learning refers to “a process of detecting and correcting error,” and 
experience is fundamental to the acquisition of knowledge and learning (Argyris, 1977; Huber, 
1991). Organizational learning has been studied in a variety of fields, demonstrating that 
organizations improve their performance through acquired knowledge and learning (Argote et al., 
2003; Huber, 1991; Madsen, 2009; Mani & Muthulingam, 2019). However, there are two notable 
trends in the learning literature. First, while early studies have focused on the benefits of learning 
in terms of cost and productivity, more recent studies concern improvements in other performance 
areas, such as quality and safety (Argote et al., 1995; Ball et al., 2017; Baum & Dahlin, 2007; 
Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002; KC et al., 2013; Madsen, 2009; Mani & Muthulingam, 2019). Next, 
recent studies have disaggregated learning experience. For instance, these studies decompose 
whether organizations learn from the following: their own experience (direct learning) or the 
experience of others (indirect learning); experience with success or failure; experience at a specific 
site; and voluntary or involuntary experience (Ball et al., 2017; Baum & Dahlin, 2007; Haunschild 
& Rhee, 2004; Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002; Huber, 1991; Levitt & March, 1988; Madsen, 2009; 
Madsen & Desai, 2010; Mani & Muthulingam, 2019).  
However, organizational learning in high-hazard organizations is more idiosyncratic. 
Learning from failures in the form of high-consequence, low-probability events is often 
problematic, because these rare events provide only a few opportunities to learn and little 
motivation to prepare for future risk (Starbuck, 2009). We also lack relevant empirical studies, 
because existing literature has focused on qualitative studies (Baum & Dahlin, 2007; Carroll et al., 
2002; Labib et al., 2019). However, we review notable empirical studies in this domain (e.g., 
pharmaceutical, airline, orbital vehicle, coal mining, oil production) listed in Table 4.2. The review 
presents important findings which indicate that high-hazard organizations learn more effectively 
under certain conditions. Specifically, they learn more from their own failures than success 
(Madsen & Desai, 2010; Mani & Muthulingam, 2019); from complex causes than simple causes 
(Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002); from major failure than minor failure (Madsen, 2009); from firm-
specific experience than other experience (Huckman & Pisano, 2006); and from voluntary 
experience than involuntary experience (Haunschild & Rhee, 2004).  
Among various learning contexts in high-hazard industries, we study organizational 
learning from IMP, an internally developed safety management program, because this program 
facilitates higher-level learning more so than other contexts (e.g., failure, inspection). For instance, 
when organizations attempt to learn from failures, they often learn superficially (Reason, 1997). 
Further, failure investigation and routine inspections are external events that create defensive 
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responses from organizations (Haunschild & Rhee, 2004; Marcus, 1988). Specifically, mechanical 
compliance will induce similar future errors, because unwilling responses will not create retainable 
knowledge that permanently influences organizational routines (Haunschild & Rhee, 2004; Perrow, 
1999). In contrast, when organizations internally develop a safety framework and practices, such 
as IMP, those efforts penetrate to organizational routines (Haunschild & Rhee, 2004; Marcus & 
Nichols, 1999). While PHMSA allows flexibility in implementing IMP, internally developed IMP 
per a pipeline operator should contain the elements of identifying, prioritizing, assessing, evaluating, 
repairing, and validating the integrity of hazardous liquid pipelines that could affect high 
consequence areas (See detail steps in Figure 1) (Kowalewski, 2013; 49 C.F.R. §195, 2006). 
Through these steps in IMP, operators can develop a sufficient understanding of the appropriate 
preventive and mitigative actions and integrate the program into their daily activities (DeWolf, 
2003).  
Consistent with organizational learning theory, pipeline operators engage in single-loop 
and double-loop learning through IMP. Single-loop learning denotes that organizations adjust 
actions based on feedback to fill the gap between the desired goal and actual achievement (Argyris, 
1977; Carroll et al., 2002). In our context, described in Figure 4.1, operators update risk analysis, 
establish reassessment tools, and schedule future plans (baseline assessment plans) based on their 
assessment and necessary repair (action), a process which corresponds to single-loop learning. In 
contrast, double-loop learning refers to question and challenge underlying assumptions, values, and 
the appropriateness of goals (Argyris, 1977; Carroll et al., 2002). IMP requires operators to 
continually update program procedures and frameworks (assumptions) to reflect their previous 
assessment and repair (act), which generates double-loop learning (Figure 4.1). Overall, as 
operators gain experience with IMPs, their IMPs have evolved and improved to better mitigate risk 
and enhance safety. Therefore, we argue that as operators gain learning experience from the 
Integrity Management Program, their safety performance increases, lowering incident risk. 
 
H2. Organizational learning is negatively associated with subsequent risk. 
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Table 4.2  Overview of Organizational Learning in Safety and High-hazard Industries 
Authors (year) Industry Sector  
(Unit of analysis) 
Research Focus and Findings Independent Variables  
(Type of learning) 
Dependent Variables 
Ball et al. (2017) Pharmaceutical 
(2,244 plants) 
Effect of inspectors' learning on future recalls 
– Site-specific inspection experience of inspectors lead to more subsequent 
recalls. 
Learning (experience in 
inspection – direct, site-specific 
or other) 
Recall frequency 
Baum & Dahlin 
(2007) 
Freight rail 
(189 railroad-year) 
Effect of learning and aspiration-performance feedback on  
– Own operating experience and others’ accident experiences reduce 
subsequent accident consequence.  
– Aspiration-performance feedback (e.g., gap from historical accident rate) 
strengthens the learning effect on accident consequence. 
Learning (operating and accident 
experience – direct, indirect, 
success, failure) 
Accident consequence (cost 
per operating mile) 
Haunschild & Rhee 
(2004) 
Automotive 
(47 automakers) 
Effect of learning with automobile recalls on future recalls 
– Production and voluntary recall experiences decrease subsequent involuntary 
recalls. 
Learning (production and 
(in)voluntary recall experience – 
direct, indirect, success, failure) 
Recall frequency 
Haunschild & 
Sullivan (2002) 
Airline 
(310 airlines) 
Effect of learning from heterogeneity on accident rate 
heterogeneity is generally better for learning, as prior heterogeneity in the 
causes of errors decreases subsequent accident rates. 
– Own accident experience reduces subsequent accident rate. 
– Airlines learn more from accidents with heterogeneous (complex) causes than 
one with a homogeneous cause. 
Learning (experience in accidents 
with (homo-)heterogeneous 
causes – direct, failure) 
Accident rate (accidents per 
100k departures) 
Huckman & Pisano 
(2006) 
Healthcare 
(203 surgeons) 
Effect of freelancing (site-specific or other experience) on mortality 
– Surgeons learn from their experiences with surgeries at local hospital (site-
specific experience) not at other hospitals.  
Learning (experience in surgeries 
– direct, site-specific or other)  
Mortality 
KC et al. (2013) Healthcare 
(71 surgeons) 
Effect of individual learning from own and others' success and failure on 
mortality 
– Surgeons learn more from their own successes than failures.  
– Surgeons learn more from the failures of others than from  
successes. 
Learning (experience in surgeries 
– direct, indirect, success, failure) 
Mortality  
Madsen & Desai 
(2010) 
Orbital vehicle 
(36 organizations) 
Effects of learning from success and failure in orbital launch 
– Organizations learn more effectively from failures than successes 
– The effect of learning from failures depreciates more slowly than from 
successes. 
Learning (experience with 
success failure – direct, indirect, 
success, failure) 
Failed or succeeded launch 
Madsen (2009) Coal mining 
(20,864 mines) 
Effects of learning from minor accidents and disasters experience 
– Own experience and the experience of others prevent future disasters. 
– The effect of learning from minor accidents depreciates more rapidly than 
from disasters. 
Learning (experience with minor 
accident and disasters – direct, 
indirect, failure) 
Accident frequency 
(disasters) 
Mani & Muthulingam 
(2018) 
Oil production  
(13,606 wells) 
Effect of learning from own and others' inspection experience on 
environmental performance  
– A focal unit learns from inspection of other units when inspections detect 
violations (failure). 
Learning (experience in 
inspection – direct, indirect, 
success, failure) 
Environmental performance 
(inspection violations) 
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Figure 4.1  Learning in Integrity Management Program 
 
 
single-loop learning
Act
Assessment and Repair
Plan
Baseline Assessment
Assume
IM Framework and Processes
▪ Develop IMP framework
▪ Develop processes for 
a.  Determining pipeline that could affect HCA
b.  Analyzing risk factors
c.  Reviewing assessment plan and results
▪ Identify pipeline that could impact HCA
▪ Assess risk and prioritize pipe segments
▪ Determine appropriate assessment tools
▪ Establish Baseline Assessment schedule
▪ Perform assessment and evaluate results
▪ Perform necessary repairs and preventive 
actions
▪ Re-analyze risk of pipe segment
▪ Update risk analysis and prioritization
▪ Determine reassessment methods and schedule
Update the program procedures and framework
double-loop learning
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Complexity in Learning 
Researchers in organizational learning literature note the difficulty in learning from 
experience. Organizational environments are often complex, which renders their experience 
ambiguous (Levinthal & March, 1993; Levitt & March, 1988). However, previous studies do not 
provide a coherent theory and accompanying evidence to indicate whether complexity facilitates 
or hinders organizational learning. Instead, complexity has been considered a double-edged sword 
in learning (Rijpma, 1997). On the one hand, scholars lay out two argument to prove that 
complexity heightens the effect of organizational learning. First, complexity fosters learning 
because it requires organizations to broaden their perspectives and create greater desire and need 
to learn (Carroll et al., 2002; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002; Rijpma, 
1997). Second, complexity offers greater learning opportunities because it leads to a deeper 
understanding and analysis of the problem. Some studies argue that the effects of learning with 
experience (e.g., airline failures, safety certification) are stronger when the learning environment is 
complex (Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002; Schilling et al., 2003; Vickery et al., 2016). On the other 
hand, learning under complex conditions is difficult and ambiguous, and organizations sometimes 
struggle to comprehend knowledge derived from complex situations (Baum & Dahlin, 2007; 
Carroll et al., 2002; Perrow, 1999; Rijpma, 1997). When organizations operate complex systems 
or encounter complex situations, they have difficulties identifying the best solution and sometimes 
view systematic failures as random (Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002; Pisano et al., 2001). However, 
relevant empirical evidence is scarce (Argote et al., 1995). Taken together, and consistent with 
more concrete evidence that supports the beneficial role of complexity, we argue that pipeline 
operators with highly complex system will be exposed to greater learning opportunities to broaden 
their perspectives and practices. Thus, the effect of organizational learning is greater for pipeline 
operators with high complexity rather than low complexity. 
 
H3. The effect of organizational learning on subsequent risk is greater under high complexity 
rather than low complexity.  
 
4.4   Research Design and Data 
 
Sample and Data Collection 
We investigate the primary effects of complexity and organizational learning and the 
moderation effect of complexity among hazardous material (hazmat) pipeline operators in the 
United States. We chose hazmat pipeline operators because of their immense consequences to 
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human health, property, and the environment, as they operate about 200,000 miles of pipeline 
(Kowalewski, 2013; Stafford, 2014). To test our hypotheses, we use data from the Pipeline and 
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), and ORBIS, a private company database of 
the Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing firm that compiles administrative data from operators. 
The primary data comes from PHMSA reports, which have been completed by hazmat pipeline 
operators. Reporting is mandatory for operators, because PHMSA will impose a civil penalty for 
failure to report pursuant to the Code of Federal Regulations (49 C.F.R. §195, 2006). We first 
obtained pipeline operators’ characteristics and their activities in the Integrity Management 
Program from operator-level annual reports. Second, we retrieved incident information (e.g., date, 
operator, consequence of incident) from incident reports. We then merged these data using the 
unique identification numbers of the operators assigned by PHMSA. Third, we complement other 
characteristics of pipeline operators (e.g., ownership of operator and parent company) from ORBIS 
by matching the names and addresses of pipeline operators between PHMSA reports and ORBIS 
database. We then excluded those pipeline operators when characteristics of the incident (e.g., total 
pipeline mileage, nominal size) were missing. This process resulted in the final sample, an 
unbalanced panel of 642 hazmat pipeline operators, consisting of 4,696 pipeline operator-year 
observations between 2004 and 2017. We describe corresponding variables and provide summary 
statistics in Table 4.3. 
We use data range from 2004 to 2017 because PHMSA carried out major revision to the 
reports, and this revision affected operators’ submissions from 2004 forward.29 The unit of analysis 
is pipeline operator, because annual reports contain pipeline characteristic information at the 
pipeline operator level, and we consider a pipeline operator a learning unit. This consideration is 
appropriate because a pipeline operator operates an entire network system, including but not limited 
to line pipe, valves, pumping units, and other equipment connected to the line pipe (49 C.F.R. §195, 
2006).  
                                                     
29 We note that the initial IMP activities in 2002 and 2003 were recorded in the report of year 2004, but 
additional pipeline characteristics have been reported since 2004. 
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Table 4.3  Description of Variables and Summary Statistics 
Variable Description (n = 642, Observations = 4,696) Mean SD Min Max 
Safety Performance Measures 
     
 
Incident CostPerMile t+1 Log of (incident cost per pipeline miles) on next year 1.266 2.632 0 14.024 
Independent Variables 
     
 
Complexity Degree of complexity in a pipeline system, measured by variability from 
installed years across segments 
0.323 0.306 0 0.883 
 
BaseAssess Indicator 1 if an operator conducts Baseline Assessment 0.397 0.489 0 1 
 
BaseAssesst Experience Log of pipeline mileages that an operator conducts baseline assessment 1.343 1.995 0 8.380 
 
Yrs from Last BaseAssess Years passed since the last Baseline Assessment 1.100 1.989 0 14 
Controls 
     
 
Ownership Operator is a public company (Yes = 46.4%) 
    
 
HCA Ratio Pipeline miles in High Consequence Area over total miles 0.523 0.395 0 1.000 
 
Pipeline Diameter Large Pipeline miles with diameter ≥ 18” over total miles 0.098 0.252 0 1.000 
 
Pipeline Diameter Medium Pipeline miles with diameter between 10" and 18" over total miles 0.238 0.338 0 1.000 
 Average Age Pipeline average age from installation year 36.664 18.897 0 101.000 
 
Table 4.4  Correlation Matrix 
  ICC (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) Incident CostPerMilet +1 0.483 1 
         
(2) Complexity 0.890 0.346** 1         
(3) BaseAssess Indicator 0.302 0.258** 0.375** 1        
(4) BaseAssess Experience 0.521 0.355** 0.427** 0.829** 1       
(5) Yrs from Last BaseAssess 0.452 -0.111** -0.139** -0.449** -0.372** 1      
(6) Ownership 0.838 0.048** 0.143** 0.069** 0.063** -0.009 1     
(7) HCA Ratio 0.802 -0.007 0.062*** 0.091*** -0.001 0.069*** -0.016 1    
(8) Pipeline Diameter Large 0.975 0.170*** -0.046** 0.063*** 0.125*** -0.005 -0.004 0.010 1   
(9) Pipeline Diameter Medium 0.934 0.079*** 0.008 0.045** 0.055*** 0.047** 0.037* 0.064*** -0.130*** 1  
(10) Average Age 0.824 0.205*** 0.310*** 0.185*** 0.212*** 0.005 0.021 0.166*** 0.022 0.002 1 
Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC) denotes between variation over total variation (sum of between and within variation). **p < 0.01, *p <0.05. 
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Dependent Variables 
Safety Performance: Incident Cost Per Mile. We consider a subsequent incident a key construct 
in the safety management performance of pipeline operators, because it reflects the outcome of the 
managerial effort of the operators (Sosa & Alvarez-Ramirez, 2009; Stafford, 2014). In the pipeline 
industry, federal regulations refer to an incident as an unintentional release of a hazardous material 
(49 C.F.R §171.16, 2011). While there are two types of measures with respect to safety, incident 
consequences (e.g., incident cost, spilled volume) and incident frequency (e.g., incident rate), we 
use a consequence measure of cost, which has been employed in previous studies (Baum & Dahlin, 
2007; DeWolf, 2003; Leveson et al., 2009). We focus on the cost measure because it can 
comprehensively capture the influences of incidents on operators, the public, and the environment, 
while a frequency measure cannot precisely assess these impacts. Further, the frequency measure 
is imperfect because a comparison of incident frequency only makes sense if the consequences 
stemming from the incident are similar (Leveson et al., 2009). Further, the cost measure also 
outperforms the other consequence measure, spilled volume, for several reasons. First, the volume 
measure does not recognize the impacts of different commodities when the volume spilled is the 
same. However, the total cost of releasing highly volatile liquids (e.g., propane, butane) is radically 
different than a release of crude oil. Next, the volume measure does not reflect whether hazmat is 
released in high consequence areas (e.g., densely populated area) or low consequence areas. Instead, 
the cost measure quantifies the overall consequence through costs. To create the cost measure, we 
first compute the total cost (indexed to 2018 dollars) of pipeline incidents over pipeline miles per 
operator from PHMSA reports, then take a logarithmic form. Specifically, we take together the 
costs of an operator’s lost commodity, property damage and repairs, emergency response, and 
environmental remediation, and the cost of third-party property damage (e.g., public property, non-
operator private property) from the incidents. To account for impacts on subsequent risk, we 
consider the incidents cost per mile at t+1 year. 
Independent Variables 
Complexity. Organizational theory has conceded that complexity is a structural variable which 
portrays organizations (Anderson, 1999). As Bar-Yam (1997) considers complexity as the amount 
of information needed to describe a system, researchers have suggested that homogeneity-
heterogeneity and concentration-dispersion describe complexity (Dess & Beard, 1984; Haunschild 
& Sullivan, 2002). Among various factors that generate heterogeneity in pipeline operator systems, 
we regard heterogeneity from the year of pipeline installed (age) as a key measure to construct 
structural complexity. This is because the risk factors from pipeline characteristics are 
interdependent, and age is a clear and logical indicator of physical properties (e.g., materials, 
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construction methods) and the way to assess pipeline condition (e.g., hydrostatic test) (Kiefner & 
Trench, 2001). For instance, pipelines from the early 1900s still contain iron; pipelines from the 
1920s were constructed with electric-resistance welding; pipelines from the 1940s were built with 
cathodic protection to prevent corrosion; pipelines from the late 1960s were coupled with high 
frequency electric-resistance welding; and older pipelines do not conform to in-line cleaning and 
inspection (Kiefner & Trench, 2001; TRB & NASEM, 2017). The heterogeneity in pipeline age 
reflects a complexity in pipeline operations that requires different monitoring, maintenance, and 
repair practices.  
To create a structural complexity measure from age heterogeneity, we use information on 
pipeline mileage by installed decade per operator (i.e., mileage of pipeline installed from 1920-
1929) contained in PHMSA annual reports. We measure the complexity by computing a 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) from pipeline mileage by installed decade and then subtracting 
the HHI from 1. 
Learning. To capture organizational learning through the Integrity Management Program, we focus 
on the baseline assessment for two reasons. First, this is a primary step that builds a technical basis 
for determining risk factors used in scheduling and selecting integrity assessment methods, and that 
conducts scheduled assessments to understand the condition of the pipeline (TRB & NASEM, 
2017).  Second, this is a step, which has been observed by PHMSA and recorded in the annual 
reports. Therefore, it is an appropriate proxy for overall learning from IMP. However, we note a 
unique setting in the implementation of baseline assessment under federal regulations (49 C.F.R. 
§195, 2006). The regulations require operators to maintain intervals between assessments of less 
than 68 months, although operators may lengthen the interval and defer the next assessment with 
engineering-based justification. In that sense, we construct two main variables with one control 
variable. First, we create a dichotomous variable of BaseAssess Indicator that indicates whether a 
pipeline operator conducts a baseline assessment in that year. This represents whether pipeline 
operators encounter opportunity to learn by doing (baseline assessment) in that year. Second, we 
create a volume measure of BaseAssess Experience by computing logged pipeline miles for which 
an operator conducts a baseline assessment. We focus on experience at the current time frame 
instead of cumulative experience, because operators may have difficulty retrieving older 
experiences, and experiences may not be preserved when the level of technology keeps changing 
(Levitt & March, 1988). Finally, we create a control variable, Years from Last BaseAssess, because 
an operator will conduct the next baseline assessment after a certain number of years which 
probably will not exceed 68 months, as noted in the regulation.  
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Control Variables 
We incorporate key control variables from previous literature and federal law about the 
transportation of hazardous liquids by pipeline (DeWolf, 2003; Stafford, 2014, 2017; 49 C.F.R. 
§195, 2006). This law includes risk factors delineated by the Department of Transportation, the 
National Transportation Safety Board, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Technical 
Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Standards Committee. We also include other risk factors, which 
might influence risk management efforts and outcomes.   
Ownership. We control for the ownership of operators because we expect that public companies 
will be more concerned about incidents that may result in a potential drop in their stock price. Since 
many pipeline operators are private companies, we comprehensively investigate the ownership of 
the parent company. We collect this information from Orbis and code an ownership dummy 
variable as one if either an operator or its parent company is a public company and otherwise zero.  
HCA Ratio. There are areas in which incidents will have a more significant impact, even with the 
same amount of hazardous material release, because such areas are densely populated or 
environmentally sensitive. Specifically, federal law defines a high consequence area (HCA) as a 
highly populated area, an unusually sensitive area, or a commercially navigable waterway (49 
C.F.R. §195, 2006). HCA is an important risk indicator, as noted in the regulation, and it requires 
greater attention and protection from incidents (Kowalewski, 2013; 49 C.F.R. §195, 2006). To 
control for the HCA Ratio, we create a measure by computing pipeline mileage at HCA over total 
pipeline miles per operator.    
Pipeline Diameter. PHMSA suggests that an operator consider pipeline diameter size when it 
establishes baseline assessment and IMP (49 C.F.R. §195, 2006). While the range of pipeline 
diameter usually spans from 8 to 42 inches, the federal regulations consider the pipe segments with 
a diameter greater than or equal to 18inches as high risk, a diameter between 10 inches and 18inches 
as moderate risk, and a diameter of less than 10 inches as low risk. To control for risk from pipeline 
diameter size, we collect pipeline mileage by diameter size per operator (e.g., mileage of pipeline 
whose nominal size is less than 10 inches) from the annual reports. We then create two variables, 
each of which computes the pipeline mileage rate whose diameter is within a certain range (e.g., 
greater than 18 inches, between 10 inches and 18 inches) over the total pipeline mileage of an 
operator, respectively. 
Average Age. PHMSA requires a pipeline operator to consider pipeline age when it establishes an 
internal assessment of risks and plans (49 CFR §195.452, 2010). While federal law indicates that a 
pipeline segment older than 25 years has a high risk, previous literature has argued that pipelines 
installed before 1930 have consistently more incidents because they have experienced more 
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external corrosion (Kiefner & Trench, 2001; Kowalewski, 2013). However, to incorporate pipeline 
age comprehensively, we calculate the weighted average using decade pipeline installed and its 
mileage value (i.e. mileage of pipeline installed during 1920-1929) in the annual reports. We then 
subtract the calculated average from the current year of observation. 
Empirical Strategy 
Our analyses investigate three research questions: whether the relationship between 
complexity and subsequent risk is positive; whether the relationship between organizational 
learning from the internally developed program (IMP) and subsequent risk is negative; and when 
organizational learning becomes more effective (e.g., level of complexity). We establish ordinary 
least squares regression models to test the main effects of complexity (Complexityit) and baseline 
assessment experience (BaseAssess Indicator, BaseAssess Experienceit). We then investigate the 
moderating role of complexity using subgroup (segmented regression) analysis by splitting samples 
into two groups depending on the level of complexity. We employ subgroup analyses in lieu of 
interaction variables because interaction effects in fixed-effect models are likely to be biased 
(Giesselmann & Schmidt-Catran, 2018; Shaver, 2019). Specifically, interaction terms in fixed-
effect models do not purely capture within-group variation. Instead, the estimates of interaction 
effects will exhibit both within-group and between-group variations. To avoid ambiguous results 
and interpretation, we employ subgroup analysis, as suggested by Shaver (2019). For all regression 
models, we include time-varying characteristics of pipeline operators (Controlsit) and fixed effects 
of pipeline operator and year. The following equation describes our model, where Incident 
CostPerMilet+1 is the logged amount of incident cost per pipeline mileage of an operator i at year 
t+1, while other variables are constructed from an operator i at year t. We use standard errors 
clustered in operator-level.  
 
Incident CostPerMileit+1 = β1Complexityit + β2BaseAssess Indicatorit + β3BaseAssess Experienceit 
+ γControlsit + δOperator Fixed Effecti + τYear Fixed Effectt  
 
4.5   Results 
A correlation matrix table in Table 4.4 suggests that both complexity and baseline 
assessment variables are positively associated with the dependent variable: Complexity and Incident 
CostPerMile (ρ = 0.346, p < 0.01), BaseAssess Indicator and Incident CostPerMile (ρ = 0.258, p < 
0.01), BaseAssess Experience and Incident CostPerMile (ρ = 0.355, p < 0.01). We observe that 
Complexity and BaseAssess variables are positively associated: Complexity and BaseAssess 
Indicator (ρ = 0.375, p < 0.01), Complexity and BaseAssess Experience (ρ = 0.427, p < 0.01).  
89 
 
To test our hypotheses, we first use a full sample: 642 pipeline operators with 4,696 
operator-year observations. We then consider a subsample, which excludes pipeline operators that 
never experienced any incidents or that never conducted baseline assessment activities during the 
research period. This consideration reduces the number of pipeline operators from 642 to 234, 
consisting of 2,369 operator-year observations (see Appendix C, Table 1). We report primary 
analyses from the testing of H1 and H2 in Table 4.5 and from the testing of H3 in Table 4.6, for 
both the full sample and the subsample.  
We first describe the main effects of complexity and the baseline assessment on incident 
cost in Table 4.5. Models 1, 2 and 3 denote the results from the full sample, and Models 4, 5, and 
6 represent the results from the subsample. We first include complexity with control variables 
(Model 1 – full sample; Model 4 – subsample) and baseline assessment variables with controls 
(Model 2 – full sample; Model 5 – subsample), respectively. We then consider both the effects of 
complexity and a baseline assessment in a stepwise manner (Model 3 – full sample; Model 6 – 
subsample). Our results are consistent across the full sample and the subsample. We find that 
Complexity is positively associated with subsequent incident cost (b1 = 1.042, p < 0.01, Model 1; 
b1 = 2.085, p < 0.01, Model 4), supporting H1, which theorized a positive effect. Next, while the 
coefficient of BaseAssess Indicator is positive and statistically significant (b2 = 0.330, p < 0.01, 
Model 2; b2 = 0.592, p < 0.01, Model 5), the estimate of BaseAssess Experience is negative and 
significant, supporting H2 (b3 = −0.107, p < 0.05, Model 2; b3 = −0.159, p < 0.05, Model 5). These 
effects of complexity and baseline assessment remain significant in Models 3 and 6.  
Next, we evaluate the moderation effect of complexity on the relationship between baseline 
assessment and subsequent incident cost (H3). We report subgroup analyses in Table 4.6: Models 
1, 2 and 3 denote the results from the full sample, and Models 4, 5, and 6 represent the results from 
the subsample. We include Models 1 and 4 in Table 4.6, which correspond to Models 3 and 6 in 
Table 4.5, to render the main estimates comparable to the estimates from subgroup analyses. We 
lay out the results of subgroup analyses, when pipeline structural complexity is high (Model 2 – 
Full sample; Model 5 – subsample) and low (Model 3 – Full sample; Model 6 – subsample). We 
show consistent results across the full sample and the subsample. When the complexity level is 
high (Models 2 and 5), we observe a non-significant positive association between Complexity and 
subsequent incident cost (b1 = 0.733, p > 0. 1, Model 2; b1 = 1.086, p > 0. 1, Model 5; H1 not 
supported). The results also suggest no significant association between BaseAssess Indicator and 
subsequent incident cost (b2 = 0.304, p > 0.10, Model 2; b2 = 0.113, p > 0.10, Model 5). However, 
BaseAssess Experience and subsequent incident cost show a negative and significant association 
(b3= −0.141, p < 0.05. Model 2; b3= −0.169, p < 0.05. Model 5; H2 supported). In contrast, when 
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we consider operators with low complexity (Models 3 and 6), we find a strong and positive 
association between Complexity and subsequent incident cost (b1 = 1.323, p < 0.01, Model 3; b1 = 
2.558, p < 0.01, Model 6; H1 supported). We observe a positive association between BaseAssess 
Indicator and subsequent incident costs without significance in the full sample (b2 = 0.221, p > 
0.10, Model 3), and with significance in the subsample (b2 = 0.809, p < 0.05, Model 6). The results 
further suggest an insignificant negative association between BaseAssess Experience and 
subsequent incident costs (b3 = −0.041, p > 0.10, Model 3; b3 = −0.162, p > 0.10, Model 6). To 
investigate the moderation effects, we compare coefficients across operator groups with high and 
low complexity, following the procedure introduced by Clogg et al. (1995). While the differences 
in main effects between high and low complexity groups are mostly insignificant, BaseAssess 
Experience in high and low complexity groups is significantly different (∆b2 = −0.696, p < 0.10, 
Models 5 and 6). Interestingly, the main effects of complexity and the baseline assessment variables 
are not universally significant between the two groups. Specifically, the effect of complexity is 
insignificant in high complexity groups but significant in low complexity groups for both the full 
sample and the subsample. In contrast, the effect of BaseAssess Experience is significant in high 
complexity groups but insignificant in low complexity groups. 
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Table 4.5  Regression Analyses Testing Complexity (H1) and Learning (H2) 
Sample  Full-Sample   Sub-Sample with no incidents; no IMP 
DV: Incident CostPerMilet+1 Model Model Model  Model Model Model 
 1 2 3  4 5 6 
Complexity 1.042**  1.034**  2.085**  2.130** 
  (0.335)  (0.332)  (0.595)  (0.584) 
BaseAssess Indicator   0.330* 0.320*   0.592* 0.567* 
     (0.155) (0.155)   (0.266) (0.265) 
BaseAssess Experience  -0.107* -0.110*   -0.159* -0.170** 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  (0.047) (0.047)  (0.062) (0.062)
Yrs from Last BaseAssess  -0.026 -0.023   -0.023 -0.028 
  (0.022) (0.022)   (0.052) (0.052) 
Ownership 0.130 0.148 0.142  0.203 0.181 0.237 
 (0.201) (0.203) (0.201)  (0.304) (0.310) (0.302) 
HCA Ratio -0.014 -0.021 -0.026  -0.080 -0.149 -0.062 
 (0.159) (0.162) (0.160)  (0.373) (0.386) (0.373) 
Pipeline Diameter Large 0.765 0.612 0.835  1.252 1.218 1.433 
 (1.048) (1.053) (1.047)  (1.759) (1.707) (1.748) 
Pipeline Diameter Medium 0.035 0.095 0.055  0.239 0.217 0.275 
 (0.481) (0.501) (0.485)  (0.917) (0.990) (0.917) 
Average Age 0.001 0.001 0.001  0.001 -0.004 0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
Constant 0.862** 0.715* 0.756**  1.442* 1.785** 1.261* 
 (0.279) (0.291) (0.283)  (0.587) (0.647) (0.590) 
Pipeline Operator FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
# of Operators 642 642 642  234 234 234 
Observations 4,696 4,696 4,696  2,369 2,369 2,369 
R2 0.008 0.007 0.010  0.015 0.012 0.019 
Operator-cluster robust standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1. 
Notes. Models 1,2 and 3 includes all observations (full sample), and Models 4, 5 and 6 use the subsample, which excludes pipeline 
operators that never experienced incidents or that never conducted Integrity Management Program (no Baseline Assessment activities). 
Per each sample, we run segment regression analysis based on the level of structural complexity: high (Models 2 and 5) and low 
complexity (Models 3 and 6). Results show that the coefficient of structural complexity is positive and significant except in pipeline 
operators with high complexity group in subsample (Model 5). We also find that the effect of Baseline Assessment experience is negative 
and significant under high complexity group (Models 2 and 5). 
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Table 4.6  Subgroup Analysis Testing Moderation Effects of Complexity (H3) 
Sample (Complexity) Full (All) Full (High) Full (Low)  Sub (All) Sub (High) Sub (Low) 
DV: Incident 
CostPerMilet+1 
Model Model Model  Model Model Model 
 1 2 3  4 5 6 
Complexity 1.034** 0.733 1.323**  2.130** 1.086 2.558** 
  (0.332) (0.478) (0.456)  (0.584) (1.051) (0.700) 
BaseAssess Indicator  0.320* 0.304 0.221  0.567* 0.113 0.809* 
    (0.155) (0.229) (0.217)  (0.265) (0.370) (0.396) 
BaseAssess Experience -0.110* -0.141* -0.041  -0.170** -0.169* -0.162 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  (0.047) (0.058) (0.080) (0.062) (0.076) (0.102)
Yrs from Last BaseAssess -0.023 -0.069 0.009  -0.028 -0.202* 0.055 
 (0.022) (0.043) (0.025)  (0.052) (0.100) (0.060) 
Ownership 0.142 -0.120 0.499†  0.237 -0.015 0.433 
 (0.201) (0.270) (0.271)  (0.302) (0.287) (0.545) 
HCA Ratio -0.026 0.005 -0.035  -0.062 -0.387 0.185 
 (0.160) (0.332) (0.171)  (0.373) (0.482) (0.549) 
Pipeline Diameter Large 0.835 1.084 0.090  1.433 2.880 0.325 
 (1.047) (1.406) (0.915)  (1.748) (3.205) (1.862) 
Pipeline Diameter Medium 0.055 0.459 -0.375  0.275 -0.895 0.718 
 (0.485) (0.691) (0.726)  (0.917) (1.535) (1.160) 
Average Age 0.001 -0.001 0.003  0.002 -0.019 0.007 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.006)  (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) 
Constant 0.756** 1.268* 0.148  1.261* 3.440** 0.016 
 (0.283) (0.527) (0.294)  (0.590) (1.034) (0.776) 
Pipeline Operator FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
# of Operators 642 258 384  234 117 117 
Observations 4,696 2,342 2,354  2,369 1,229 1,140 
R2 0.010 0.013 0.019  0.019 0.022 0.036 
Operator-cluster robust standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1. 
Notes. Models 1,2 and 3 includes all observations (full sample), and Model 4, 5 and 6 use the subsample, which excludes pipeline 
operators that never experienced incidents or that never conducted Integrity Management Program (no Baseline Assessment activities). 
For full sample and subsample respectively, we run segment regression analysis based on the level of structural complexity: high 
(Models 2 and 5) and low complexity (Models 3 and 6). Results show that the coefficient of structural complexity is positive and 
significant except in pipeline operators with high complexity group in subsample (Models 2 and 5). We also find that the effect of 
Baseline Assessment experience is negative and significant under high complexity group (Models 2 and 5).  
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Robustness Check 
We conduct several robustness checks to address concerns regarding the many zeros in the 
dependent variable, selection bias, and omitted variable bias. We first employ a two-part model to 
account for mass zeros in the outcome variable, Incident CostPerMile. We use this model over 
other methods (e.g., Heckman selection model, Tobit model) for several reasons First, while the 
zeros in the Heckman selection model represent censored values, the zeros in the two-part model 
are real zeros. The two-part model applies to our context, in which we observe non-zero incident 
cost only if there is an incident. Next, two-part models produce better or more robust estimates than 
a generalized Tobit model (Belotti et al., 2015). To construct a two-part model, we first build a 
logit model to predict the likelihood of observing a positive outcome for incident cost. We then 
construct a generalized linear model (GLM) with a log link conditional on the positive outcome of 
incident cost per pipeline mileage. Both the first and the second parts contain independent variables, 
controls, and fixed effects of years, with standard errors clustered in operator-level (Table 4.7). By 
examining the variations between operators in Model 1, we find that operators with greater 
complexity (b1 = 3.123, p < 0.01, Model 1), no baseline assessment implementation (b2 = −0.459, 
p < 0.05, Model 1), more baseline assessment experience (b3 = 0.391, p < 0.01; Model 1), a lower 
HCA ratio (b = −0.866, p < 0.01, Model 1), a larger diameter (b = 2.255, p < 0.01; Model 1), and 
more aged (b = 0.021, p < 0.01, Model 1) are likely to incur incidents. Conditioned on the positive 
outcome of Incident CostPerMile in Model 2, we observe that operators with less baseline 
assessment experience (b3 = −0.150, p < 0.05, Model 2, H2 supported) and a greater HCA ratio (b 
= 2.441, p < 0.01, Model 2) incur greater incident cost.  
 Next, to address selection bias with respect to the baseline assessment, we investigate the 
sensitivity of incident cost to complexity changes between pipeline operators that ever conducted 
a baseline assessment and those that never did. To investigate sensitivity, we use switching 
regression, which consists of two stages (Table 4.8). In the first stage, we estimate a probit model 
(Model 1), which predicts the decision to conduct a baseline assessment. In the second stage, we 
then estimate ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions on Incident CostPerMile between the two 
groups: operators that conducted a baseline assessment (Ever BaseAssess = Yes, Model 2) and 
those never did (Ever BaseAssess = No; Model 3). While both stages include complexity, controls, 
year fixed effects in common, only the second stage (Models 2 and 3) has a selection correction 
term (inverse Mills ratio) and operator fixed effects. We find that Complexity has a positive effect 
on incident cost, but only for operators that have conducted a baseline assessment (b = 1.694, p < 
0.01; Model 2), as opposed to operators that have not (b = −0.733, p > 0.10; Model 3). Two 
coefficients are significantly different (Z = 2.877, p < 0.01). Additionally, the insignificant results 
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of the Mills ratio in Models 2 and 3 indicate that omitted factors which may influence the decision 
to conduct a baseline assessment do not influence future incident cost.  
 
 
Table 4.7  Robustness Checks: Effects on Likelihood of Incidents and Incident Cost 
Sample Full Full 
DV Likelihood of Incident Incident CostPerMile for Those with Incident 
Two-part model Model Model 
 1 2 
Complexity 3.123** -0.260 
  (0.294) (0.447) 
BaseAssess Indicator -0.459* -0.077 
 (0.228) (0.306) 
BaseAssess Experience 0.391** -0.150* 
  (0.054) (0.061) 
Yrs from Last BaseAssess -0.027 -0.018 
 (0.045) (0.070) 
Ownership -0.107 0.069 
 (0.153) (0.201) 
HCA Ratio -0.866** 2.441** 
 (0.202) (0.396) 
Pipeline Diameter Large 2.255** 0.373 
 (0.295) (0.409) 
Pipeline Diameter Medium 1.257** 0.074 
 (0.236) (0.434) 
Average Age 0.021** 0.005 
 (0.004) (0.006) 
Constant -2.701** 4.285** 
 (0.283) (0.565) 
Pipeline Operator FE No No 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Specification  Logit GLM 
# of Operators 642 254 
Observations 4,696 1,050 
Pseudo R2 0.304 – 
R2 – 0.141 
Operator-cluster standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1. 
Notes. We use a logit model to predict the probability of experiencing incident and employ a generalized linear model (GLM) to estimate 
the incident consequence (log of incident cost per mile), conditional on the incident.   
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Table 4.8  Robustness Checks: Sensitivity in Complexity Effects on Incident Cost – (N)ever 
BaseAssess 
Sample Full Ever BaseAssess= Yes Ever BaseAssess = No 
DV Ever BaseAssess (Y/N) Incident CostPerMilet+1 Incident CostPerMilet+1 
Switching Regression  Model Model Model 
  1 2 3 
Complexity 4.187** 1.694** -0.733 
 (0.639) (0.515) (0.668) 
Inverse Mills ratio  -0.134 -0.012 
  (0.085) (0.111) 
Ownership 0.878** 0.238 0.367 
 (0.314) (0.196) (0.339) 
HCA Ratio 3.348** 0.365 0.590 
 (0.439) (0.351) (0.439) 
Pipeline Diameter Large 1.559* 1.192 -1.371† 
 (0.610) (1.305) (0.715) 
Pipeline Diameter Medium 1.732** 0.305 -1.916 
 (0.457) (0.541) (1.512) 
Average Age 0.021** 0.000 0.024* 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.011) 
Constant 1.510* 1.307** -0.383 
 (0.716) (0.307) (0.482) 
Pipeline Operator FE No Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Specification Probit OLS OLS 
# of Operators 642 464 178 
Observations 4,696 4,041 655 
Pseudo R2 0.042 – – 
R2 – 0.009 0.040 
Operator-cluster robust standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1. 
Notes. We examine how sensitivity of future incident consequence to structural complexity changes between pipeline operators that 
ever conducted Baseline Assessment (at least once) and those that never did using switching regression. We run a first-stage with a 
probit model (Model 1), predicting the decision to entry to Baseline Assessment. In a second stage (Models 2 and 3), we then estimate 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for each group based on the BA entry, respectively. Ever BA Indicator represents whether a 
pipeline operator ever conducted Baseline Assessment. The results show a substantial difference between the effects of structural 
complexity on future incident consequence of pipeline operators that ever-implemented BA versus those that did not: The effect is more 
statistically significant under pipeline operators with BA. The insignificant results of Mills ratio in Models 2 and 3 indicate that omitted 
factors that may influence the decision to conduct BA, do not influence future incident consequence.  
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We also take several approaches to mitigate concerns regarding endogeneity from omitted 
variables. Because we have already examined the issues of mass zeros and baseline assessment, we 
only report the results of the subsample hereafter, which exclude pipeline operators that never 
experienced any incidents during the research period and that never conducted baseline assessment 
activities. This sample consists of 234 pipeline operators with 2,369 operator-year observations 
(see Appendix C, Table 1). To begin, we additionally include repair experience, the logged amount 
of pipeline miles repaired by an operator, which may influence the baseline assessment, and 
incident cost (Table 4.9). We find that the overall results are consistent with previous results, but 
the coefficient of repair experience is statistically insignificant (b = −0.017, p > 0.10; Model 3).  
Next, we consider enforcement actions carried out by PHMSA. PHMSA initiates an 
enforcement case if it observes a violation of safety regulations during an inspection. The type of 
enforcement action is dependent on the seriousness of the violations. While minor problems 
typically lead to a warning letter, more critical violations may require notices of amendment and 
monetary penalties (Stafford, 2014). We include four categories of enforcement actions – warning 
letters, concern letters, notices of amendment, and monetary penalty – in the models (Table A2). 
While the overall results are consistent with the main results, the coefficients of enforcement 
actions are insignificant. We note that only warning letters and amendment notices have negative 
estimates, without statistical significance.  
Importantly, we note that the BaseAssess Indicator can be endogenous, because some 
important risk factors influence the baseline assessment decision and the incident cost. To address 
this potential bias, we consider enforcement regarding IMP (e.g., evaluate whether operators 
employ appropriate information to assess risks and take needed actions in IMP (Stafford, 2014)) as 
instrumental variables. Among enforcement actions including warning letters, concern letters, 
notices of amendment, and monetary penalties issued by PHMSA, we extract enforcement 
activities exclusive to IMP. We expect that the previous enforcement activities on IMP influence 
incident cost only through IMP (BaseAssess). However, when we conduct two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) regression with these instrumental variables, the model is underidentified (Chi-square = 
5.371, p = 0.717) and does not empirically meet instrument relevancy. However, we alternatively 
use generated instruments employing heteroskedastic errors, as suggested by Lewbel (2012). This 
is a useful approach when external instruments are not available and overidentifying information 
is needed. The approach considers a subset of regressors, which are not correlated with the product 
of heteroskedastic errors for identification. This is often the characteristic of statistical models due 
to unobserved common factors (See Lewbel (2012) for a more detail explanation).  
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We conduct 2SLS regression with the generated instruments and the standard errors 
clustered in operator-level. We report the second-stage analyses in Table 4.10. Model 1 concerns 
operators with all complexity levels, and Models 2 and 3 demonstrate operators with high and low 
complexity, respectively. Based on the Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test, we conclude that 
the BaseAssess Indicator is not endogenous and is positively associated with incident cost in Model 
2 (p = 0.388) and Model 3 (p = 0.649). While the Hausman test is marginally significant in Model 
1 (p = 0.076), the significance and the positive sign of the BaseAssess Indicator (b = 1.471, p < 
0.05) remain the same, with the main results shown in Table 5. We confirm the validity of 
instruments through multiple tests of relevance and exclusion restrictions assumptions (Wooldridge, 
2002). To test the relevance of instruments, we examine the first stage of 2SLS regression. The F 
statistics (F = 82.49, Model 1; F = 82.31, Model 2; F = 87.77, Model 3) are greater than the rule of 
thumb value and within a range indicating strong instruments (Staiger & Stock, 1997). Next, the 
overidentification test suggests that our instruments satisfy exclusion restriction assumptions 
(Hansen J (H) = 19.055, p = 0.453, Model 1; H = 19.668, p = 0.415, Model 2; H = 16.824, p = 
0.602, Model 3).  
 One of the interesting controls that we did not include in the main analyses is previous 
failures, lagged dependent variables, and independent variables (BaseAssess). However, including 
lagged dependent variables leads to dynamic panel structure, and previous literature suggests that 
fixed effect estimators may be inconsistent when the number of cross-sectional observations is 
large and the number of time periods is small (Nickell, 1981). To address this concern, we employ 
a bootstrap-based bias correction procedure for the dynamic panel model (Everaert & Pozzi, 2007). 
This approach is better than generalized method of moments approaches because it is not vulnerable 
to the issues of weak instruments and poor small sample property (Bun & Windmeijer, 2010; 
Everaert & Pozzi, 2007). Our bootstrap procedure contains 250 wild bootstrap iterations with burn-
in initialization, which allows general heteroscedasticity. We report the results of including three-
year lags of dependent and independent variables in Table 4.11. Model 1 concerns all levels of 
complexity, and Models 2 and 3 consider high and low complexity groups, respectively. The results 
show that past Incident CostPerMile do not relate to future Incident CostPerMile. We find that the 
main effects of Complexity and BaseAssess are significant, which is generally consistent with the 
main results in Table 4.6. However, we note that the effect of BaseAssess Experience in low 
complex groups is also significant (b = −0.376, p < 0.05, Model 3). We also note that the effects of 
baseline assessment variables at time t and t−3 are statistically significant. Unreported results of 
one-year lag and two-year lags remain the same.  
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Table 4.9  Robustness Checks: Repair Activities as Additional Control 
Sample (Complexity) Sub (All) Sub (High) Sub (Low) 
DV: Incident CostPerMilet+1 Model Model Model 
 1 2 3 
Complexity 2.148** 1.027 2.643** 
  (0.594) (1.059) (0.722) 
BaseAssess Indicator 0.568* 0.113 0.818* 
 (0.265) (0.371) (0.398) 
BaseAssess Experience -0.168** -0.175* -0.155 
  (0.062) (0.075) (0.103) 
Repair Experience -0.017 0.047 -0.088 
  (0.051) (0.066) (0.079) 
Years from Last BaseAssess -0.028 -0.203* 0.053 
 (0.052) (0.100) (0.060) 
Ownership 0.232 -0.014 0.378 
 (0.302) (0.288) (0.541) 
HCA Ratio -0.065 -0.381 0.168 
 (0.374) (0.479) (0.547) 
Pipeline Diameter Large 1.440 2.888 0.401 
 (1.749) (3.211) (1.883) 
Pipeline Diameter Medium 0.284 -0.903 0.779 
 (0.921) (1.528) (1.161) 
Average Age 0.002 -0.019 0.008 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) 
Constant 0.810 3.413** 0.040 
 (0.625) (1.032) (0.775) 
Pipeline Operator FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
# of Operators 234 117 117 
Observations 2,369 1,229 1,140 
R2 0.019 0.023 0.037 
Operator-cluster robust standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1.  
Notes. We use a subsample, excluding pipeline operators that never experienced incidents or that never conducted Baseline Assessment. 
PHMSA measures IMP performance as the number of miles repaired. We additionally control for repair activities, measured as the log 
of pipelines miles that is identified and repaired.     
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Table 4.10  Robustness Checks: Endogeneity Test for BaseAssess Indicator 
Sample (Complexity) Sub (All) Sub (High) Sub (Low) 
DV: Incident CostPerMilet+1 Model Model Model 
 1 2 3 
Complexity 2.075** 0.935 2.521** 
  (0.587) (1.063) (0.689) 
BaseAssess Indicator 1.471* 0.866 1.317† 
 (0.585) (0.573) (0.763) 
BaseAssess Experience -0.328** -0.275** -0.268 
  (0.109) (0.101) (0.173) 
Yrs from Last BaseAssess 0.046 -0.096 0.082 
 -0.072 -0.129 -0.066 
Ownership 0.252 -0.035 0.445 
 (0.304) (0.290) (0.538) 
HCA Ratio -0.095 -0.129 0.025 
 (0.111) (0.085) (0.434) 
Pipeline Diameter Large 1.620 2.856 0.427 
 (1.736) (3.145) (1.814) 
Pipeline Diameter Medium 0.272 -0.752 0.654 
 (0.889) (1.524) (1.117) 
Average Age 0.001 -0.019 0.007 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) 
Pipeline Operator FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Underidentification test (KP LM) 75.968*** 57.334 43.361*** 
Weak identification test (CD Wald F) 16.103 15.305 11.630 
Weak identification test (KP Wald F) 9.936 19.142 8.937 
Hansen J (Overidentification test) 19.055 19.668 16.824 
p-value 0.453 0.415 0.602 
Hausman test (p-value) 0.076 0.388 0.649 
# of Operators 234 117 117 
Observations 2,369 1,229 1,140 
Operator-cluster robust standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1. 
Notes. We use a subsample, excluding pipeline operators that never experienced incidents or that never conducted Baseline Assessment. 
We use generated instruments with two stage least square regression (2SLS) to test of endogeneity in a baseline assessment indicator 
suggested by Lewbel (2012). The result supports that baseline assessment indicator is positively associated with baseline assessment 
indicator.  
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Table 4.11  Robustness Checks: Lagged Dependent and Independent Variables 
Sample (Complexity) Sub (All) Sub (High) Sub (Low) 
DV: Incident CostPerMilet+1 Model Model Model 
 1 2 3 
Incident CostPerMilet 0.013 0.031 0.010 
 (0.034) (0.041) (0.043) 
Incident CostPerMilet-1 -0.013 0.014 -0.043 
 (0.034) (0.048) (0.041) 
Incident CostPerMilet-2 0.007 0.016 -0.011 
 (0.034) (0.047) (0.039) 
Complexity 3.599** 1.477 4.118** 
  (0.759) (1.907) (1.128) 
BaseAssess Indicatort 1.124** 0.855* 1.416** 
  (0.304) (0.425) (0.413) 
BaseAssess Indicatort-1 0.449 0.566 0.272 
  (0.279) (0.402) (0.442) 
BaseAssess Indicatort-2 0.525* 0.747† 0.310 
  (0.253) (0.393) (0.439) 
BaseAssess Indicatort-3 0.716* 0.259 1.032* 
  (0.310) (0.415) (0.507) 
BaseAsses Experiencet -0.280** -0.236** -0.376** 
  (0.073) (0.082) (0.090) 
BaseAsses Experiencet t-1 -0.028 -0.044 -0.025 
  (0.060) (0.091) (0.120) 
BaseAsses Experiencet t-2 -0.044 -0.105 0.038 
  (0.074) (0.101) (0.130) 
BaseAsses Experiencet t-3 -0.193** -0.095 -0.285* 
  (0.073) (0.094) (0.119) 
Yrs from Last BaseAssess -0.019 -0.077 0.016 
 (0.070) (0.144) (0.083) 
Ownership 0.264 0.015 0.516 
 (0.296) (0.429) (0.579) 
HCA Ratio -0.027 -0.419 0.368 
 (0.168) (0.603) (0.747) 
Pipeline Diameter Large -0.485 -0.003 -1.154 
 (1.699) (2.936) (2.403) 
Pipeline Diameter Medium 0.258 0.054 0.559 
 (0.945) (2.600) (1.729) 
Average age 0.005 -0.009 0.007 
 (0.010) (0.017) (0.020) 
Pipeline Operator FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
# of Operators 202 101 101 
Observations 1,656 838 818 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1. 
Notes. We use bootstrap-corrected fixed-effects estimation and inference in dynamic panel-data models (Everaert & Pozzi, 2007). We 
set wild bootstrap iterations with burn-in initialization, which allows general heteroscedasticity and does not require an assumption of 
initial condition. We use a subsample, excluding pipeline operators that never experienced incidents or that never conducted Baseline 
Assessment.  
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4.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
Recently, organizations in high-hazard industries began to adopt externally mandated, but 
internally developed, safety management programs (e.g., IMP) to reduce future risk and to enhance 
safety. However, the academic literature in operations management has focused on more intently 
on either external aspects (external inspection, penalty) or internal aspects (self-inspection). In this 
paper, we address organizational learning based upon the safety management program in pipeline 
operators, where both external and internal agencies are engaged. We show that an increase in 
structural complexity in a pipeline operator leads to greater costs from subsequent incidents, but 
organizational learning from the program reduces the costs of future incidents. Importantly, we find 
that the effect of organizational learning is beneficial when pipeline operators have higher structural 
complexity in their system. To comprehend our findings, we discuss our results with post-hoc 
analyses and then provide theoretical contributions and managerial implications.  
To better understand the boundary conditions and interpret the findings, we conduct post-
hoc analysis by comparing the effects from within-operator variance and between-operator variance. 
The within effect represents the effect observed over time at the operator level, which indicates the 
difference based upon an operator’s mean-level performance. In contrast, the between effect refers 
to the effect observed over time across operators in a cross-sectional manner, which specifies the 
difference in operators’ mean-level performance (Ketokivi & McIntosh, 2017; Miller et al., 2018). 
While the hypotheses and the fixed effects analyses in the previous sections dealt with within-
operator variation and within effects, we are also interested in whether major variations in 
Complexity, BaseAssess variables, and Incident CostPerMile are derived from between-operator 
variation. To identify these variations, we display the value of intraclass correlation coefficients 
(ICCs) for each variable in Table 4.3. The ICCs express between-operator variance over total 
variance, and the sum of within- and between-operator variances. For instance, the ICC of 
complexity is 0.890, indicating that 89 percent of the variance in complexity is from between 
operators, while 11 percent is from within operators. We also note that the baseline assessment (BA) 
and incident cost have a substantial amount of between-operator variance (ICCBA indicator = 0.302, 
ICCBA exp = 0.521, ICCIncident cost = 0.483).  
Since fixed-effects estimators do not denote between effects, we use a hybrid model to 
incorporate both within and between effects (Allison, 2009; Certo et al., 2017; Schunck, 2013). 
This approach employs both operator-centered variables and the variables representing operator 
mean. The former variables capture the within effects, and the latter variables represent the between 
effects (Certo et al., 2017). Table A3 displays the overall results of the hybrid models. Model 1 
concerns operators with all complexity levels, and Models 2 and 3 demonstrate operators with high 
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and low complexity levels, respectively. We confirm that the coefficients of within effects (see 
Appendix C, Table 3) are consistent with the coefficients of fixed effect models in Table 4.6 
(Models 4, 5, and 6). For complexity, our results show that both within effect (b = 2.132, p < 0.01) 
and between effect (b = 1.820, p < 0.01) are significant in Model 1. The results indicate that an 
increase in complexity of a pipeline operator leads to greater incident cost per mile (within effect), 
and that pipeline operators with higher complexity have greater incident cost per mile than 
operators with lower complexity (between effect). The results in Models 2 and 3 provide interesting 
results, indicating that the between effect of complexity is significant when the complexity level is 
high (b = 6.703, p < 0.01, Model 2), and that the within effect of complexity is significant when 
the complexity level is low (b = 2.504, p < 0.01, Model 3). Thus, when the complexity level is high, 
an increase of complexity in an operator does not influence incident cost per mile, while the relative 
difference in complexity across operators is positively associated with the incident cost per mile. 
In contrast, when the complexity level is low, an increase of complexity in an operator does 
influence the incident cost per mile, while the relative difference in complexity across operators is 
not associated with the incident cost per mile. 
Regarding baseline assessment effects, we have two relevant variables, BaseAssess 
Indicator and BaseAssess Experience, in Table A3. For the baseline assessment indicator in Model 
1, the results indicate that both within and between effects are statistically significant, but with 
different directions (b = 0.573, p < 0.05, within effect; b = −2.430, p < 0.01, between effect). The 
results show that changing the baseline assessment status of an operator from none to any activities 
leads to a greater incident consequence (within effect), and that operators with baseline assessment 
implementation will have less incident consequences than operators without it (between effect). 
The unexpected positive sign of the within effect is possibly explicated by operators’ capability of 
sensing weak signals (Su et al., 2014). Under the integrity management program (IMP), 
organizations are more likely to be engaged in operations and to be looking for potential failures. 
To sense weak signals under IMP, operators will remain attentive to changes in external and internal 
environments, and they will also take appropriate actions, such as baseline assessment, upon a 
signal. Therefore, the positive within effect of the baseline assessment indicator does not indicate 
that the baseline assessment will diminish safety performance, but represents the activities for 
responsiveness and proactiveness. However, results in Models 2 and 3 suggest that the between 
effect of the baseline assessment indicator is significant when the complexity level is high (b = 
−2.591, p < 0.05, Model 2), and that the within effect of the baseline assessment indicator is 
significant when the complexity level is low (b = 0.794, p < 0.05, Model 3), suggesting contingency 
in the effects.  
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 Moving on to the baseline assessment experience, we show that both the within effect and 
between effect are significant, but with different directions, in Model 1 (b = −0.170, p < 0.01, 
between effect; b = 0.695, p < 0.01, within effect). The results indicate that an increase in experience 
with baseline assessment, measured as pipeline mileage, leads to a smaller incident consequence 
(within effect), while pipeline operators with more experience used to have greater incident 
consequences than operators with less experience (between effect). The results in Models 2 and 3 
are similar to the results in Model 1, while suggesting that the within effect of the experience 
becomes effective when the complexity level is high.   
Our research makes two notable theoretical contributions. First, the high-level contribution 
is that we investigate important arguments about the roles of complexity and organizational 
learning through an empirical approach. We corroborate the argument that complexity diminishes 
operational performance, consistent with previous studies (Bode & Wagner, 2015; Bozarth et al., 
2009; Wolf, 2001). The results also support the theory that organizational learning can mitigate 
future incident consequences (Baum & Dahlin, 2007). More importantly, we show that complexity 
facilitates organizational learning. This is theoretically important because previous studies do not 
provide a coherent theory and evidence to justify whether complexity fosters or hinders 
organizational learning (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002; Leveson et al., 
2009; Levitt & March, 1988; Perrow, 1999; Pisano et al., 2001; Rijpma, 1997). Instead, complexity 
has been considered a double-edge sword in the learning process (Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002; 
Rijpma, 1997). Our results underpin the argument that complexity heightens the effect of 
organizational learning.  
Second, this study contributes to the growing body of literature on organizational learning 
in high-hazard industries. Current literature lacks relevant empirical studies about learning in high-
hazard organizations, because previous studies have focused on qualitative studies of failures, and 
the rare events of failures provide only few opportunities to learn (Baum & Dahlin, 2007; Carroll 
et al., 2002; Labib et al., 2019; Starbuck, 2009). In contrast, we show that high-hazard organizations 
can learn from an externally mandated, internally developed safety management program (IMP). 
When we focus on the recent experience from the previous year, we show that learning from the 
program is effective in reducing subsequent incident consequences. However, our robustness 
checks examine the evidence of learning from other experiences: inspection with enforcement, 
repair, and failure. First, we suggest that operators in oil transportation may not learn from recent 
inspections (see Appendix C, Table 2). While a recent study shows that operators in oil production 
learn from inspections with enforcement (Mani & Muthulingam, 2019), our results are consistent 
with previous studies in the pipeline industry that demonstrate federal enforcement actions are poor 
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deterrents in reducing such incidents (Stafford, 2014, 2017). They argue that pipeline operators will 
comply with regulations only if “the cost of non-compliance exceeds the cost of compliance,” 
implying the Becker’s model of crime. This argument also explains our results in terms of why 
enforcement actions with respect to IMP do not empirically satisfy instrument relevancy. Second, 
our results suggest that pipeline operators may not learn from experience with repair activities 
(Table 4.9). Interestingly, a government report points to the possibility that repair activities can 
increase risk in a pipeline system due to the disturbance in operations (Kowalewski, 2013). Third, 
we show that operators may not effectively learn from failures by measuring failures from incident 
cost per mile at one, two, and three years before (Table 4.11). The results coincide with the 
argument that failure investigations and routine inspections are external events, which will create 
superficial learning (Haunschild & Rhee, 2004; Marcus, 1988). Similarly, an empirical study of the 
railroad industry suggests that experiences with past accidents do not reduce future accident costs 
(Baum & Dahlin, 2007).  
 Finally, this study offers important managerial implications for regulators, who are 
responsible for designing policies and regulations. Specifically, we provide insights into whether 
the integrity management program is effective, where the program is effective, and where we can 
apply it. First, we support the argument that the IMP has reduced subsequent incident consequences. 
A previous government report, which deals with data between 1986 and 2012, questions the 
effectiveness of the program by comparing industry-wide incident consequences and incident 
frequency before and after the adoption of the program in 2002 (Kowalewski, 2013). In contrast, 
we show that the program has mitigated future incident consequences by looking at operator-level 
data with experience with IMP. Specifically, if an operator conducts 10% more baseline assessment 
over the previous year, given that they conducted the assessment in the previous year as well, the 
operator will reduce expected incident consequences by 1.6%.30  
Second, we suggest where the program is effective. Our empirical results show that the 
program and corresponding activities, including baseline assessment, become effective if a pipeline 
operator has high structural complexity in its system. Additionally, we further exhibit through post-
hoc analysis that the program is fruitful for incidents in high consequence areas (HCAs), but not in 
non-HCAs. To compare the difference, we examine the influences of base assessment on HCAs 
(incident cost at HCAs per pipe mileage at HCAs) and non-HCAs (incident cost at non-HCAs per 
pipe mileage at non-HCAs) in Table 4.12. The results highlight that IMP reduces subsequent 
incident consequences at HCAs (b = −0.218, p < 0.01) but not at non-HCAs (b = −0.067, p > 0.10). 
                                                     
30 ∆incident cost per pipeline mile (%) =  e−0.170*ln(1.1) = 98.4%, 100% − 98.4% = 1.6% (where Beta 
Coefficient is −0.170 from Model 4 in Table 6).   
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The results align with the objective of IMP, which is to reduce damages in HCAs by prioritizing 
resources to HCAs (Kowalewski, 2013). However, we do not observe a spillover effect of IMP on 
non-HCAs.  
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Table 4.12  Post-hoc Analysis: Main Effects on Incident Cost Per Mile in HCA and non-
HCA 
Sample (Complexity) Sub (All) Sub (High) Sub (Low)  Sub (All) Sub (High) Sub (Low) 
DV Incident CostPerMile in HCAt+1  Incident CostPerMile in non-HCAt+1 
 Model Model Model  Model Model Model 
 1 2 3  4 5 6 
Complexity 1.535* 1.281 1.621*  1.818** 1.309 1.982** 
  (0.641) (1.180) (0.759)  (0.557) (1.245) (0.600) 
BaseAssess Indicator 0.700* 0.197 1.122**  0.309 -0.097 0.623* 
  (0.281) (0.447) (0.402)  (0.218) (0.308) (0.308) 
BaseAssess Experience -0.218** -0.190* -0.264*  -0.067 -0.048 -0.114 
  (0.072) (0.088) (0.117)  (0.054) (0.070) (0.085) 
Years from Last BaseAssess -0.039 -0.188 0.022  0.019 -0.097 0.078 
 (0.045) (0.136) (0.041)  (0.050) (0.066) (0.062) 
Ownership 0.280 0.649 -0.150  0.250 -0.401 0.856 
 (0.337) (0.478) (0.403)  (0.328) (0.266) (0.568) 
HCA Ratio -0.026 -0.136 0.338  -0.159 -0.074 -0.477 
 (0.093) (0.092) (0.372)  (0.129) (0.081) (0.385) 
Pipeline Diameter Large -0.682 -1.452 -0.584  1.309 2.684 0.379 
 (1.489) (3.123) (1.515)  (1.958) (4.115) (1.299) 
Pipeline Diameter Medium 0.415 0.252 0.362  0.323 -0.278 0.363 
 (0.938) (1.939) (0.841)  (0.864) (1.406) (1.147) 
Average Age -0.004 -0.018 0.006  0.003 -0.005 0.003 
 (0.008) (0.014) (0.009)  (0.010) (0.011) (0.014) 
Constant 0.967† 2.473* 0.014  0.389 1.771† 0.313 
 (0.537) (1.214) (0.513)  (0.610) (0.961) (0.749) 
Pipeline Operator FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Operators 234 117 117  234 117 117 
Observations 2,369 1,229 1,140  2,369 1,229 1,140 
R2 0.020 0.026 0.044  0.016 0.019 0.037 
Operator-cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1. 
Notes. We use a subsample, excluding pipeline operators that never experienced incidents or that never conducted Baseline Assessment. 
We compute Incident CostPerMile in HCA as the logged amount of (incident cost in HCA per pipeline mileage in HCA). In a similar 
vein, we construct Incident CostPerMile in non-HCA as the logged amount of (incident cost in non-HCA per pipeline mileage in non-
HCA). 
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Third, our results broadly apply to other contexts in high-hazard industries. IMP is one of 
the government safety programs referred to as a performance-based regulation (PBR), which has 
been applied to several other industries. For instance, the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency implemented PBRs (e.g., process safety 
management (PSM), risk management program (RMP)) for chemical plants; the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission launched Probabilistic Risk Assessment for nuclear power plants; and the 
U.S. Coast Guard and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement enacted PBRs (e.g., 
International Safety Management, Safety and Environmental Management System) for shipping 
companies and offshore oil production facilities (Blanco et al., 2019; Chinander et al., 1998; 
Coglianese & Olmstead, 2003; DeWolf, 2003; Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005; Kowalewski, 2013; 
Suzuki, 2014; TRB & NASEM, 2017). However, there are both common and different 
characteristics between IMP and other PBRs (e.g., PSM, RMP).  
The frameworks commonly include organizational procedures of identifying and managing 
risks, responding to emergencies, and continuously improving safety skills through self-
improvement efforts. In contrast, several distinct characteristics of IMP render the context more 
attractive for investigation. First, granular data related to these efforts are often unavailable in other 
PBRs (Kowalewski, 2013; Short & Toffel, 2010). Second, IMP articulates the integration of 
information and requirements more explicitly than other PBRs (DeWolf, 2003; Kowalewski, 2013). 
For instance, IMP requires documented risk assessment, while PSM and RMP do not require risk 
assessment as a mandated rule (DeWolf 2003). More specifically, the rule of IMP recommends that 
the list of risk factors should considered and provides an example of risk ranking methodology. 
This is a significant difference from other PBRs. Taken together, we propose that other PBRs need 
to provide guidelines and make their reporting and data more transparent. For instance, a previous 
study regarding RMP focuses on regulatory compliance outcomes and does not address 
organizations’ internal assessment or practices due to information asymmetry and availability of 
data (Short & Toffel, 2010). 
  
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
This study has limitations, some of which could be mitigated through further research. One 
limitation is related to the theoretical perspective, and the other concerns the characteristics of data 
in the analyses. First, during our hypothesis development, we posit that complexity moderates the 
effect of learning, not that learning moderates the effect of complexity. However, some studies 
propose that learning nurtures the ability to reduce the cost of complexity (Jacobs & Swink, 2011; 
Rijpma, 1997). We suggest that future qualitative studies can provide insights in terms of whether 
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complexity moderates the effect of learning or learning moderates the effect of complexity. Next, 
the annual report data from PHMSA are summary-level, and detailed information is removed. A 
government report indicates the limitations in the current available data, which does not allow 
consideration of all of the interactions from various risk factors (Kowalewski, 2013).  
We expect our study to spur other researchers to more thoroughly investigate performance-
based regulations (PBRs) (e.g., integrity management program) and organizational learning in 
high-hazard organizations. For instance, one potential study would be to examine PBRs in high-
hazard organizations through a qualitative study or a survey method. Specifically, one would 
address the question of how the  adoption of PBRs changes the organizational culture from a 
compliance culture to a safety culture by incorporating a sense of responsibility, which was 
highlighted in an existing report (TRB & NASEM, 2017). Relatedly, researchers and practitioners 
note that it would take a long period of time to make PBR mature by changing the process, system, 
and culture of pipeline operators (Kowalewski, 2013; Stafford, 2017; Suzuki, 2014).  
Next, one would examine the effectiveness of a focused approach on safety management 
programs. IMP rationalizes that operators should prioritize their resources on high consequence 
areas rather than applying uniform treatment to all areas. However, investigating when a focused 
approach is justifiable is an interesting question to study. Finally, we note that among 642 pipeline 
operators, which consists of 4,696 operator-year observations, 383 operators never had any 
incidents, and only 259 pipeline operators ever had incidents during our research period, 
representing 1,050 observations. One approach would be to investigate how operators with no 
incidents (supposedly high reliability organizations) are different from operators with incidents. 
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Chapter 5  
Conclusion 
Managing quality and safety is critical in highly regulated industries because failing to do 
so can lead to serious negative consequences, such as damage to the environment and loss of human 
life. One way to improve quality and safety is enhancing organizational focus, emphasis on a 
specific set of actions or activities. While most of the relevant studies consider that focus is 
motivated by internal entities, my dissertation extended this perspective by examining focus that 
are internally and externally driven. The dissertation consisted of three chapters, where each chapter 
concerns improvements of quality and safety in highly regulated industries: acute-care hospitals, 
nursing homes, and oil and gas pipeline operators in the United States. I first provide the summary 
and the contribution of individual chapters and then offer a holistic comparison below.  
In chapter two, I studied internally driven focus as disproportionate emphasis on a medical 
specialty in acute-care hospitals. Hospitals are under tremendous pressure to concurrently improve 
measures of multiple dimensions such as readmission rates and patient satisfaction. Improving 
these two distinct outcomes by pursuing two improvement approaches - via focus and patient 
experience - puts conflicting demands on hospital management. These dual goals also pose a 
considerable challenge for hospital administrators because pursuing focus rests on variation 
reduction, while improving patient experience increases variation in delivery processes. Using 
secondary data from 3,027 hospitals, this research demonstrated that focus and patient experience 
have opposing direct effects on the two measures of performance. Focus has undesirable effects on 
both the measures while patient experience leads to desirable impacts on both the measures. 
However, I also demonstrated that the joint effect of focus and patient experience reduces the 
readmission rates. In contrast, an imbalance between focus and patient experience increases 
readmission rates and decreases patient satisfaction, both undesirable outcomes from management 
and patient perspectives. As a set, the study suggested that while managers face challenging 
tradeoffs in their pursuit to improve multiple dimensions of performance, there is no single magic 
bullet to improve the two performance measures.  
In chapter three, I study externally driven change in attentional focus where recurring visits 
are unannounced while initial visits are announced in advance at nursing homes. Various types of 
inspections have been used to improve and monitor quality and safety in the manufacturing and 
service industries. Inspecting agencies make an important choice between two inspection modes: 
either announce the inspection before arriving at the facility or make an unannounced inspection. 
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However, despite the debates on the efficacy of these different inspection strategies, there was no 
coherent theory explains the difference between announced and unannounced inspections, and its 
immediate and sustained operational performance effects. Using a dataset from accredited nursing 
homes, the results suggested that both announced and unannounced inspections increase nursing 
home quality. However, an unannounced inspection leads to more sustained quality performance, 
while quality performance tends to decline after an announced inspection. Thus, announcing the 
inspection in advance results in short-term gains but long-term disadvantages. This research 
provided empirical evidence that announced and unannounced inspections play different roles in 
affecting immediate and sustained quality performance. I also offered an insight for broad 
application that unannounced inspections are effective where sustained high-quality performance 
is critically important, such as the healthcare industry. 
In chapter four, I studied externally driven focus on a safety management program in oil 
transportation. High-hazard industries face significant threats of experiencing negative incidents, 
many of which are highly consequential in their impact (e.g., injuries, fatalities, property loss, and 
environmental damage). To prevent such incidents, regulatory agencies began to adopt 
performance-based regulation (Integrity Management Program in oil transportation) to reduce 
regulator’s monitoring burden and cost. Rather than government agencies inspect pipeline 
operators, the program requires pipeline operators to identify and manage risks, to respond to 
emergencies, and to continuously improve safety skills by focusing on high consequence areas 
(HCAs). Using a panel dataset of 642 pipeline operators, this research showed that complexity 
increases future incident cost but the experience with the program reduces it. Interestingly, 
complexity heightens the negative relationship between the experience and future incident cost. 
The program is fruitful for incidents in high consequence areas (HCAs), but not in non-HCAs, 
which substantiates the intent of the program. This study contributed to the growing literature of 
organizational learning in high-hazard industries. 
To highlight overall findings, I compare the three studies in Table 5.1. These studies 
commonly addressed the improvements of quality and safety in highly regulated industries through 
focus. However, they are substantially different in various aspects. First, each study dealt with the 
different context of focus. While Chapter 2 described internally driven focus, Chapters 3 and 4 
demonstrated externally driven focus. Specifically, Chapter 2 illustrated focus as disproportionate 
emphasis on a medical specialty. In contrast, Chapter 3 addressed attentional focus on inspection 
announcement and Chapter 4 studied a mandated safety management program dedicated to high 
consequence areas. Next, the findings provided implications for different stakeholders: internally 
driven focus for internal entities (hospitals) and externally driven focus for external entities 
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(regulators). Chapter 2 suggested hospital administrators to balance focus approach and patient 
experience practices to purse improvement in multiple dimensions. However, Chapters 3 and 4 
offered managerial implications for regulators regarding the use of inspection announcement 
strategy and the adoption of the safety management program. As a set, my dissertation investigated 
multiple paths to improve quality and safety in highly regulated industries.  
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Table 5.1  Dissertation Summary 
 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 
Title  
The Dark Side of Focus: Is Patient Experience the 
Cure? 
Does Announcing the Visit Matter? An Empirical 
Examination in US Nursing Homes 
Organizational Learning, Complexity, and Safety 
Management Performance: Evidence from the Oil and 
Gas Transportation 
Industry Healthcare Healthcare Oil and Gas Transportation: Pipeline 
Unit of Analysis Acute-care Hospitals Accredited Nursing Homes Pipeline Operators 
Data (Years) Secondary Data (2007-2013) Secondary Data (2013-2016) Secondary Data (2004-2017)  
Research Question 
How do hospitals’ execution of a focus strategy and 
patient experience practices affect multiple dimensions 
of performance? 
Do announced and unannounced inspections lead to an 
immediate and/or a sustained increase in overall 
quality performance? 
1. Do complexity and organizational learning from a 
safety management program influence safety 
performance? 
2. Are there contingencies that enhance the relationship 
between the experience with the program and safety 
performance? 
Focus Disproportionate emphasis on a medical specialty Attentional focus on inspections 
Focus of the safety management program on high 
consequence areas  
Theoretical Lens Focus as Emphasis Attention Based View Organizational Learning 
Research Method Seemingly Unrelated Regression  Difference-in-Difference; Coarsened Exact Matching; Fixed Effects Panel Data Model 
Implication 
Hospitals: Balance between focus strategy and patient 
experience practices to improve multiple performance 
simultaneously 
Regulators: Use unannounced inspections where 
sustained high-quality is critically important (e.g., 
healthcare organizations).  
Operators and Regulators: Target safety management 
program for high consequence areas and high 
complicated system  
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Appendix 
Appendix A. The Dark Side of Focus (Chapter 2) 
 
Table 1  Patient Experience Measure (HCAHPS) 
Category Description Comments* Answer** 
COM1 General communications with nurses  Communication with 
patients 
A/U/SN 
 Q1. Nurses treated you with courtesy and respect   
 Q2. Nurses listened carefully to you   
 Q3. Nurses explained things clearly   
COM2 General communications with doctors Communication with 
patients 
A/U/SN 
 Q1. Doctors treated you with courtesy and respect   
 Q2. Doctors listened carefully to you   
 Q3. Doctors explained things clearly   
COM3 Explanation of medicines Communication with 
patients 
A/U/SN 
 Q1. Staffs told you what new medicine was for   
 Q2. Staffs described possible side effect of new medicine 
clearly 
  
COM4 Discharge Information Communication with 
patients 
Y/N 
 Q1. Staffs told you would have the help you needed 
during discharge 
  
 Q2. You got written instructions about what symptoms or 
health problems monitor after discharge 
  
RES1 Staffs’ responsiveness Responsiveness to patient 
needs 
A/U/SN 
 Q1. You got help as soon as wanted after pressing the 
call button 
  
 Q2. You got help as soon as wanted to use the restroom   
RES2 Pain management Responsiveness to patient 
needs 
A/U/SN 
 Q1. Your pain was well controlled   
 Q2. Hospital staffs did everything to help you with your 
pain 
  
ENV1 Q. Room and bathroom kept clean Hospital environment A/U/SN 
ENV2 Q. Area around room quiet at night Hospital environment A/U/SN 
*We follow the categorization of Westbrook et al. (2014): communication, responsiveness, and hospital environment. 
**A/U/SN: Always, Usually, Sometimes or Never; Y/N: Yes, No 
 
Table 2  Clinical Process Quality Measure 
  Label Measure Short Name (adopted from TJC) 
HF HF-2 Evaluation of LVS Function 
 HF-3 ACEI or ARB for LVSD 
AMI AMI-2 Aspirin Prescribed at Discharge 
 AMI-8a Primary PCI Received Within 90 Minutes of Hospital Arrival  
PN PN-3b Blood Culture Before First Antibiotic 
  PN-6 Initial Antibiotic Selection for CAP in Immunocompetent Patient  
Notes. We exclude retired measure items during our data period such as ‘Adult Smoking Cessation Advice’ (HF-4/AMI-
4/PN-4). We also drop an item about discharge instruction in heart failure care (HF-1) because it is not capturing process 
of care but outcome of care (accountability issue) (Chassin et al., 2010).  
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Table 3  Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Regression Results: Readmission Rates 
  Model 
 2SLS 
Focus 0.218** 
 (0.0912) 
PatExp -0.0990*** 
 (0.0200) 
Time -0.842*** 
 (0.0380) 
For-profit 0.201*** 
 (0.0295) 
Government -0.0238 
 (0.0361) 
Teaching 0.0756*** 
 (0.0271) 
Location -0.0286 
 (0.0300) 
Hospital size 0.144*** 
 (0.0211) 
Bed occ. rate 0.141*** 
 (0.0152) 
CMI -0.263*** 
 (0.0408) 
Nursing intensity 0.0198 
 (0.0166) 
CPQ (HF) -0.0201* 
 (0.0121) 
Constant 0.376*** 
 (0.0403) 
Time FE Yes 
State FE Yes 
Observations 5,862 
R2 0.353 
Clustered Standard Errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1.  
Notes. Based on the Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test (χ2 = 0.17; p = 0.678), we conclude that focus is 
not endogenous in the readmission rates model. 
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Table 4  Subgroup Analysis of Resource Utilization on Readmission Rates 
 High Bed Occupancy  Low Bed Occupancy 
 Model Model Model  Model Model Model 
 1 2 3  4 5 6 
Focus 0.228***  0.216***  0.091***  0.088*** 
 (0.029)  (0.031)  (0.019)  (0.018) 
PatExp  -0.118*** -0.083*   -0.071† -0.067† 
  (0.033) (0.033)   (0.040) (0.037) 
For-profit 0.259*** 0.251*** 0.226***  0.192*** 0.165** 0.164** 
 (0.041) (0.045) (0.044)  (0.052) (0.054) (0.055) 
Government 0.127* 0.193*** 0.115*  -0.085† -0.070 -0.082† 
 (0.052) (0.054) (0.050)  (0.046) (0.043) (0.045) 
Teaching 0.026 0.063 0.022  0.020 0.017 0.015 
 (0.039) (0.041) (0.041)  (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) 
Location 0.023 0.007 -0.004  0.028 0.018 0.017 
 (0.084) (0.087) (0.082)  (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) 
Hospital size 0.131*** 0.065† 0.107**  0.131*** 0.092** 0.104** 
 (0.038) (0.035) (0.038)  (0.028) (0.035) (0.034) 
CMI -0.150*** -0.218*** -0.137***  -0.238*** -0.260*** -0.229*** 
 (0.027) (0.032) (0.028)  (0.031) (0.036) (0.034) 
Nursing 0.018 0.011 0.019  -0.036* -0.044* -0.035† 
intensity (0.019) (0.021) (0.019)  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
CPQ (HF) -0.006 -0.001 -0.001  -0.032† -0.030† -0.027 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)  (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Constant -0.605*** -0.730*** -0.577***  0.810*** 0.733*** 0.805*** 
 (0.091) (0.097) (0.091)  (0.039) (0.033) (0.039) 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,931 2,931 2,931  2,931 2,931 2,931 
F 36.99 33.65 36.9  33.13 32.84 32.90 
R2 0.432 0.409 0.4355  0.405 0.403 0.408 
Clustered Standard Errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1. 
Notes. The effect of focus on readmission rates is significantly greater in the high occupancy group than low occupancy 
group (p < 0.001). 
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Table 5  Subgroup Analysis of Teaching Status on Readmission Rates 
 Teaching  Non-Teaching 
 Model Model Model  Model Model Model 
 1 2 3  4 5 6 
Focus 0.222***  0.208***  0.123***  0.120*** 
 (0.041)  (0.039)  (0.019)  (0.020) 
PatExp  -0.114** -0.065*   -0.082* -0.076* 
  (0.036) (0.030)   (0.036) (0.035) 
For-profit 0.207*** 0.188*** 0.182**  0.257*** 0.227*** 0.224*** 
 (0.062) (0.057) (0.059)  (0.039) (0.042) (0.044) 
Government 0.120† 0.197** 0.110  -0.035 -0.017 -0.033 
 (0.073) (0.073) (0.071)  (0.036) (0.033) (0.035) 
Teaching -0.061 -0.043 -0.079  0.052 0.037 0.037 
 (0.069) (0.071) (0.065)  (0.045) (0.044) (0.044) 
Location 0.124** 0.082* 0.107*  0.116*** 0.068* 0.087** 
 (0.045) (0.041) (0.043)  (0.026) (0.033) (0.033) 
Hospital size 0.207*** 0.188*** 0.182**  0.257*** 0.227*** 0.224*** 
 (0.062) (0.057) (0.059)  (0.039) (0.042) (0.044) 
CMI -0.161*** -0.239*** -0.156***  -0.257*** -0.282*** -0.243*** 
 (0.044) (0.046) (0.043)  (0.030) (0.037) (0.034) 
Nursing 0.020 0.000 0.018  -0.023 -0.031† -0.022 
intensity (0.029) (0.030) (0.029)  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
CPQ (HF) 0.000 0.004 0.003  -0.023 -0.023 -0.018 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.018)  (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) 
Constant -0.683*** -0.793*** -0.668***  0.618*** 0.512*** 0.619*** 
 (0.082) (0.085) (0.082)  (0.045) (0.035) (0.045) 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,939 1,939 1,939  3,923 3,923 3,923 
F 25.96 23.95 25.72  44.00 43.01 43.79 
R2 0.449 0.429 0.4511  0.402 0.396 0.405 
Clustered Standard Errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1. 
Notes. The effect magnitude of focus on readmission rates is significantly greater in teaching group than non-teaching 
group (p < 0.05). 
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Table 6  Subgroup Analysis of Resource Utilization on Patient Satisfaction 
 High Bed Occupancy  Low Bed Occupancy 
 Model Model Model  Model Model Model 
 1 2 3  4 5 6 
Focus -0.224***  -0.098**  -0.128***  -0.093*** 
 (0.058)  (0.035)  (0.034)  (0.023) 
PatExp  0.912*** 0.897***   0.891*** 0.887*** 
  (0.038) (0.037)   (0.070) (0.068) 
For-profit -0.501*** -0.157** -0.144**  -0.556*** -0.172*** -0.171*** 
 (0.109) (0.051) (0.052)  (0.068) (0.037) (0.037) 
Government -0.160** -0.083* -0.049  -0.046 -0.094** -0.081** 
 (0.056) (0.041) (0.038)  (0.065) (0.029) (0.030) 
Teaching -0.031 -0.011 0.007  -0.044 0.017 0.019 
 (0.067) (0.036) (0.036)  (0.046) (0.026) (0.025) 
Location -0.061 0.224*** 0.230***  0.013 0.163*** 0.165*** 
 (0.073) (0.047) (0.046)  (0.053) (0.028) (0.028) 
Hospital size -0.183*** 0.085*** 0.066***  -0.361*** 0.009 -0.004 
 (0.032) (0.018) (0.017)  (0.034) (0.030) (0.031) 
CMI 0.243*** 0.145*** 0.108***  0.262*** 0.192*** 0.160*** 
 (0.042) (0.019) (0.021)  (0.023) (0.021) (0.016) 
Nursing  0.044* 0.046** 0.043**  0.052† 0.050* 0.041* 
 intensity (0.019) (0.015) (0.015)  (0.029) (0.020) (0.019) 
CPQ (All) 0.137*** 0.053*** 0.049***  0.171*** 0.079*** 0.075*** 
 (0.030) (0.013) (0.014)  (0.029) (0.019) (0.018) 
Constant 0.143 -0.121† -0.193**  -0.210*** -0.101*** -0.179*** 
 (0.091) (0.069) (0.066)  (0.045) (0.026) (0.030) 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,931 2,931 2,931  2,931 2,931 2,931 
F 34.84 233.69 238.86  23.46 152.82 154.55 
R2 0.417 0.828 0.833  0.325 0.758 0.764 
Clustered Standard Errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1. 
Notes. The effect magnitude of focus on patient satisfaction is significantly greater in the high occupancy group than 
low occupancy group (p = 0.07). 
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Table 7  Subgroup Analysis of Teaching Status on Patient Satisfaction 
 Teaching  Non-Teaching 
 Model Model Model  Model Model Model 
 1 2 3  4 5 6 
Focus -0.309***  -0.118**  -0.114***  -0.080*** 
 (0.064)  (0.038)  (0.031)  (0.021) 
PatExp  0.888*** 0.860***   0.958*** 0.955*** 
  (0.053) (0.047)   (0.062) (0.061) 
For-profit -0.481*** -0.147* -0.142†  -0.574*** -0.146*** -0.143*** 
 (0.100) (0.073) (0.075)  (0.079) (0.034) (0.036) 
Government -0.123* -0.046 0.003  -0.064 -0.108*** -0.098*** 
 (0.061) (0.039) (0.040)  (0.049) (0.026) (0.026) 
Teaching -0.048 0.180*** 0.202***  -0.017 0.163*** 0.162*** 
 (0.096) (0.052) (0.052)  (0.056) (0.027) (0.027) 
Location -0.134** 0.090** 0.076**  -0.343*** 0.027 0.014 
 (0.042) (0.029) (0.028)  (0.028) (0.022) (0.023) 
Hospital size -0.006 0.099*** 0.091***  0.004 0.132*** 0.124*** 
 (0.042) (0.021) (0.023)  (0.024) (0.013) (0.013) 
CMI 0.176*** 0.154*** 0.108***  0.298*** 0.158*** 0.133*** 
 (0.030) (0.026) (0.025)  (0.026) (0.016) (0.015) 
Nursing 0.003 0.038* 0.028  0.044† 0.050** 0.045** 
intensity (0.026) (0.016) (0.017)  (0.023) (0.018) (0.017) 
CPQ (All) 0.123*** 0.051† 0.048  0.157*** 0.062*** 0.058*** 
 (0.027) (0.029) (0.029)  (0.024) (0.013) (0.012) 
Constant 0.214** 0.027 -0.047  -0.179*** -0.134*** -0.205*** 
 (0.079) (0.062) (0.070)  (0.053) (0.024) (0.025) 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,939 1,939 1,939   3,923 3,923 3,923 
F 26.38 128.80 132.4  33.14 253.03 254.39 
R2 0.453 0.802 0.8088   0.336 0.794 0.798 
Clustered Standard Errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1. 
Notes. The effect magnitude of focus on patient satisfaction is significantly greater in teaching group than non-teaching 
group (p < 0.01). 
 
  
133 
 
Appendix B. Does Announcing the Visit Matter (Chapter 3) 
 
Table 1  Quality Measures and Description 
Measure Description (% of) All Long Short 
long 401 Long stay residents whose need for help with ADLs has increased‡ X X  
long 402 Long stay residents who self-report moderate to severe pain† X X  
long 403 High-risk long stay residents with pressure ulcers‡ X X  
long 406 Long stay residents with a catheter inserted and left in their bladder† X X  
long 407 Long stay residents with a urinary tract infection‡ X X  
long 409 Long stay residents who were physically restrained‡ X X  
long 410 Long stay residents experiencing one or more falls with major injury‡ X X  
long 419 Long stay residents who received an antipsychotic medication‡ X X  
short 424 Short stay residents who self-report moderate to severe pain‡ X  X 
short 425 Short stay residents with pressure ulcers that are new or worsened† X  X 
short 434 Short stay residents who newly received an antipsychotic medication‡ X   X 
†Model-based risk-adjusted (using resident-level covariates that increase the risks of an outcome)  
‡Sampling-based risk-adjusted (excluding residents whose outcomes are unavoidable or not under nursing 
homes’ control) 
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Table 2  Sample Reduction and Matching 
  Original Sample   Reduced Sample   Reduced Sample   Reduced Sample 
     for DV Availability  for One Inspection  After Matching 
Variables All TJC 
Non-
TJC 
 All TJC 
Non-
TJC 
 All TJC 
Non-
TJC 
 TJC Non-TJC 
For-profit 73.8% 80.8% 73.4%  74.8% 79.2% 74.3%  74.9% 82.8% 74.3%  83.8% 83.8% 
Not-for-profit 22.4% 18.0% 22.6%  22.1% 19.9% 22.3%  21.9% 16.6% 22.3%  15.9% 15.9% 
Chain 58.5% 61.7% 58.3%  60.2% 62.4% 60.0%  60.1% 62.0% 60.0%  62.4% 62.4% 
Location 71.1% 90.6% 69.9%  83.0% 92.7% 82.0%  82.8% 92.3% 82.0%  93.0% 93.0% 
TJC State 33.8% 40.7% 33.4%  33.3% 38.9% 32.7%  33.3% 41.0% 32.7%  40.4% 40.4% 
Size (bed) 111.2 144.1 109.3  147.3 159.1 146.1  147.1 159.5 146.1  160.5 155.1 
 (59.3) (62.0) (58.5)  (63.7) (64.1) (63.6)  (63.8) (65.7) (63.6)  (65.9) (59.2) 
Medicare (%) 15.3 20.4 15.0  16.1 18.5 15.9  16.1 19.0 15.9  19.0 17.0 
 (13.0) (15.7) (12.8)  (9.0) (10.9) (8.7)  (9.0) (11.5) (8.7)  (11.60) (8.63) 
Medicaid (%) 60.4 56.3 60.7  61.3 59.0 61.5  61.3 58.5 61.5  58.5 60.5 
 (21.5) (20.7) (21.6)  (15.1) (14.7) (15.1)  (15.1) (15.6) (15.1)  (15.7) (14.6) 
Acuity Index 12.1 12.2 12.1  12.4 12.3 12.4  12.4 12.4 12.4  12.4 12.4 
 (1.3) (1.3) (1.3)  (1.0) (0.8) (1.0)  (1.0) (0.8) (1.0)  (0.8) (0.9) 
OP Margin (%) -7.5 -1.7 -14.2  -2.3 -1.2 -2.4  -2.3 -1.1 -2.4  -1.0 -0.5 
 (67.6) (12.8) (31.2)  (27.4) (11.5) (28.5)  (27.7) (12.2) (28.5)  (12.3) (17.6) 
Observations 13,324 733 12,591  4,926 452 4,474  4,812 337 4,474  331 331 
Standard deviations in the parentheses. 
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Table 3  Bootstrap-based Bias Correction 
 (1) Announced Inspection (2) Unannounced Inspection 
  
All residents 
Quality 
Long-stay 
Quality 
Short-stay 
Quality 
All residents 
Quality 
Long-stay 
Quality 
Short-stay 
Quality 
  1 2 3 1 2 3 
2 Quarters Prior 1.613 2.260 -0.155 9.690 6.291 3.491 
 (5.966) (3.934) (2.552) (7.093) (6.447) (2.723) 
1 Quarter Prior 1.243 -1.003 2.221 7.812 7.258 0.939 
 (4.441) (3.703) (2.579) (7.801) (6.531) (3.813) 
Inspection Visit 11.293* 8.210* 2.716 9.928† 0.992 9.453** 
 (4.883) (4.085) (2.112) (6.000) (5.060) (2.745) 
1 Quarter After -3.396 -4.694 2.198 7.302 2.205 5.666† 
 (4.845) (4.157) (2.076) (6.492) (5.857) (3.132) 
2 Quarters After -0.930 1.233 -1.938 9.665 9.066 1.159 
 (4.871) (4.035) (2.375) (6.026) (5.657) (2.661) 
DV (t-1) 0.633** 0.582** 0.605** 0.643** 0.583** 0.612** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.011) (0.014) (0.016) (0.012) 
Nursing FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of NHs 552 552 552 441 441 441 
Observations 8,280 8,280 8,280 6,615 6,615 6,615 
Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, †p<0.1; Used wild bootstrap. 
 
Table 4  TJC and State Agency (SA) Inspections Visits 
 (1) Announced Inspection by TJC (2) Unannounced Inspection by TJC 
  
All residents 
Quality 
Long-stay 
Quality 
Short-stay 
Quality 
All residents 
Quality 
Long-stay 
Quality 
Short-stay 
Quality 
  1 2 3 1 2 3 
2 Quarters Prior 1.759 2.020 -0.209 8.950 5.504 3.656 
 (5.024) (3.913) (2.942) (6.676) (6.046) (3.134) 
1 Quarter Prior 0.994 -1.199 2.098 8.108 7.418 1.102 
 (4.711) (4.012) (2.500) (7.815) (6.588) (3.720) 
TJC’s Inspection Visit 11.285* 7.923* 3.189 10.759† 1.616 9.690** 
 (4.747) (3.815) (2.316) (6.138) (5.185) (3.017) 
1 Quarter After -2.088 -4.028 2.283 8.999 2.796 6.761* 
 (5.060) (3.996) (2.560) (6.786) (6.036) (2.862) 
2 Quarters After 0.095 1.528 -1.325 10.781† 9.096† 2.217 
 (4.801) (3.919) (2.393) (6.255) (5.200) (3.072) 
SA's Unannounced Visit 2.304 1.360 1.012 -0.466 0.055 -0.443 
 (1.844) (1.535) (0.908) (2.144) (1.770) (1.014) 
DV (t-1) 0.516** 0.470** 0.489** 0.525** 0.472** 0.496** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) 
Constant 349.951** 275.132** 103.400** 344.986** 274.993** 102.950** 
 (8.694) (6.609) (2.529) (9.649) (7.516) (2.879) 
Nursing FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Nursing Homes 552 552 552 441 441 441 
Observations 8,280 8,280 8,280 6,615 6,615 6,615 
R2 0.282 0.242 0.242 0.299 0.249 0.250 
Clustered Standard Errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, †p<0.1. 
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Table 5  Conditions of announced and unannounced inspections 
Inspection  Prior notice Accreditation Program   
    MCLTC NCC (LTC) 
Announced  
Visit 
30 days Initial inspection Initial inspection 
Announced  
Visit 
7 days (1) Recurring inspection for freestanding nursing 
homes 
(2) First inspection after converting from MCLTC to 
NCC program 
 
Unannounced 
Visit 
0 days Recurring inspection for hospital affiliated nursing 
homes 
Recurring inspection 
Notes. To fully comprehend the conditions of announced and unannounced inspections, we delineate two types of TJC accreditation 
programs for nursing homes: nursing care center (NCC) accreditation program, previously known as long-term care (LTC) accreditation 
program, and Medicare and Medicaid certification-based long-term care (MCLTC) accreditation program. Both programs provide the 
framework of TJC standards for nursing homes, including leader’s role in promoting safety and quality, risk and safety management, 
education for staff and residents. While the NCC program evaluates all TJC standards for care quality and safety, the MCLTC program 
contains only a subset of TJC standards, which are not evaluated during the state survey agency’s inspection. Relatedly, the MCLTC 
accreditation program costs less than the NCC program and typically involves one-day inspection. TJC introduced MCLTC program in 
2003 for those nursing homes with limited financial resources but it expired in 2013–2014. While TJC have conduced inspection on the 
unannounced basis since 2006, some inspections were announced. This table  gives an overview of the conditions for announced and 
unannounced inspections. First, if a nursing home undergoes its first TJC inspection, the schedule of inspection is announced at least 
thirty days before the actual visit. Second, when a nursing home is under the MCLTC program and it is not part of a hospital, there will 
be seven-day notice before the inspection visit. Third, if a nursing home shifts its accreditation from the MCLTC program to the NCC 
program due to the MCLTC program retirement, the first subsequent inspection is announced seven days prior to the visit. However, all 
other inspections are unannounced. We note that, recently, there were no 7-day announced inspections in TJC’s nursing home 
accreditation program, since the MCLTC program was retired from TJC.  
(https://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/18/Unannounced_Survey_Process_9_12.pdf).  
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Table 6  Effects of 30-day and 7-day Announced Inspection Visits 
  
All residents 
Quality 
Long-stay 
Quality 
Short-stay 
Quality 
  1 2 3 
2 Quarters Prior 5.196 -1.075 6.179 
 (8.138) (7.479) (4.666) 
1 Quarter Prior 1.692 1.477 0.347 
 (8.204) (7.005) (4.187) 
Announced Visit 7.259 6.084 1.360 
(30-day notice) (8.359) (6.283) (4.292) 
1 Quarter After -3.830 -10.874† 7.557† 
 (8.177) (6.529) (4.183) 
2 Quarters After 1.932 3.509 -1.674 
 (8.090) (6.780) (3.808) 
    
2 Quarters Prior 0.021 3.720 -3.540 
 (6.327) (4.480) (3.689) 
1 Quarter Prior 0.553 -2.603 2.937 
 (5.760) (4.915) (3.058) 
Announced Visit 13.297* 8.838† 4.085 
(7-day notice) (5.757) (4.785) (2.705) 
1 Quarter After -1.255 -0.524 -0.469 
 (6.448) (5.025) (3.202) 
2 Quarters After -0.731 0.720 -1.254 
 (5.992) (4.833) (3.015) 
DV (t-1) 0.516** 0.471** 0.490** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) 
Constant 349.879** 275.115** 103.295** 
 (8.689) (6.603) (2.528) 
Nursing FE Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes 
# of Nursing Homes 552 552 552 
Observations 8,280 8,280 8,280 
R2 0.282 0.242 0.242 
Cluster-robust standard errors are given in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, †p<0.1.  
Notes. 30-day notice (n = 76), 7-day notice (n = 145) 
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Table 7  Immediate Effects of (Un)Announced in Quantile Regression: All resident Quality 
  Q10 Q20 Q30 Q40 Q50 Q60 Q70 Q80 Q90 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Announced 
Visit -8.626 1.269 19.314* 21.723** 19.223* 11.432 -5.838 14.838 3.742 
 (11.982) (9.044) (8.101) (8.395) (8.034) (8.168) (8.258) (9.149) (11.331) 
DV (t-1) 0.540** 0.571** 0.564** 0.575** 0.534** 0.515** 0.524** 0.528** 0.490** 
 (0.038) (0.028) (0.022) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.023) (0.029) (0.039) 
Constant 179.478** 201.709** 248.203** 274.341** 331.453** 374.899** 416.526** 449.939** 539.208** 
 (27.279) (20.758) (16.177) (15.289) (14.414) (14.725) (16.497) (20.757) (27.928) 
Nursing FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of NHs 552 552 552 552 552 552 552 552 552 
Observations 8,280 8,280 8,280 8,280 8,280 8,280 8,280 8,280 8,280 
R2 0.065 0.098 0.121 0.131 0.131 0.128 0.125 0.105 0.069 
Cluster-robust standard errors are given in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, †p<0.1.  
 
  Q10 Q20 Q30 Q40 Q50 Q60 Q70 Q80 Q90 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Unannounced 
Visit 1.168 -15.916 -6.904 -6.864 8.581 10.216 13.476 25.083† 18.057 
 (13.721) (12.975) (11.114) (9.804) (9.921) (9.759) (10.818) (13.321) (19.156) 
DV (t-1) 0.553** 0.565** 0.533** 0.560** 0.515** 0.513** 0.534** 0.558** 0.544** 
 (0.043) (0.032) (0.025) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.033) (0.044) 
Constant 162.154** 210.177** 271.685** 285.157** 345.669** 378.559** 405.536** 435.687** 503.504** 
 (30.456) (23.150) (17.968) (16.808) (16.348) (16.744) (18.960) (24.178) (32.231) 
Nursing FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of NHs 441 441 441 441 441 441 441 441 441 
Observations 6,615 6,615 6,615 6,615 6,615 6,615 6,615 6,615 6,615 
R2 0.076 0.111 0.123 0.136 0.131 0.131 0.123 0.111 0.081 
Cluster-robust standard errors are given in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, †p<0.1.  
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Figure 1  Immediate Effects in Quantile Regression 
 
Notes. Dots represent the coefficient estimates of immediate effects with respect to the current standing of quality represented by 
quantile (decile) levels. Vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals for these coefficient estimates. 
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Figure 2  Kernel Density Plots of Placebo Test Coefficients: Announced Inspection 
 
Notes. The graphs display kernel density plots of the distribution of 2,000 placebo estimates of the effects of the announced inspection visits. Each vertical line indicates the 
estimate observed in the actual data: 11.2 for all-residents quality, 7.9 for long-stay residents quality, and 3.2 for short-stay residents quality. The graphs except short-stay resident 
one, indicate that these estimates in actual data are extremely unlikely to occur by chance, which is consistent with our main result. 
Figure 3  Kernel Density Plots of Placebo Test Coefficients: Unannounced Inspection 
 
Notes. The graphs display kernel density plots of the distribution of 2,000 placebo estimates of the effects of the unannounced inspection visits. Each vertical line indicates the 
estimate observed in the actual data: 10.7 for all-residents quality, 1.6 for long-stay residents quality, and 9.7 for short-stay residents quality. The graphs except long-stay resident 
one, indicate that the estimate in actual data are extremely unlikely to occur by chance, which is consistent with our main result. 
0
.0
2
.0
4
.0
6
.0
8
D
e
n
s
it
y
-20 -10 0 10 20
Placebo Estimates
All Quality
11.2
0
.0
2
.0
4
.0
6
.0
8
.1
D
e
n
s
it
y
-15 -10 -5 0 5 10
Placebo Estimates
Long-stay Quality
7.9
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
D
e
n
s
it
y
-10 -5 0 5 10
Placebo Estimates
Shoty-stay Quality
3.2
0
.0
1
.0
2
.0
3
.0
4
.0
5
D
e
n
s
it
y
-20 -10 0 10 20
Placebo Estimates
All Quality
10.7
0
.0
2
.0
4
.0
6
.0
8
D
e
n
s
it
y
-20 -10 0 10 20
Placebo Estimates
Long-stay Quality
1.6
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
D
e
n
s
it
y
-10 -5 0 5 10
Placebo Estimates
Short-stay Quality
9.7
141 
 
Appendix C. Organizational Learning, Complexity, and Risk Management Performance 
(Chapter 4) 
 
Table 1  Pipeline Operators That Ever-Experienced Incidents and Ever-Conducted 
BaseAssess 
Operators  Ever-Conducted BaseAssess  
  Yes No Total 
Ever-Experienced Incidents 
Yes 234** 25 259 
No 230 153 383 
 Total 464 178 642* 
*Full sample; **Subsample 
 
Observations  Ever-Conducted BaseAssess  
  Yes No Total 
Ever-Experienced Incidents 
Yes 2,369** 103 2,472 
No 1,672 552 2,224 
 Total 4,041 655 4,696* 
*Full sample; **Subsample 
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Table 2  Robustness Checks: Enforcement as Additional Control 
Sample (Complexity) Sub (All) Sub (High) Sub (Low) 
DV: Incident CostPerMilet+1 Model Model Model 
 1 2 3 
Complexity 2.147** 1.099 2.595** 
  (0.585) (1.050) (0.694) 
BaseAssess Indicator 0.566* 0.109 0.780† 
 (0.265) (0.371) (0.396) 
BaseAssess Experience -0.168** -0.164* -0.156 
  (0.062) (0.076) (0.103) 
Enforcement: # of warnings -0.047 -0.069 0.001 
 (0.120) (0.119) (0.300) 
Enforcement: # of concern letters 0.088 0.034 0.415 
 (0.254) (0.272) (0.605) 
Enforcement: # of amendment notices -0.075 -0.140 0.097 
 (0.110) (0.105) (0.278) 
Enforcement: # of penalty issued 0.076 0.032 0.360 
 (0.134) (0.140) (0.390) 
Yrs from Last BaseAssess -0.027 -0.196† 0.056 
 (0.052) (0.100) (0.061) 
Ownership 0.237 0.003 0.430 
 (0.303) (0.295) (0.547) 
HCA Ratio -0.055 -0.380 0.179 
 (0.374) (0.484) (0.547) 
Pipeline Diameter Large 1.432 2.853 0.288 
 (1.755) (3.232) (1.802) 
Pipeline Diameter Medium 0.263 -0.887 0.768 
 (0.917) (1.526) (1.160) 
Average Age 0.002 -0.019 0.007 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) 
Constant 0.794 3.480** -0.084 
 (0.644) (1.062) (0.785) 
Pipeline Operator FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
# of Operators 234 117 117 
Observations 2,369 1,229 1,140 
R2 0.019 0.023 0.038 
Operator-cluster robust standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1. 
Notes. We use a subsample, excluding pipeline operators that never experienced incidents or that never conducted Baseline Assessment. 
PHMSA measures IMP performance as the number of miles repaired. PHMSA enforce compliance with safety regulations through 
enforcement actions: warning letters, concern letters, notices of amendment, penalty issued. We additionally control for repair actions, 
measured the number of actions in each category.     
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Table 3  Post-hoc Analysis: Hybrid Model Exhibiting With-in and Between Variation 
Sample (Complexity) Sub (All) Sub (High) Sub (Low) 
Variation With-in Between With-in Between With-in Between 
DV: Incident CostPerMilet+1 Model Model Model Model Model Model 
 1 1 Cont’d 2 2 Cont’d 3 3 Cont’d 
Complexity 2.132** 1.820** 1.149 6.703** 2.504** 0.039 
  (0.579) (0.484) (1.061) (1.930) (0.692) (0.750) 
BaseAssess Indicator 0.573* -2.430** 0.134 -2.591* 0.794* -1.660 
  (0.264) (0.855) (0.369) (1.183) (0.393) (1.074) 
BaseAssess Experience -0.170** 0.695** -0.173* 0.645** -0.158 0.615* 
  (0.061) (0.124) (0.075) (0.164) (0.102) (0.261) 
Years from Last BaseAssess -0.027 -0.234† -0.196* 0.065 0.050 -0.310* 
 (0.051) (0.125) (0.097) (0.231) (0.060) (0.138) 
Ownership 0.236 -0.081 -0.007 -0.484† 0.373 0.232 
 (0.300) (0.206) (0.282) (0.279) (0.542) (0.278) 
HCA Ratio -0.075 0.021 -0.117 0.132 0.029 -0.001 
 (0.108) (0.322) (0.088) (0.540) (0.428) (0.391) 
Pipeline Diameter Large 1.435 1.529** 2.830 2.869** 0.304 1.166* 
 (1.733) (0.410) (3.123) (0.606) (1.829) (0.454) 
Pipeline Diameter Medium 0.268 1.120** -0.871 2.215** 0.672 0.575† 
 (0.910) (0.305) (1.534) (0.716) (1.137) (0.296) 
Average Age 0.002 0.011 -0.017 0.013 0.006 0.013† 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.008) 
Constant 0.479 -3.196* 0.737 
 (0.539) (1.456) (0.605) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
# of Operators 234 117 117 
Observations 2,369 1,229 1,140 
Wald χ2 304.96 300.64 101.14 
Operator-cluster robust standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1. 
Notes. We use hybrid models, which incorporate within and between effects on incident consequence and report operator-cluster robust 
standard errors in parentheses. We use a subsample, excluding pipeline operators that never experienced incidents or that never 
conducted Baseline Assessment.  
 
